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ABSTRACT
LATIN AMERICAN-UNITED STATES SECURITY RELATIONS AND
THE POWER ASYMMETRY DIVIDE
Matthew R. Slater
Old Dominion University, 2002
Director: Dr. Francis Adams

Security relations between Latin American and the United States are generally
well explained by hegemonic stability theory. Succinctly stated, hegemonic stability
theory explains that in systems with a hegemonic power there is a greater likelihood of
security cooperation. This is because a hegemon provides public goods, such as a stable
currency or security from outside interference, and in turn, the less powerful states
acknowledge the leadership of the dominant state. When compared to other regions it is
readily apparent that the U.S. and Latin America do not have major security issues on the
level of East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or even Europe.
However, a review of the literature indicates a persistent gap between U.S. and
Latin American responses to security related issues such as state sovereignty, arms trade,
humanitarian intervention, the illegal narcotics trade, and technology transfer.
Hegemonic stability explains the relatively peaceful relations between the U.S. and Latin
America; however, it fails to explain the undercurrent of distrust.
This study focuses on the degree of power asymmetry between the hegemon and
weaker states in the system to explain why the same hegemonic system may create greater
levels of cooperation during different periods. A hegemonic system by definition
contains a certain level of power asymmetry, however this study asks the question: When
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power asymmetry becomes more extreme does it erode security cooperation between the
U.S. and Latin America?
To explore this issue empirical evidence is gathered from the last century of Latin
American-U.S. security relations. The ebb and flow of security cooperation is analyzed
and reveals that broad patterns in the system emerge over time demonstrating that as the
power of the U.S. increases, the likelihood of U.S. leaders to commit to unilateral actions
in Latin America increases. During the same time, the likelihood o f Latin American
leaders to be more sensitive to U.S. policies and search for alternatives to U.S. dominance
also increases. Although U.S. hegemony contributes to greater security cooperation as
hegemonic stability theory predicts, when U.S. power reaches higher levels compared to
Latin American, the gains o f hegemonic stability deteriorate and security cooperation
becomes more difficult.
The dissertation contributes to international relations scholarship in two important
ways. First, it demands that when hegemonic stability theory is applied it cannot be
assumed that all levels of power asymmetry create security cooperation equally. Second,
it applies formal international relations theory to Latin American-U.S. relations, a
geographical area in which comparative political theory is more commonly utilized.
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1
CHAPTER I
THE BURDEN OF POWER ASYMMETRY

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of improved inter-American security
cooperation. The Cold War had seemed to inhibit the ability of regional states to work
together for the benefit of regional stability and prosperity. Many analysts noted the
importance of the Cold War on regional relations: “In response to Soviet challenges the
United States (U.S.) sought to extend and consolidate its political supremacy throughout
the hemisphere." resulting in a U.S. “anti-communist crusade."1 Regional experts noted
that due to its anti-communist perceptions the U.S. proceeded to intervene in Brazil.
Chile. Cuba. Dominican Republic. Grenada. Guatemala, and Nicaragua during the Cold
War. and indirectly to influence the internal affairs of regional states in other cases.
These actions had the effect of polarizing regional relations and undermining efforts at
regional security cooperation.
Even with the end of the Cold War an invisible force still seemed to be curbing
cooperative efforts. Alongside the successes of the post-CoId War era. such as the
negotiations and implementation of the peace plan to end the Peru-Ecuador border
conflict in 1997, there were also surprising failures. The Organization of American
States (OAS) did not fulfill its collective responsibilities to defend democracy in Haiti to

This dissertation uses the following document for its formatting standard: Kate L.
Turabian. A Manual fo r Writers o f Term Papers. Theses, and Dissertations. 6th ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
lPeter H. Smith. Talons o f the Eagle: Dynamics o f U.S.-Latin American Relations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 117.
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the United Nations (UN-).2 As David Forsythe noted, there is an abstract commitment to
human rights and democracy in Latin America, but an unwillingness to politically
support them / Despite the fact that the drug trade severely damages the social and
economic institutions in Latin America, cooperation with the U.S. on the drug war has
not been especially forthcoming by Latin American states. The problem of instability in
Colombia, which is at least partially due to the narcotic trafficking, is almost ignored by
neighboring states. Leaders of these countries fear U.S. involvement may lead to an
escalation and a U.S. occupation, despite assurances from U.S. officials that this is not
the intent. Although the benefits of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) continue to fuel Mexican economic growth, some Latin American states are
reluctant to enter into a broader hemispheric accord. In an almost reflexive response,
regional states doubled their efforts to create and support a regional trade agreement that
purposely excludes the U.S. Latin American disagreement over the government of Cuba
has declined in the post-Cold War era but still remains a thorny issue between the U.S.
and Latin America.
Although some reviews of Latin American-U.S. security cooperation focus on the
detrimental impact of the Cold War. patterns that persist today began well before the
forty-year confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Mexico and Argentina were
both suspicious of U.S. intentions during the first Pan American meeting in 1889. U.S.

2Anthony Maingot, “Haiti: Sovereign Consent versus State-Centric Sovereignty.”
in Beyond Sovereignty. Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas, ed. Tom
Farer (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 190.
^David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, the United States, and the Organization of
American States,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. I (February, 1991): 66.
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interventions were not unique to the Cold War, and occurred with frequency during the
first twenty years o f the twentieth century. The effect of U.S. interventions was similar to
what was experienced during the Cold War: Latin American states actively sought to
balance U.S. military and economic power because it was viewed as a threat to state
sovereignty.
There were also eras of greater stability in regional security relations. After the
Civil War in the U.S.. and its subsequent rise to world power. Latin America reaction to
U.S. power was more subdued. The U.S. assumed the role as the primary enforcer of the
Monroe Doctrine, a position that was traditionally filled by Great Britain. Through U.S.
military action and diplomacy several European forays into the region were reversed, and
U.S. power was considered beneficial by many states in the Americas. The era before the
Great Depression also resulted in better inter-American security relations. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt extended his Good Neighbor Policy to Latin America with positive
results. Relations improved in time to enable a unified effort against the Axis powers
during World War II. This period of goodwill culminated in the signing of the Rio Treaty
in 1947 and the creation o f the OAS the following year. After the Cold War security
cooperation once again seemed to improve to some degree.
Several theories exist to explain the lack of security cooperation in the region. As
mentioned above, the overlay o f the Cold War has been debated as a major impediment
to regional security cooperation. However, problems began before the Cold War, and
persisted to some degree in the post-CoId War era. although it is clear the Cold War
played a role in amplifying security problems.
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Many theses concentrate on the deleterious impact of U.S. intervention on
regional states. David Dent's meticulously records U.S. interventions in Latin America
in his volume: The Legacy o f the Monroe Doctrine. Dent blames the Monroe Doctrine
for U.S. interventionist policy, and this policy for helping to destabilize Latin America.4
Although this approach to understanding regional security dynamics is logical, it does not
comprehensively explain the security dynamics of regional security relations. For
example, holding U.S. interventionist policy accountable for regional security dynamics
does not sufficiently explain the rise and fall of security cooperation over time since U.S.
policy is assumed to be consistently interventionist beginning with the introduction of the
Monroe Doctrine in 1823. If intervention were the primary problem one would expect a
consistent Latin American reaction, building in intensity for the last hundred years, and
culminating in a Latin American collective security agreement directed against the U.S.
An alternative explanation for problems in regional security relations holds the
lack of institutionalization accountable. Richard J. Bloomfield offers collective security
as an alternative to intervention.5 However, collective security has been an ongoing
effort in the Americas since the creation of Pan Americanism in 1889. reiterated by the
creation of the OAS in 1948. Despite the best of intentions and efforts by many Latin
American and U.S. leaders these institutions failed to create a reliable alternative for
regional security relations.
■^David W. Dent, The Legacy o f the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S.
Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean (Westport: Greenwood Press. 1999),
14-16.
5Richard J. Bloomfield, “Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse: Toward a New
Collective Security System in the Americas,” in Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.Latin American Security Relationship, eds. Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F.
Treverton (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), 115.
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Some scholars focus on one constant dynamic through the history of U.S.-Latin
American security relations, the persistence of U.S. hegemony. Bloomfield summarized
the asymmetry of power in the region as follows:
“Their [Latin Americans] enduring problem has been how to cope with the greater
power of the United States: how to benefit from it and avoid being dominated by
it. For North Americans, the problem has been how to prevent their enemies from
using the weakness of Latin American politics from threatening U.S. national
interests.*'6
Cole Blaiser writes that U.S. behavior “reflects the huge power gap between the United
States and the smaller powers in its sphere of influence in the Americas.” He continues
the observation. “The reason is not primarily one of leaders or policies per se. It is the
result of power disparities.”7 Blaiser acknowledges that all the good policies in the world
cannot change the structural reality of the U.S.-Latin American relationship. Peter H.
Smith finds that this disparity in power, at least in terms of GDP. is growing. In 1950 per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the U.S. was seven times that of all Latin
American states combined, and by 1990 this increased to ten times larger.8
The relationship between the U.S. and Latin America is one of hegemony. Blaiser
writes of hegemony in terms of dominance. Hegemonic stability theory views hegemony
in a more complex manner. Hegemonic stability is **the view that stability in

6Ibid.
Cole Blaiser, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Changes in
Latin America 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1985), 298.
8Peter H. Smith. “Strategic Options for Latin America.” in Latin America in the
New International System, eds. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 2001), 38.
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international relations stems from the presence of hegemony.”9 This stability is the
product of a symbiotic relationship in which the hegemon provides public goods in
exchange for acknowledgement of its leadership and the benefits that go with it. Two
examples of public goods are security from outside intervention, or providing a market
for the goods of weaker states in the hegemonic relationship. Unipolarity is a
relationship stemming from dominance: meaning that there is an understanding among
states that the relationship is solely based on power. One is more likely to find
institutions in hegemonic stability than in a situation of strict unipolarity.
A fundamental characteristic of the U.S. hegemonic system in the Americas is
that it seems to fluctuate between strong and weaker hegemony. The fluctuation seems to
play a role in the kinds of public goods the hegemon is willing to provide. As James R.
Kurth points out, "The inter-American collective security system has never been based
upon an identity of interests between the United States and Latin America.” 10 The reality
is that regional cooperation has been based on a bargain in which neither side clearly
understood the expectations of the other. Latin America expected economic aid in the
form of debt relief. U.S. investments, opening of the U.S. market, and direct aid for
infrastructure projects. The U.S. expected acknowledgement of its leadership in turn for
protection from potential interlocutors. Latin America sought stability from internal
social and economic threats, whereas the U.S. focused on providing stability against
Vaui R. Vioti and Mark V. Kaupi. International Relations Theory: Realism.
Pluralism, Globalism (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), 592.
l0James R. Kurth, “The Rise and Decline of the Inter-American System: A U.S.
View,” in Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship,
eds. Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton (Boulder. Lynne Rienner, 1990),
24.
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European monarchy. Soviet communism, and now, against terrorism. In short, there is a
discrepancy in the kinds of public goods offered by the hegemon and the kinds of public
goods sought by the weaker states.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND ASSUMPTIONS
To study power asymmetry in the context of U.S.-Latin American security
relations, the following research question is proposed: How does power asymmetry
impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America? This dissertation
examines a relationship exists between power asymmetry under U.S. hegemony, and the
degree of security cooperation that takes place in the region. The U.S. and Latin
America compose the region under study. When the term Latin America is used it is
intended to encompass all states in Central America. South America, and the Caribbean.
The next section will discuss the study’s basic assumptions. The last section of chapter
one outlines the overall organization and methodology of the project.
The concept of power asymmetry is tied to hegemonic stability theory. The
presence of a hegemon raises the potential for system stability. However, this stability is
not perfect. Just as hegemony provides a basic stability, it also represents a large degree
of power asymmetry in the system. This dissertation contends that excessive power
asymmetry in the relationship can provoke a reaction in the system that undermines
security cooperation. For example, when one state becomes exceedingly powerful it is
frequently tempted to use the unilateral option without deliberations with weaker states in
the system. The lack of consultation gives the appearance of undermining the
sovereignty of the weaker states. In such a system any action by the hegemon has the
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potential to affect the sovereignty of the weaker state. Therefore, power asymmetry can
be thought of as a condition among given states in which one state's dominance is so
overwhelming that it undermines the gains from hegemonic stability.
The history of security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America supports
the idea that power structure is a determining factor in regional affairs, but also
challenges hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability predicts that institutions
should exist in the Americas to address regional security concerns. Inter-American
institutions exist, but play a limited role in security affairs. Strong power asymmetry may
explain the duality of persistent security institutions that endure despite their diminished
capacity to influence U.S.-Latin American security relations.
Hegemonic stability asserts that the presence of the hegemon improves the
chances of security cooperation because the hegemon makes concessions to weaker states
to encourage them to acknowledge the hegemonic state's leadership.11 The power
asymmetry argument adds that in cases where the accepted hegemon is excessively
powerful the stability endowed by the hegemon can be eroded.
A condition of strong power asymmetry in a given system suppresses security
cooperation by making bilateral or multilateral initiatives appear to be coercive from the
perspective of the weaker states. Weaker states find the difference between cooperation
and coercion hard to distinguish. Whether a dominant state imparts public goods to
weaker states or not, the public goods will be perceived as another indicator of the
restraints of the weaker state. Military assistance becomes a scheme to sink less powerful

llRobert W. Cox. “Social Forces, States, and World Order,” in Neorealism and its
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 219.
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states into further debt, and if offered for free, it is an attempt to create a dependent
relationship. Free trade agreements may be perceived as a tool of the dominant state to
keep weaker states in a subservient position. Under the condition of strong power
asymmetry all intervention, for humanitarian reasons or otherwise, can be interpreted as
an egregious breach of state sovereignty rather than as an attempt to restore stability and
alleviate human suffering. Even non-intervention has the potential to be viewed in a
negative light, as a sign of neglect and arrogance by the hegemon. As Donald Marquand
Dozer states in his critique of U.S.-Latin American relations. “Gift-giving is intolerable
except among equals.” 12 At a certain point power asymmetry becomes too strong in a
given system, after that line is crossed security cooperation is less likely to occur.
Two basic assumptions deemed important to the study are reviewed below. The
first argues that a region should be considered an important and useful level of analysis.
The second supports the notion that security cooperation entails more than military
related issues.
To justify the regional focus of this study there is an assumption that the regional
level of analysis, specifically the America's region, can be thought of as a cohesive unit.
The regional level of analysis is not a well-developed concept, despite its frequent use in
international relations literature. Many scholars have definition problems with the term
‘region', which is no surprise since very few authors have written on the topic, and many
that do, focus on region structures do not recognize the analytical division within their

12 Donald Marquand Dozer. Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades o f InterAmerican Relations, 1930-1960 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959), 52.
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own work.lj Some authors claim to be studying a region, yet are really only referring to
it in a geographical sense, with their true discussion directed towards a systemic or
comparative analysis.
Barry Buzan and William R. Thompson composed similar definitions of the term
region. Buzan posits the need for a regional level of analysis because of the inherent
complexity in trying to explain all state actions from a purely systemic level: “If the
security of each is related to the security of all. then nothing can be fully understood
without understanding everything. Such a tall order threatens to make the study of
security unrealistic.” 14 This study agrees, asserting that a greater degree of detail is
obtained from observing state behavior from the perspective o f the region.
Other scholars have provided a body of literature that fleshes out the regional
level of analysis. Thompson has provided a four-point definition for a region, or
subsystem, that roughly correlates with Buzan. First, the actors' pattern of relations or
interactions must exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a
change at one point in the subsystem affects other points. Second, The actors must be
generally proximate.15 Third, internal and external observers and actors recognize the

13For more on this point see the introductory section of David A. Lake and Patrick
M. Morgan. Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
l4Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1990), 187.
t5The U.S. is a unique exception to this case as it is a major actor in every region
in the world. The same may be said of the former Soviet Union.
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subsystem as a distinctive area or "theater of operation”. And the last point is that the
subsystem must logically consist of at least two and quite probably more actors.16
The literature supports the concept of a regional level of analysis and validates the
idea that the Americas form a region. Some analysts argue that the U.S. and Latin
America form distinct regions, based in Northern European roots of the U.S. and Canada,
and the Iberian heritage of the states south of the Rio Grande. Robert Keohane disagrees:
“Empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis." Based on
“...communication routes, airline routes, and trade relationships across the globe.
without sticking on national or regional labels, you would not be able to pick out a
coherent geographical entity to be called Latin America. In fact, judging airline
connections alone, the entire region would appear tied to North America.” 1'
The final assumption addresses the question: What issues are viable security
topics? During much of the Cold War security issues were considered high politics, and
economic and social phenomena were thought of as low politics. This is because the
threat of military force was considered the most effective means of expressing power:
therefore it deserved the majority of attention.18 Arnold Wolfers describes high politics
in terms of the goals of self-extension, or self-preservation.19 Edward Morse contradicted

16WilIiam R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication
and Propositional Inventory." International Studies Quarterlv, Vol. 17, No. I (March
1973): 101.
wRobert O. Keohane, “Between Vision and Reality: Variables in Latin American
Foreign Policy,” In Latin American in the New International System, eds. Joseph S.
Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2000), 207-208.
18

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World
Politics in Transition (U .S .: Harper-CoIIins, 1989), 3-5.
19AmoId Wolfers. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), 91-102.
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traditional thought, stating, "The classical goals of power and security have been
expanded to, or superseded by, goals of wealth and welfare.”20 After the end of the Cold
War the clear delineation between high and low politics began to dissolve. Other
variables, such as culture and economy rose to the forefront of security analysis.21
For this study high and low politics are considered relevant to security issues of
the Americas region. Security issues will encompass border disputes, national
insurrection, state sovereignty, but also include the drug trade, and economic issues.
Many of the security topics in the Americas are instigated by state instability, in turn
fomented by economic and social problems. To focus on "high” politics as the only
legitimate topics for research would severely weaken this study.

ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY
This study is structured around a research question that provides a framework to
explore the effect asymmetric power structures on interstate security cooperation. The
research question is: How does power asymmetry impact security cooperation between
the U.S. and Latin America? Historical review is utilized to explore the causal
relationship proposed in the hypothesis, supported by empirical evidence. Different eras
of U.S.-Latin American relations are broken down into five case study chapters to better

20Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization,
Interdependence, and Extemalization,” World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April 1970): 316.
2lPerhaps the most influential book in the post Cold War order to date is Samuel
P. Huntington's, The Clash o f Civilizations the Remaking o f World Order (New York:
Simon and Schuster. 1996). Another influential author that focuses on the relevance of
culture to security issues, among many others, is Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy:
Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War Order (New York: Random House, 2000).
Francis Fukuyama tends to take a sociological/economic view of security.
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understand how U.S. regional dominance contributes to regional security cooperation.
This method was selected since it could demonstrate whether security cooperation
improved during times when U.S. dominance marginally decreased, such as during the
Great Depression, and the recessions of the 1970s, or decreased during periods of U.S.
power growth, such as the later years of the nineteenth century after the civil war. after
World War L after World War II and the end of the Cold War.
There are several potential ways regional security relations could be examined.
One method is to explore bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual Latin
American states in consecutive chapters. The second method is to organize the case study
chapters by chronological order, dividing the chapters by time periods. This work
utilizes the latter format. Studying time periods preserves the regional integrity of the
study since it considers the impact of historical events on all states at once. This format
will make the task of describing system-wide trends far easier. For example, the policy
of the U.S. to evaluate states regarding their level of democracy in the late 1970s drew’
criticism from many Latin American leaders. If these reactions were noted in chapters
that consider individual states, the ability to note the reaction as a regional trend becomes
more difficult.
This study places an emphasis on security cooperation between the U.S. and key
states in the Americas. Certain states are emphasized because of their importance to
regional politics and history of interaction with the U.S. These characteristics make their
policies, and reactions to U.S. policies, pertinent to understanding Latin America as a
whole. Some of the states regularly referred to in this dissertation are reviewed below.
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Argentina, like Brazil, maintained its independence and a strong military, making
its role as a regional player more important. Further, it has developed into a very
important security player in the region. One example of Argentina’s growing regional
prestige can be found in its request for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
membership. Although Argentina was not granted its request for NATO membership, the
U.S. accorded Argentina with a security partner status that it previously only reserved for
Israel.
Brazil is considered the primary power in South America, as Mexico is the
primary power in Central America. Brazil has the largest economy and population in
Latin America, its population of 160 million being greater than the rest of South America
combined. It maintains a border with every state in South America except for Chile and
Ecuador.
Mexico is the second most populous state in Latin America, with just over 100
million inhabitants. Until the end of the 1980s Mexico was prominent in leading Latin
American efforts to lessen the impact of U.S. dominance. Mexico is particularly
important to U.S. policy makers for several reasons. Because of its lengthy border with
the U.S.. migration and the illegal drug-trade are important issues in bilateral relations.
Interdependence between Mexico and the U.S. increased dramatically with the advent of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For example, in 1993 Mexico
exported nearly $52 million of goods and services. This figure increased to $117 million
by 1998.“

~Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, The United States and
Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2001), 119.
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Venezuela’s regional importance is due to its large petroleum production, its
proximity to the fighting in Colombia, and its notable policies aimed at asserting its
independence from the U.S. It is the world's fourth largest oil producing state, and the
third largest supplier to the U.S. Because of the policies of its current leader. President
Hugo Chavez, it has become the manifestation of problems in the U.S.-Latin American
dialog. Colombia also is a major oil producer, although not to the same degree as
Venezuela. Its instability due to a continuing civil war that has recently intensified
makes Colombia the focus of much of the regional security dialog. Chapter seven will
discuss the Venezuelan and Colombian cases in more detail.
This paper contends that the defining factor that shapes security cooperation in the
region is the hegemonic power structure. However, it argues that hegemonic stability
does not alone adequately describe regional security dynamics. The power fluctuation of
the hegemon may have an impact on the level of security cooperation in the system,
chapter two will explore this notion further, laying the theoretical foundation for the rest
of the project. Chapter two reviews the relevance of international relations theory
literature associated with this study and explores alternative explanations for variation in
the dependent variable, security cooperation. By reviewing international relations
literature on security cooperation and power asymmetry a clearer definition of how the
terms will be used in this study will emerge.
Chapter three reviews the general themes of U.S.-Latin America relations and
how these themes relate to security issues. This is accomplished by providing a broad
overview of regional relations dating from the early nineteenth century, when the first
proposals for inter-hemispheric security cooperation were instituted, to the beginning of
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World War n. Patterns in security relations emerged during this time period that held
sway throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, making this time period
important to understanding the broader regional security dynamics.
Chapter three explores bilateral relations between states on both sides of the
regional asymmetric power division. In the nascent stage of the America's regional
development the power structure that would eventually emerge was far from certain.
States in South America, such as Argentina and Mexico, seemed destined to surpass, if
not compete, with the dominant position of the U.S. However, the regional power
structure emerged as distinctly asymmetric, a point that will be elaborated. The period
before strong power asymmetry became a characteristic of U.S.-Latin American relations
provides a baseline for comparison to examine state behavior.
Chapters four. five, six and seven continue in the format of chapter three. Each
case study chapter reviews a time period after World War II in the Americas region, and
how security relations were shaped by the fluctuation of power asymmetry. Important
events such as overt expressions of U.S. military dominance and economic upturns and
crisis are closely examined to show any evidence of change in cooperative behavior.
Because the U.S. has consistently been the dominant power in the region by any measure,
regional security relations have been regularly dictated by a pattern of U.S. action and
Latin American reaction. Therefore much of the research focuses on U.S. policy
initiatives and the impact they have on regional security relations.
Chapter four examines the period from World War II until the 1960s. This era is
primarily marked by an increase in Latin American goodwill towards U.S. leadership and
U.S. distraction with the onset of the Cold War. Many Latin Americans were expecting a
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version of Marshall Plan for their region, being disappointed with the U.S. response to
rebuild former Axis member states and ignoring the needs of regional allies. Although
the U.S. committed itself to binding security treaties with the region during this period,
security relations suffered in part because of the U.S. policy imperative to concentrate on
Europe. Hope was renewed because of initiatives implemented by the Kennedy
Administration in the early 1960s. only to lead to disillusionment when the U.S.
commitment waned in the later part of the decade.
Chapter five concentrates on interregional relations during the 1970 to 1980
decade. Some analysts characterized this era as one of U.S. neglect towards Latin
America since the U.S. was focused on what it perceived as Cold War priorities. This
sentiment is well represented by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 's wellknown comment that the only important politics are those that occur between
Washington. London and Moscow. This chapter will show that what was perceived as
neglect by the U.S.. is in part explained by the broader issue of a global economic crisis.
The perception that U.S. power was in decline grew, and events of the decade such as its
retreat from Vietnam, and economic problems prompted its leaders to reduce national
commitments and search for alternatives to unilateralism. The analysis will show the
regional disengagement of the U.S. during the bulk of the 1970s only reinforced the Latin
American perception of U.S. dominance.
Chapter six addresses the decade from 1980-1989. Security relations during this
period became increasingly polarized, as Cold War competition increased. The
government of Cuba supported revolutionary movements in the region and beyond, and
U.S. policy became more aggressive at combating what it perceived as communist
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activity. Latin American leaders generally discounted the U.S. perception that domestic
revolutions were motivated by outside forces and believed Washington's interventions
were motivated by a desire to dominate the region. The 1980s also marked the beginning
of the Latin American shift away from state-planned economic policy and
authoritarianism.
Chapter seven, the last case study chapter, deals with the end of the 1990s to the
present. The era is marked by a significant change throughout the Americas. The
political and economic landscape was thoroughly altered, along with most of the
contentious security issues of the past. This chapter explores whether cooperation
improved with the easing of Cold War tensions and relative political stability in the
region. Chapter eight summarizes the major study findings, and then it offers the major
conclusions of the study.
Assuming this study supports the power asymmetry theory, it should provoke a
reassessment of hegemonic stability theory. Perhaps more importantly, it might show the
limits of regional security cooperation that will curb high expectations shared by both
Latin American and U.S. leaders during the last hundred years. During times of
increased power asymmetry leaders from both sides may learn to better understand the
constraints on the regional partnership. The study results may also draw lessons from
regional security successes and shed light on new strategies to circumvent the power
realities that limit the U.S.-Latin American security relationship.
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CHAPTER H
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY. POWER ASYMMETRY AND
SECURITY COOPERATION

The purpose of this chapter is to review the scholarly literature related to
hegemonic stability, power asymmetry and security cooperation, and explain how they
relate to the main topic of this study, U.S.-Latin American security relations. The first
section describes the central points of hegemonic stability theory and references key
criticisms of the theory. The second section reviews the theoretical debate on the
dependent variable, security cooperation. The hegemonic stability literature addresses
how security cooperation may occur due to the presence of a hegemon. The third section
discusses power asymmetry and the debate surrounding alternative power distribution
models. Hegemonic stability assumes that a system dominated by one power is more
likely to create stability. Not all scholars agree with this assumption. By nature, a
hegemonic system contains a large power differential between the hegemon and other
states. The third section will outline how power asymmetry is used in this study and how
it may lead to less security cooperation under the beneficial structure of hegemonic
stability.
The fourth section briefly addresses other theories that also focus on the regional
security cooperation problem, mostly from the perspective of state level theory. These
theories are important to note because they are representative of the majority of the
theoretical debate in the region. However, this study demonstrates that the systemic
effects of power asymmetry have more influence over hemispheric relations. The last
section explains power asymmetry and security cooperation in light of the literature, and
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based on these explanations identifies indicators of power asymmetry and security
cooperation.
This study assumes that the structural level of analysis is preferable to the state
level of analysis or cultural studies. As Kenneth Waltz states,
“It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states.
If the aims, policies, and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or
even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from
simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be logically drawn."1
For example, one can claim Latin American or U.S. culture is to blame for a lack of
regional security cooperation, culture being a characteristic of states, or of a system. The
next step in such an analysis is to list the attributes describing U.S. culture and Latin
American culture. Left with two lists of disparate characteristics the author must assume
that the system is a sum of its parts, and make value judgments in order to reach such a
conclusion. Such a process removes the scholar further from the ideal goal of total
objectivity and invites criticism of the use of such inductive methodology.
Another argument against state-level theory is that state-level variables are the
most important to examine system level outcomes, one must believe that units will not
influence each other’s actions. Waltz points out that if this is not a likely assumption
since “in the history of international relations...results achieved seldom correspond to the
intentions of actors.”2 Because the dealings of an actor do not always achieve their
intended outcome, a description of an actor’s motivations is not likely to be helpful in
explaining systemic behavior.
1Kenneth Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories.” in Neorealism and its
Critics. ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986), 52.
2Ibid.
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To make a connection between state-level phenomena and its influence on the
system, the internal characteristics of states must be relatively consistent over time to
explain systemic trends. In this study that assumption could be made about the U.S. since
it has maintained the same government for over two hundred years. However, Latin
American states have not experienced this level of stability, making any explanation of
systemic trends from state-level causes more difficult to prove. To account for regular
state behavior that is produced by internal processes it must be assumed that these
internal processes remain relatively consistent over time. This assumption would be
difficult to prove since a multitude of variables contribute to state decisions, including
other states, and the interests affecting policy decisions frequently change as w ell/
This study uses the systemic level of analysis as described by Kenneth Waltz. In
relation to systemic theory Waltz explains. "...How the organization of a realm acts as a
constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it.*"1 In this study the
presence of a dominant power is the organizational aspect of the system under scrutiny.'
Waltz also explains that systemic theory should explain the consistent behavior of units
despite their differences. This study focuses on the continuity of U.S.-Latin American
relations under U.S. dominance since the end of the U.S. Civil War, and seeks to explain
security relations by noting the variation of U.S. dominance as an explanatory element.

•>Waltz asks the question. "If changes in international outcomes are linked directly
to changes in actors, how can one account for similarities of outcome that persist or recur
even as actors vary?” Ibid., 53.
4Ibid.. 60.
5Waltz supports the emphasis of study on the major powers in a system, stating,
“The units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for
themselves.” Ibid., 61.
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Systems theories maintain that outcomes are produced by a system's structure.
The structure is key to understanding a system because they designate constraints on the
actors. These constraints shape actor behavior by rewarding and punishing particular
behaviors. These rewards and punishments create consistent actor behavior, as
seemingly disparate individuals become far more predictable when acting in a group.
The process of the structure creating consistent behavior is referred to as socialization,
put bluntly, “Socialization reduces variety.”6 The socializing effect of a structure creates
predictability and enables the analysis of state behavior. By comparison, the
examination of the differences of state behavior to explain the system creates
incoherencies that undermine analytical efforts.
Although this dissertation contends that the systemic level of analysis will explain
the greater percentage of state behavior, it also acknowledges the value of state-level
theories. The utility of the systemic level is that it can bring coherency to state
interaction of a large period of time, but it does not seek to explain the ramification of
these policies on the domestic politics of particular states. The direct cause of domestic
politics is best explained by state-level theory.

HEGEMONIC STABILITY
The example provided by the last 130 years of U.S.-Latin American security
relations directly supports hegemonic stability theory. The dominance of the U.S. has
been the central issue in regional security dynamics since the 1870s. Frequently studies
that focus on regional dynamics must focus more closely on U.S. policy choices since

6Vbi±, 65.
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they are the most important determining factor in security relations. However, the
description of ‘dominance’ does not adequately describe regional relations. Dominance
can give the impression of a unipolar power occupying and ruling a system by force
alone. Although the U.S. has demonstrated it is willing to use military power to enforce
its will on other regional states, it has not acted as a conquering power, and at times led
security cooperation efforts that show a remarkable level of support for weaker states in
the region.
Even though this study utilizes hegemonic stability theory, which emphasizes the
cooperative relationship between the dominant state and weaker states in the system, it
focuses on the undercurrent of non-cooperation caused by the presence of hegemony.
The study argues that in the case of U.S.-Latin American relations. U.S. hegemony has
had a notable deleterious impact on state relations as well as a beneficial one. The
possibility remains open that the conclusion may yet contradict hegemonic stability,
perhaps finding the negative impact of a hegemonic system on other states in the system
make other power alignments preferable to one with a single, dominant state. It is more
likely that an alternative conclusion may emerge, such as a hegemonic system may
provide disincentives for states to cooperate. However, these problems illustrate issues of
a smaller scale compared to the greater stability caused by the presence of a hegemon.
The remainder of this section reviews hegemonic stability theory, drawing out important
theoretical questions and issues of this work.
A concise definition of hegemonic stability theory was given in chapter one:
’‘...stability in international relations stems from the presence of hegemony or
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dominance.”7 A major debate surrounding hegemonic stability theory emerged during
the 1970s. Several authors noted that the unwillingness of the U.S. and Great Britain to
assume a leadership role and Great Britain’s loss of capability, created a power vacuum
during the period between World War I and World War II.8 This power vacuum was
indirectly blamed for interwar economic and security disequilibria that led to World War
II. In their separate works the authors warned that the U.S. was once again retreating
from world leadership and similar results could occur. Their fundamental hypothesis was
that as U.S. power declined, international stability and openness declined, which was a
thesis resurrected in the 1970s and 1980s.9
In the literature authors disagree on whether the weaker states, or the dominant
state, has greater incentive to maintain the hegemonic system. Charles Kindleberger
argues that the hegemon provides stability to a given system, and that stability is a benefit
enjoyed by less powerful states without their contribution. Stability is therefore
considered a public good, since all states benefit although only one contributes. In a
system without a dominant state, free riders, or states that do not contribute to stability,
will still seek to consume the same amount of public good, yet no state exists to produce

Viotti and Kaupi. 592.
O

^

Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: Berkeley University
Press, 1973), Robert Gilpin. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1975), and Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of
International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 317-347.
9Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An
Empirical Assessment,” Review o f International Studies 15 (1989): 183.
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the public good.10 Stephen Krasner argues that when a state obtains hegemony it has the
ability to provide stability without threatening its core security objectives. The hegemon
is not concerned with its essential security objectives because it realizes gains from its
dominance, just as less powerful states may realize the gains from stability.11 Krasner’s
interpretation o f hegemonic stability shows that the hegemon has just as much incentive
to maintain dominance as weaker states that enjoy the ’free’ public goods. The hegemon
realizes benefits from the relationship such as an increase in income and growth o f
political power without a commensurate effect on domestic stability. Because the
hegemon has an incentive to maintain the dominant relationship Kindleberger points out
that some commentaries describe a hegemonic arrangement as exploitation. These
analyses contend that the U.S. sought world dominance as early as 1898. a notion that
Kindleberger finds doubtful since most U.S. political leaders o f the early twentieth
century were isolationists.12
Mancur Olson views the gains debate in hegemonic stability from an economic
perspective. He explains there are two ways that an actor in a given system can increase
then* gains: either by procuring a larger slice o f the pie, or instituting changes that enable
the pie to grow larger.13 Rather than debating who gains the most in a hegemonic

l0Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International
Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly
25. no. 2 (Spring 1985): 244.
11Webb and Krasner, 184.
12Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership,” 247.
l3Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline o f Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation,
and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 42.
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relationship, Olson contends that an actor's willingness to legitimize hegemony is
directly proportional to how much benefit they gain. If the hegemon wishes to keep
weaker states satisfied with its leadership, it must continue to provide an increasing
amount of public goods to other states in the system, or provide the necessary support to
ensure other states are experiencing satisfactory economic growth.
Putting aside the debate concerning whether the hegemon or weaker states in the
system gain the most, hegemonic stability theory differentiates dominance from a
symbiotic relationship. However, this study contends that over time this relationship may
fluctuate and either side may view their contribution as being greater than what they
receive. When this happens the incentives to support the hegemonic system decline. In
the case of the U.S. and Latin America, the willingness of Latin American states to
cooperate on security matters with the U.S. seem to deteriorate when U.S. dominance
grows. The perception of dominant state exploitation increased as the power gap grew.
There is a debate on how other states come to recognize hegemonic leaders.
Krasner comments that others recognize the hegemonic state as the primary power
because it has economic and military capabilities that can be used as a carrot or stick to
compel other states in the region to accept an open trading structure.14 Webb and Krasner
argue that to be considered a hegemon a state must take on core responsibilities. These
responsibilities include: organizing trade liberalization, keeping its market open in times
of economic crisis, manage the monetary system, supply the international currency,
provide liquidity, manage the exchange rate structure, supply investment capital and

l4Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” 322.
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encourage development in the peripheral areas of the system.15 Kindleberger believes
that primacy entails a broader list, including other things such as number of innovations
produced, productivity growth, and the level of investment in key economic sectors.16
Kindleberger maintains that economic primacy performs a different function than
hegemony. Primacy “involves less dominance or hegemony than the public good of
leadership of the world economy, not ordering others to behave as the leader directs, but
pointing the way and convincing others of the desirability of following.” 1.
Although theorists may disagree to some degree on what constitutes a hegemonic
power, it is clear the U.S. fulfills the description of a hegemonic state vis-a-vis Latin
America. The U.S. acts through institutions like the UN and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), to influence Latin American states to make certain domestic reforms or
negotiate debt payments. The U.S. does not compel Latin American states to perform
these functions as the Soviet Union ordered Warsaw Pact member states how to allocate
its funding, meaning the systemic relationship is based on more than just power. It
encourages development, promotes trade liberalization by maintaining trade policies
more open than Latin American states, and provides for general stability.
Hegemonic stability theory is argued to have either an economic or security focus.
Webb and Krasner dispute Kindleberger* s focus on economic primacy. They point out
that not all states gain equally from the public goods provided by the hegemon, thus their

l5Webb and Krasner, 185.
I6CharIes Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy. 1500-1990 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 13.
I7Ibid.
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interests in supporting such a system are not constant.18 The economic and social
problems of developing states, combined with the introduction of a relative gains
dynamic, creates a security problem in hegemonic structures. Therefore security issues
become the focus of hegemonic stability, and the ability of the hegemon to provide
stability comes under pressure from state competition. Because states gain unequally the
relative gain problem may occur. To this point Robert Gilpin states. “It may very well be
that in a particular situation absolute gains will not affect relative positions. But the
efforts of groups to cause or prevent such shifts in the relative distribution of power
constitute the critical issue of politics.” 19 Since not all states seek hegemonic public
goods at any given time, and some may openly eschew them, the reign of the hegemon
may tend to be perceived as forceful domination and less benign.
Jonanne Gowa criticizes hegemonic stability theory because it focuses on
economic cooperation among states as opposed to security cooperation. The focus of the
discussion on economic issues was consciously motivated by scholars to demonstrate that
states can move beyond the zero-sum paradigm that characterized nuclear deterrence of
the era.20 As Gowa writes to the economic focus of the theory, “...hegemonic stability
theory must include security as an argument in the utility functions it assigns to states
opening their borders to trade.”21

18Webb and Krasner, 184.
l9Gilpin, 36.
20Stephen Krasner. “Preface,” in International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983), vii.
2IJoanne Gowa, “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An
Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory,” World Politics 41, no. 3 (April 1989): 308.
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This dissertation recognizes the primary importance of the security aspect of
hegemonic stability theory, although identifying that the hegemon’s economic leadership
is also vital to maintaining system stability. In other words, economic and military
policies are both contributors to regional stability and therefore important in examining
hegemonic stability, but both economic and military concerns are subsets of security.
This study measures power by both military and economic indicators, reflecting the view
that both matter to overall security of the region.
Some scholars question more basic assumptions than the military or economic
emphasis of hegemonic stability theory. Isabelle Grunberg questions the very notion of
hegemonic states and how one can differentiate between them and non-hegemonic
states."2 She makes the point that other authors based their definitions of a hegemon on
power indicators an not the control of outcomes.23 The insight fundamentally asks and
important question: What is a useful metric to measure hegemony? Grunberg suggests
that capability alone does not make one state a hegemon. For example. Japan's GDP
may be higher than China’s, but few would consider Japan the hegemon of East Asia. A
hegemon must maintain dominance in terms of economic and military indicators.
Further, a historical review must reveal that other states in the region accepted the
leadership of the state in question on economic and security issues.

“ Isabelle Grunberg, “Exploring the “Myth” of Hegemonic Stability,”
International Organization 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 434.
■^Grunberg credits Russett with this observation. See Bruce Russett, “The
Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or. Is Mark Twain Really Dead?”
International Organization 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 209, 211.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
Grunberg’s concerns are refuted by Kindleberger's analysis. She demands proof
of dominance, yet Kindleberger explicitly states that hegemonic states do not lead by
dominance, but by providing incentives and punishment for specified behavior.
Punishment may include the use of military force, but less invasive actions are more
likely to be applied. The relationship between the hegemon and weaker states is
characterized by a quid-pro-quo interaction in which public goods are traded for the
benefits of leadership. Direct domination of other states is not a regular feature of a
hegemonic system since it demonstrates there is little mutual benefit. Historical review
can ameliorate Grunberg’s concerns at demonstrating the presence of a hegemon.24
Certain indicators, such as the ability of the system to generate institutions, maintain
relative stability despite the presence of dominant state, may help define the presence of a
true hegemon. If a dominant state can exist in a system for many years without
instigating a durable alliance against it. then its leadership extends beyond simple
dominance. In one hundred and thirty years Latin American states existed with U.S.
leadership without being broadly opposed. This is an important indicator of the presence
of a hegemonic system.
Measuring a system for the presence of a dominant state is not as difficult as
measuring for a hegemonic system. A method for measuring a hegemon’s presence is to
test for stable regimes that should indicate the presence of a dominant state. Regimes
can be defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around

24Strange supports this conclusion. See Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of
Lost Hegemony," International Organization 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 554.
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which actor expectations converge on a given issue-area.”25 Robert Keohane adds that
regimes are "...those arrangements for issue areas that embody implicit rules and norms
insofar as they actually guide behavior of important actors in a particular issue area.”26
The level to which regimes may guide actors is a controversial topic, however the fact
that hegemonic leadership can give rise to regimes is less so.
Another potential means of measuring hegemony lies in the degree of system
socialization. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan write. "There is a more subtle
component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather
than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in
secondary nations.”*' They found that when domestic instability occurred in a weaker
state the socialization process was promoted through military and economic
reconstruction. The hegemon was able to better articulate a new set of norms through a
more direct approach than trying to passively articulate norms.'8 The transfer of the
dominant state's norms was more successful when they were inculcated to the weaker
states elites, then spread to the masses than visa versa. This is an interesting observation
that may demonstrate moments of greater power asymmetry that may immediately act as
a detriment to interstate relations, but has the potential to increase stability in the long
term.
^Stephen Krasner. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.” I.
26Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in
International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 76.
27G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic
Power,” International Organization 44, no. 3, (Summer 1990): 283.
28IbicL, 314.
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Other scholars challenge the basic assumptions of hegemonic stability theory.
Duncan Snidal suggests that hegemony may not ensure the level of stability that many
assume. Snidal points out that hegemonic leadership can be either beneficial or
exploitative, whereas collective action avoids this dichotomy since it is by nature
inclusive of all players. Snidal supports his contention by providing the post-war
examples of the North Adantic Treaty Organization and the European Community (EC).
He admits EC collective action was not flawless, but nonetheless was successful at times.
He admits it took U.S. hegemony to create North Atlantic Security Organization
(NATO), but argues its continued existence is based more on collective action than
hegemonic leadership.29 His study concludes that hegemony is not necessary to create
cooperation, since cooperation can occur through collective action.30 Snidal’s
observation concerning the EC does not sufficiently acknowledge the fact that EC
success can be attributed to the hegemonic presence of the U.S. In the post World War II
period the U.S. was the guarantor of West European stability. Even in the context of the
post-CoId War era. many European states oppose U.S. troop reduction plans in the
European theater. Further. NATO is still clearly dependent on U.S. leadership and
military capabilities.
Despite the arguments of some critics this study accepts the main premise of
hegemonic stability, that the presence of a hegemonic power will create greater stability
in a system. As Keohane states on the relationship between hegemonic power and
stability: “as the distribution o f tangible resources becomes more equal, international
29Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International
Organization 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985): 595-569.
20Ibid., 612.
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regimes should weaken," and "as the hegemonial state's margin o f resource superiority
over its partners declines, the costs of leadership will become more burdensome.”^1
However, it also questions the issue of how the hegemonic relationship may deteriorate
and inhibit the gains generated by hegemony. Figure I shows the relationship between
security cooperation and hegemony in this dissertation. As the power of hegemony (xaxis) increases, the level of security cooperation (y-axis) increases, as predicted by
hegemonic stability theory. However, when the power of the hegemon becomes
excessive, security cooperation gains diminish.

Security
Cooperation

Hegemonic Power
Figure I. Relationship Between Hegemonic Power and Security Cooperation

The U.S. meets the criteria as a hegemon in its relationship with Latin America as
described by Kindleberger, Krasner and Webb. It provides stability or regional security

3IKeohane, “International Institutions and State Power," 78-79.
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by maintaining open markets, a strong currency, humanitarian intervention, and
leadership on a variety of security issues. These are core responsibilities that may burden
the hegemonic state, and which a dominant state that relies purely on coercion may not
choose to accept.

A hegemonic state leads predominately by setting an example rather

than forcing weaker states to do its bidding. This suggests that hegemonic stability is
differentiated from strict unipolarity by the degree of volunteerism inherent in the
relationship between the dominant and weaker states. In both cases the relationship is
defined by the presence of the dominant state, however in a hegemonic system the
dominant state leads mostly by incentive as opposed to military force.
Different theorists focus on different elements of power when describing the role
of the hegemon. Kindleberger applies the theory to the economic relationship between
the hegemon and weaker states. Gowa. Webb and Krasner uphold that the stability the
hegemonic system maintains is a security-centric variable. This study sides with the
latter, although the analysis does not exclude economic considerations.
The literature contends that the presence of regimes and socialization are results
of the hegemonic system. The economic or military infirmities of weaker states may fuel
the socialization process. Socialization may be the engine that spreads the values of the
hegemon to the rest of the system, but before these values are accepted by weaker states
they are alien and may be considered a constant reminder of the dominance of the
stronger state leading to the undercurrent of cooperation suggested in this study.
Hegemonic stability theory focuses on the presence of regimes as by-products of the
system. Since the cooperative aspects endowed by the presence o f a hegemon produce
them, the rise and fall of their prominence may be an indicator of security cooperation.
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For this reason the dissertation concentrates on regional organizations such as the Pan
American Union and the OAS.
Krasner and Webb's contention that states in a given system do not gain equally
from the public good provided by the hegemon, thus their interests in supporting such a
system are not constant over time, is a key point in this dissertation. This study
hypothesizes that weaker states are affected by the degree of power asymmetry when
determining their gains from public goods provided by the hegemon.

SECURITY COOPERATION
This work examines the proposition that security cooperation in a hegemonic
system may be directly related to the change of the hegemon's power in relation to other
states in the system. It proposes that the power asymmetry inherent in a hegemonic
system may reach a point at which the power is excessive and creates a higher level of
distrust among the weaker states in the system directed towards the hegemon. This
distrust is related to the way the hegemon exercises its power in the system. According
to Ikenberry and Kupchan hegemonic states may exercise their power either through the
manipulation of material incentives by the hegemon to prompt weaker states to cooperate
or by a subtler process in which the hegemon is able to alter the substantive beliefs of
weaker states.
The manipulation of material incentives occurs “through threats of punishment or
promises of reward, the hegemon alters the political or economic incentives facing other
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states.”32 The hegemon induces policy change by using the stick and carrot approach to
change the behavior of other states pursuing their individual interests.
The other way a hegemon exercises power is by socializing the elites o f weaker
states, or altering their substantive beliefs. The socialization of the hegemon's norms and
values takes place
“...when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and
accept it as their own— that is, when they internalize the norms and value
orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the
nature of the international system.”33
The successful transmission of norms from the hegemon guarantees some degree of
acquiescence from other states in the system. Both expressions of power work together.
but Ikenberry and Kupchan draw the distinction that altering substantive beliefs
successfully is tantamount to the consolidation of hegemonic control.
This study seeks to identify the level of power asymmetry that indicates an
erosion of security cooperation. Through the review of regional security relations it is
likely that certain indicators, or stress points, may emerge that can be used to indicate
eras of cooperation and non-cooperation. For example, when a high level of power
asymmetry is present it is likely that it will be reflected through regional security
institutions. In other words, institutional effectiveness should decline as the level of
power asymmetry increases. Other indicators of high levels of power asymmetry should
emerge as the historical review in the case study chapters unfolds.
Under excessive power asymmetry the sensitivity level of weaker states is
increased to all hegemonic expressions of power, but particularly to the manipulation of
32Bcenberry and Kupchan, 285.
33Ibid.
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material incentives. Because the manipulation of material incentives is a more visible
expression of power, weaker states are particularly sensitive when it is utilized. Because
of the greater than usual level of dominance by the hegemon, the level of awareness
among other states is raised as well. The effect of excessive power asymmetry extends to
hegemonic states as well. As the hegemon gains more power it becomes less interested
in the quid-pro-quo of the hegemonic relationship. As a super hegemon it begins to
redefine its unstated agreement with partner states, less willing to cooperate through
multilateral forums, and more willing to take unilateral action. The combination of more
sensitive weaker states, and a more confident hegemon, undermines security cooperation
in the system. Although the system still benefits from a surplus of stability due to the
presence of a hegemon, it suffers from the counter-current created by power asymmetry.
Whereas manipulation of material incentives under conditions of power
asymmetry helps explain a decrease in security cooperation under hegemony, the growth
and proliferation of regimes and institutions are thought of by some as indicators of
increasing cooperation. Some of the regime theory and institution literature maintains
that regimes and institutions have a greater likelihood of spreading and being successful
at facilitating cooperation in a hegemonic system. Although the literature defines
insitutionalization as a more formal codification of norms rules and behavior between
states, many scholars agree that both regimes and institutions are signs of cooperative
behavior. Institutionalization is defined as “behavior recognized by participants as
reflecting established rules, norms, and conventions, and its meaning is interpreted in
light of these understandings.”34 Regimes are defined as, “ ...principles, norms, rules, and

34 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, 1.
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decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue
area.”35 Some theorists argue it is possible to circumvent anarchy through institutions or
regimes. Arthur Stein comments that cooperation through regimes is possible when
states recognize areas of mutual benefit. “Sovereign nations have a rational incentive to
develop processes for making joint decisions when confronting dilemmas of common
interests or common aversions. In these contexts, self-interested actors rationally forgo
independent decision making and construct regimes.”36 Stein's reasoning explains how
the rational actor and anarchy assumptions can coexist with the potential for state
cooperation.
Some regime theory scholars believe that in order for institutions to foster
cooperation, the threat level must be reduced to a point that states assess the likely actions
of other states based on their intentions as opposed to their capabilities/ This
explanation of state behavior elucidates the nature of security cooperation under power
asymmetry. Under asymmetric conditions weaker states tend to alter their threat calculus
to a capability based assessment since they are more threatened by the hegemon's
overwhelming dominance. During times when the hegemon’s power differential returns

35Stephen Krasner, “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous
Variables.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 498. The key difference
between, according to scholars, is that regimes are narrower in subject matter and time
since they converge on a single issue area. Institutions have a broader scope, usually
designed to codify cooperation occurring now and assumed cooperation between states in
the future. They are designed to cover several issue areas at once.
36Arthur Stein. “Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World.”
International Organization 36, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 140.
37Ibid.
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to normal parameters weaker states are less likely to judge the threat posed by the
hegemon in terms of capability, making security cooperation more probable.
Critics of regime theory maintain that they have a marginal impact on interstate
cooperation if any. Some claim “ ...institutions are basically a reflection of the
distribution o f power in the world.”38 They are based on self-interested calculations,
have no independent effect on state behavior, and therefore have no power to motivate
cooperative behavior. Some theorists have searched for a compromise position. Charles
Glaser asserts that cooperative behavior can be understood within the structuralist
framework if it is viewed as self help/9 Institutions can be tools used by states to realize
mutual self-help situations, but are fundamentally still prisoners of state interests. Most
institutionalists do not believe that cooperation can appear without serving state interests.
When state interests happen to be congruent with institutions, institutions may function as
facilitators.40 They maintain that institutions can make a difference, but only in
conjunction with power realities. None of these views challenge the idea that regimes are
a result of the presence of a hegemonic power, and their effectiveness reflects stability in
the system.
Other scholars use the example of interdependence as an alternative to hegemonic
stability theory and regimes to explain inter-state security cooperation. Richard
j8John Mearshiemer. “False Promise of International Institutions,” International
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 7.
39Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists, Cooperation as Self-Help,” in
Realism: Restatements and Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (Portland. OR: Frank Cass,
1996), 156.
4°Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,”
International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 43.
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Rosecrance and Stein comment “The horizontal interaction of transnational processes is
higher than at any point since World War I.”41 Growing interdependence tasks
governments to cooperate, “If they (governments) are to cope with the great transnational
phenomena of the current age...they must cooperate with one another.”42 Rosecrance
and Stein admit that although they view interdependence as a potential way for state to
work around anarchy, “Whether interdependence will emerge as positive or negative will
depend on old-fashioned cooperation among governments.”43 Keohane and Joseph Nye
agree, in their volume in which they coin the term complex interdependence. “In
analyzing the politics of interdependence, we emphasized that interdependence would not
necessarily lead to cooperation, nor did we assume that its consequences would
automatically be benign in other respects.*’44 Interdependence is a helpful tool to
understand the level of hegemony in a given system, but not useful when discussing the
likelihood of security cooperation. Institutions remain the better indicator in judging the
level of systemic cooperative behavior.
Many authors who concentrate their research on Latin America are also strong
institutionalists. David Mares critiques Latin American security issues and believes that
more thought should be applied to finding workable solutions. He upholds the PeruEcuador border conflict as a model, and trumpets the role of international financial aid

4IRichard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality.”
World Politics, 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 21.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.. 22.
44Keohane and Nye, 249.
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and outside arbiters.45 Joseph S, Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach think that the spread of
democracy and free-markets via an organization Like the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) are the best way to approach Latin American problems.46 Heman
Patino Mayer is more direct in his institutional belief, stating
“A genuine and effective inter-American hemispheric security system must be
constructed upon a community of states that has as it is premise the
acknowledgement of shared responsibilities, interests, and values and expresses
the decision to assume, preserve, and protect them from situations of risk or
threat.”47
Farer wrote that institutions such as the UN. OAS, international financial institutions and
non-govemmental organizations, are contributing to the stability of Latin America.48
Olga Pellicer’s work is based solely on regional institutions contributing to security.
explicitly showing the high regard the author has for them.49
One of the divisions between academics on the subject of cooperation pertains to
the examples they are likely to use to illustrate their viewpoint. Realists frequently use
security issues to demonstrate why cooperation is unlikely to occur. Charles Lipson
45David Mares. "Securing Peace in the Americas in the Next Decade,” in The
Future o f Inter-American Relations. ed. Jorge Dominguez (New York: Routledge. 2000).
47.
■^Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach. ‘Toward Innovative Strategic Policies:
A Conclusion,” in Latin America in the New International System (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 2001), 220.
4'Heman Patino Mayer, "The Future of Cooperative Hemispheric Security in the
Americas.” in Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American M ilitary in Transition, eds.
Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Biss (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1996), 1.
^ o m Farer. “Introduction and Overview,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively
Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1996), 4.
49Olga Pellicer, Regional Mechanisms and International Security in Latin
America (New York: UN University Press, 1998).
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explains the difference by noting that, “Economic issues are characterized far more often
by elaborate networks of rules, norms, and institutions, grounded in reasonably stable,
convergent expectations. There are few equivalents in the security field to the
comprehensive, rule-guided arrangements in trade and money.”50
Lipson points out that two factors work against the ability of security cooperative
endeavors to succeed. First, the magnitude of potendal loses for a player if cooperation is
not reciprocated and second, the risks associated with a lack of sufficient intelligence on
the others decisions and actions.51 Robert Jervis adds “...cooperation is more probable
when mutual cooperation is only slightly less attractive than exploiting the other, when
being exploited is only slightly worse than mutual competition.*02 Keohane and Axelrod
came to similar conclusions using the prisoner’s dilemma model.53 Although they
maintain that security and economic issues can be analyzed using the same model, they
contend that actors are more likely to cooperate when it comes to commerce as opposed

50CharIes Lipson. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,”
World Politics 37. no. 1. (October 1984): 21.
51Ibid., 22.
52Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security
Cooperation,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth Oye (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 64.
53Prisoner's Dilemma is a tool to explain state behavior in the presence of
anarchy. It explains that states are in competition with other states, and how this
competition thwarts their attempts to strive for the most optimal outcome for their
individual benefit. For a detailed explanation see Stein, 34-36.
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to military related issues: “Economic issues usually seem to exhibit less conflictual
payoff structures than do those of military security.”54
Many academics disagree that the presence of cooperation in a system can be
supported by the example of regimes. At the outset this dissertation remains ambivalent
on the question of institutions creating security cooperation, although a view on this issue
may emerge as a product of this research. Instead, it focuses on institutional success as a
product of hegemonic stability, and power asymmetry. In this context institutions
become an instrument to explain the difference between hegemony and the onset of
power asymmetry. As power asymmetry takes hold, the importance of institutions
decrease as the hegemon increasingly acts unilaterally and weaker states view the
institutions as tools of dominance by the hegemon. During times of hegemony the threat
posed by the hegemon is reduced and institution creation and maintenance gamer more
attention.

POWER ASYMMETRY
This dissertation focuses on high levels of power asymmetry as a factor on
reducing the level of security cooperation potential among states in a hegemonic system.
The first assumption leading to this observation is that a concentration of power in one
state in a given system is more conducive to creating stability, and thus security
cooperation. The second assumption is that when the hegemon experiences sudden

54Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Colombia University Press,
1993), 91.
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power surges compared to other states in the region a condition of power asymmetry
results. How this power surge will be accounted for in the study will be discussed.
As previously stated, the analysis of this study is performed at the systemic level.
The distribution of power of the system is the primary determinant of system
characteristics. This study focuses specifically on unipolarity as delineated by hegemonic
stability theory and why uni polarity is the most likely systemic structure to create inter
state cooperation that will provide a basis for the power asymmetry argument.
Three basic power alignments are noted in the literature, unipolarity, bipolarity
and multipolarity. Highly centralized systems are those with one state at the center of
power, bipolarity refers to those systems with two centers, and multipolarity is the most
distributed power structure referring to systems with more than two poles. Each of these
will be briefly reviewed below along with arguments concerning their qualities in relation
to stability creation. During the critique of each theory, they will be individually placed
in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations. The region has experienced both
multipolarity and bipolarity through the lens of the global system. Multipolarity
prevailed until the rise of U.S. power during the final quarter of the nineteenth century.
Pure hegemony existed from the end of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, a brief
period after World War H, and from 1990 to the present. Global bipolarity overlapped
with U.S. regional hegemony from the 1950s to 1990.
The argument for the presence of one dominant state in a system was presented at
the beginning of this chapter. Hegemonic stability theory posits that the presence of a
hegemonic power in a given system creates more stability among states in the system that
has a greater likelihood to lead to security cooperation than bipolar or multi-polar
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systems. Hegemonic stability theory also makes the argument that because a hegemonic
system is more likely to give rise to institutions o f all varieties, these institutions in turn
may perpetuate the stability above the singular ability o f the hegemon. For example. U.S.
hegemony produced many institutions, the more prominent being the Pan American
Union, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Organization o f American States
(OAS), the Inter American Development Bank, the Treaty o f Tlatelolco, and NAFTA.
Not all academics agree with the hegemonic stability assessment. Some view the
influence o f bipolarity as having been a very stabilizing influence on the Americas.
Some scholars suggest that during the U.S.-Soviet Union bipolar rivalry, U.S. power was
effectively deterred, leading to greater system stability. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin noted
that Latin American countries sought a greater degree o f autonomy from the U.S. that
made them more conscious o f powers like the Soviet Union outside o f the hemisphere.55
The Alliance for Progress can be considered as one example o f this theory. The
organization sought to bring greater development aid to Latin American to alleviate
poverty and keep communist revolutions at bay. Through the prism o f bipolar stability
one could argue that Latin American states were able to play the Soviet card against the
U.S. and receive more aid than they otherwise would. In theory, they were able to limit
the depth o f U.S. penetration by balancing one antagonist against the other.
Richard N. Rosecrance contends that weaker states may benefit from bipolarity.
“One o f the major characteristics o f the contemporary international scene resides in the

55Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, “The Rivalry Between the Superpowers: A Latin
American Perspective,” in Beyond Superpower Rivalry: Latin America and the Third
World, ed. John F. Weeks (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 69.
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difference in attitude and position of the allies of the great powers and neutral states.’06
He explains that nonaligned nations received benefits of alliance protection and without
pledging political allegiance to either major power. Augusto Varas specifically cites
occurrences of Latin American states exercising their relative political freedom: "The
early relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico serve as
counterpoints to the difficult relations between these same countries and the United
States.’0 ' Cole Blaiser adds that although many Latin American leaders were not
admirers of the Soviet system, even so they reserved the right as an autonomous state to
do so and "such ties give them room for maneuver and bargaining leverage in disputes
with the United States.”58
Despite the few perceived advantages of bipolarity in maintaining regional
stability, many disadvantages resulted as well. Jarrin also noted that the superpower
rivalry caused domestic strife in Latin America through “...exacerbating the ideological
differences in Latin America, polarizing positions, and results in domestic confrontations
on major issues.”59 The polarization of Latin American politics throughout the twentieth
century has been well regarded as a primary impediment to pluralistic political and
economic development. Bipolarity also contributed to regional arms races. Some critics
56Richard Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future.” The Journal o f
Conflict Resolution 10. no. 3 (September 1966): 325.
^Augusto Varas, “Soviet-Latin American Relations Under U.S. Regional
Hegemony,” Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press.
1987), 17.
58Cole Blasier, The G iant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 158.
59Jarrin, 75.
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point out that the distribution of arms surpluses was the primary culprit of Latin
American interstate arms races during the first half of the Cold War. However, both the
European and the Soviet Union contributed to Latin American arms expenditures as well.
For example, during the Falkland/Malvinas Island conflict the most lethal weapon used
by Argentina was the French built Exocet missile. After President Carter's efforts to curb
U.S. arms exports to the region the Soviet Union became the top arms exporter from
1979-1983-60 The bipolar competition guaranteed that regional states would always have
access to military hardware. This situation contributed to arms races in the region that in
turn, contributed to huge budget deficits that plague many Latin American states until
today.
The frequency of U.S. intervention in the region during the Cold War. because of
the perceived threat of communist revolution, is another symptom of instability caused by
bipolarity. Because U.S. leaders viewed the actions of many Latin American states
through the prism of the Cold War. the U.S. was more likely to intervene when there was
a perception of Soviet involvement. During the Cold War Latin American sensitivities
increased with each U.S. political or military effort to curb revolution, beginning first in
Central America and Caribbean, but also in less traditional areas such as Brazil and Chile.
This issue contributed to tension, which plagued U.S .-Latin American relations, affecting
regional stability in the process.
Even though bipolarity may cause more instability than unipolarity, Joanne Gowa
shows that multipolarity fares even worse. When Gowa performed an analysis on the
effects of bipolarity and multipolarity on trade she found a greater likelihood that

60Ibid., 78.
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bipolarity will contribute to an open market system than multipolarity, bringing more
stability to the system as a whole. The finding led to her comment, “It effectively assigns
a large role in the opening of post-war Western markets to the transition from a
multipolar to a bipolar international security system that occurred simultaneously.” 61
Gowa contends that the refusal of the U.S. to assume a leadership role led to
multipolarity during the interwar period, destabilizing the global system. Her analysis
can be interpreted as an indication that the more concentrated the leadership function in a
given system, the more likely cooperation may occur.
Many scholars agree that a greater concentration of power brings greater stability
to a system. John Lewis Gaddis comments, “It is a curious consequence of bipolarity that
although alliances are more durable than in a multipolar system, defections are at the
same time more tolerable.” 62 Waltz proposes that bipolarity is more stable than
multipolarity because it is easier for states to track the capabilities of two states as
opposed to more.6’’ When capabilities are easier to track, the increased transparency
makes states less concerned with marginal increases and decreases of power. Under
multipolarity Waltz points out that in Europe every state was continually worried about
the gains of several other states, refusing cooperative efforts even when mutual gain was
possible. By comparison bipolarity during the Cold War “created a situation that
61Joanne Gowa. “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade.” The American
Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (December 1989): 1253.
62John Lewis Gaddis. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar
International System.” in The Cold War and After: Prospects fo r Peace, eds. Sean M.
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MTT Press, 1993), 12.
63Ken Waltz, Theorv o f International Politics (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley,
1979), 168.
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permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states o f Western
Europe.”64
Snidal hypothesized that multipolarity has the potential to be a more stabilizing
influence on a system because its presence increases the predictability of state behavior.
He points out that, “Because rational state behavior is less affected by relative gains,
cooperation is easier under multipolarity.”63 Therefore there is less need for states to
track each other s behavior, nullifying the argument multipolarity may decrease stability
because states feel compelled to monitor each other’s capabilities: a more difficult
proposition in instances of dispersed power arrangements. However. Snidal admits that
his study does not take into account the argument that identifying and therefore punishing
non-cooperators in a multipolar setting is more difficult. Because states cannot perfectly
discriminate behavior in respect to other states, the possibility for decentralized
enforcement decreases. Without proper enforcement cooperative agreements are more
difficult. Snidal concludes that. “In brief, there is insufficient evidence to support the
claim that multipolarity has increased cooperation."66
From the discussion above the conclusion reached is that unipolarity, and thus
hegemony, is the most likely structure to generate stability and security cooperation. The
assumption of hegemonic stability that a singular center of power in a given system
results in a greater chance for cooperation than more distributed systems is supported by

64Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories.” 58.
65Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,”
in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. ed. David A. Baldwin
(New York: Colombia University Press, 1993), 200.
66Ibid., 201.
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a review of the effects of the three different power alignments on the chances of security
cooperation. This analysis supports the contention that power asymmetry should be
treated as a corollary to hegemonic stability.
There is ample evidence that a hegemonic system may increase the prospects of
security cooperation. However, there is little discussion in the literature that power
asymmetry may work to erode security cooperation which is the primary focus of this
study. Therefore, the next step is to determine the likely indicators of power asymmetry.
The ability to measure state power over time is key to understanding when asymmetry
occurs. Power measurement in this study is based on economic and security indicators.
Not only will the study seek to measure power across time to broadly demonstrate the
hegemonic relationship, but also to show how power fluctuates over time. Data will be
offered on military spending and GDP of key states for comparison purposes. The
statistics will show that the regional dominance of the U.S. has existed since the end of
the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century. The measurement of the
relative dominance of the U.S. to the rest of the region over time will chart any sharp
increases or decreases and will be compared with increases or decreases in security
cooperation.
Indicators of interdependence are also important to measure security cooperation,
in both the military and economic spheres. This is because during times of power
asymmetry it is likely that the weaker states in the system are increasingly sensitive to
their dependence on the hegemon. Conversely, when the hegemon's power differential
with weaker states grows at a reduced rate, weaker states are likely to be more amenable
to the policies of the dominant states, and less sensitive to interdependence. Therefore,
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the study will note increases and decreases of Latin American dependence on the U.S.,
and its general effect on regional relations.
This study will demonstrate many of the assertions made in this section. The case
study chapters will show that hegemony creates more stability than other security
structures. The U.S .-Latin American system offers many examples. For the last hundred
years the region has not witnessed a large multi-state conflict, a claim no other regional
area can make. On the contrary, the activity of the hegemon guided many regional
rivalries to a state of peaceful coexistence. Argentina and Brazil maintained tense
relations since the time of their independence until the 1980s. spending millions of
dollars during a Cold War arms race. By the 1990s this relationship was so improved
that the two states signed a historic trade agreement forming the core of Mercosur.
Argentina and Chile avoided conflict over the possession of territory on their Southern
border. More recently, a long-standing dispute between Peru and Ecuador was
successfully concluded by U.S. sponsored negotiations. The record of major conflict, and
deaths due to conflict, compares favorably to all other regions in the world during the
same time frame.
Using these power indicators two points of time emerge as moments where power
asymmetry began. The first one was the culmination of the rise of U.S. power at the end
of the nineteenth Century. The second one took place after World War II. Two
examples of a reduction of U.S. power will also be presented, one more dramatic than the
other. The first one was due to the Great Depression; the second one was due to
economic crises that occurred during the 1970s.
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OTHER REGIONAL THEORIES
There are many theories besides hegemonic stability that address the change in
security cooperation among states. These theories include state-level phenomena, such as
form of government, economic structures, and culture. Although they are worthy of
review because of their prominence in the regional debate, and because they address the
security cooperation issue, they do not fit the structural theme of this dissertation.
Culture has become a frequently cited concept since the end of the Cold War.
Huntington’s volume. Clash o f Civilizations, is symbolic of the popularity and influence
of culture as a causal variable to explain systemic instability. Huntington points out that
culture is important to states because, ’’States define threats in terms of the intentions of
other states, and those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by
cultural considerations."6'

However, he turns the realist versus liberal dialogue on its

side, and shows he may share philosophical qualities with both sides, but also frames
their debates under the cultural rubric. “States with similar cultures and institutions will
see common interests.”68 In other words, the primary determinant of whether states will
cooperate, or not cooperate, is based on the similarity of their cultures.
Huntington believes that the cultural trend of the post Cold War order means that
globalization is both a negative and positive force. He sees the state losing power to
international organization as well as cultural sub-groups from within. In the immortal
words of Benjamin Barber, “The planet is falling precipitately apart and coming

6'Huntington, 34.
^Ibid.
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reluctantly together at the very same moment.”69 The only place where this may not
cause chaos is within civilizations, although it may affect civilizations as well. A recent
example of Huntington’s thesis is the growing security ties between English speaking
countries. Australia. Canada. New Zealand. United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.S. As
these ties grow stronger, the connections of the U.S. with NATO are growing weaker, as
a clear example of the strength of culture over institutions.
The culture debate in the Americas predates Huntington. The culture-based thesis
is typically divided into one of two camps in the regional literature, those that hold the
U.S. accountable for detrimental regional relations, and those that blame Iberian culture.
Lars Schoultz’s volume. Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S. Policy Toward
Latin America. is an example of the literature that takes the U.S. to task. A common
assertion against the U.S. is that its Latin American foreign policy is usually not well
managed. 0 For example, Abraham Lowenthal suggests three changes to improve U.S.Latin America relations, each one directed at the U.S., as though Latin America had no
ability to affect change. ' 1 However, Schouitz seems to think the blame is far deeper than
a benign neglect and inept policies. Schouitz maintains that a feeling of cultural
superiority, based in part on racial stereotypes, generates a capricious U.S. outlook
towards Latin America. This policy is also driven by private economic interests, “...the

69Benjamin Barber, “Jihad Vs. McWorld,” The Atlantic Monthly (March 1993).
Available from http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/barberf.htm, July 21, 2001.
70Abraham Lowenthal, “United States-Latin American Relations at the Century’s
Turn: Managing the Intermestic Agenda,” in The United States and the Americas: A
Twenty-First Century View, eds. Albert Fishlow and James Jones (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1999), 134.
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need to protect U.S. security, the desire to accommodate the demands of U.S. domestic
politics, and the drive to promote U.S. economic development.”72
Schouitz states that all problems between the U.S. and Latin America lie at the
door of the U.S.: “While security concerns ebb and flow, domestic U.S. politics have
been central to the explanation of nearly every important issue of U.S.-Latin American
relations, beginning in the early 1820s....”73 In Schoultz’s essay most U.S. historical
interventions south of the border were due to the internal machinations of U.S. politics
with little or no regard for benefit or detriment of other hemispheric states. Schouitz
maintains that the Reagan Administration's refocus on the perceived communist threat in
Central America was due to a misinformed U.S. populace. He argues that President Bush
invaded Panama strictly for his own political aggrandizement and President Clinton’s
signing of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act was purely a cynical
measure to gain the state of Florida’s support in the next election. Blame spans the
century, since it is explained that the 1898 Teller Amendment was responsible for the rise
of Cuba’s leader. Fidel Castro, and the resulting acrimony between U.S. and Cuba. 4
Schouitz ends his work characterizing the contemptuous nature of U.S. cultural attitudes
towards Latin America, explaining that U.S. Presidents have malignantly treated Latin
American leaders as an: “...unwelcome dog at a garden party, giving us a glimpse of how

^Lars Schouitz. Beneath the United States: A History o f U.S. Policy Toward
Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 367.
73Ibid., 370.
74Ibid., 372.
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little has changed in the two centuries since John Quincy Adams and his generation
fashioned the mold that still constrains our thinking.”73
It is apparent that Schouitz believes the fundamental problem in Latin AmericanU.S. relation's lies with U.S. culture. Lawrence Harrison believes the opposite, as argued
in his book. Underdevelopment Is a State o f Mind. Harrison writes that most of Latin
America’s troubles derive not from the U.S., but from internal dynamics fed by
undesirable cultural traits. He dismisses dependency theory, already called into question
by mainstream critics in the U.S. and abroad, pointing out that many former colonies,
such as Hong Kong, Singapore. South Korea and Taiwan left the ranks of
underdeveloped states. 6 They would not have been able to do so if the malevolent
effects associated with dependency theory had truly burdened developing states. In the
volume Mariano Grodona. a contributing author, lists cultural characteristics
differentiating developing states from the rest.

The author maintains that the values of

developing states are virtually the same throughout the world, not an isolated Latin
American phenomenon. Harrison points out that a particularly noteworthy area of culture
study focuses on problems associated with corruption in developing societies.
Francis Fukuyama agrees with the cultural argument, noting that “virtually all
serious observers understand that liberal political and economic institutions depend on a

75 Ibid.. 386.
/6Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values
Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000), xxii.
' Mariano Grodona. “A Cultural Typology of Economic Development,” in
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and
Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 47-53.
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healthy and dynamic civil society for their vitality.”'8 Fukuyama believes that the social
capital in a society, resulting in a particular kind of culture found in all successful states,
is just as relevant as the financial capital. Family-centric business and politics are a
characteristic of developing cultures. Fukuyama points out that the lack of trust in
developing states can lead a tight network of family and friends who depend solely on
that network rather than on state institutions. These family networks are a shield against
the problems in developing societies, but can also be a hindrance to modernization.
Other researchers found that modernization does not automatically lend itself to the
disintegration of large family groups. “Instead, the modernization process is being
molded into the existing family and kinship institutions and areas of traditional family
function.”79 Although these traditional social structures spring-up and are renewed as a
result of poorly performing national government, their continuation hinders the potential
improvement of government performance.
Another body of literature concentrates on Latin American reform at the state
level to address the internal problems of Latin American states. Many analysts contend
that if the right economic and political reforms were instituted most if not all Latin
American states would reach new heights of economic and social prosperity. The logic
continues that if such progress could be made, most security problems that are currently
on the agenda will be ameliorated.

For example, in one of Jorge Dominguez's recent

Francis Fukuyama. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation o f Prosperity
(New York: The Free Press, 1995), 4.
79Manuel L. Carlos and Lois Sellers, "Family, Kinship Structure, and
Modernization in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 7, no. 2 (Summer
1972): 113.
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publications he begins by stating, 'Today there are few matters more crucial to the
construction of democracy in the Americas than how governments deal with an array of
new security challenges.”80 Notice that construction of democracy is the primary focus
of the introductory sentence. The assumption is that by instituting internal reforms Latin
American states will be able to change their condition of underdevelopment. Other
studies delve deeper into Latin America democracies searching for tendencies in the
region that may undermine democratic reforms. Scott Mainwarring and Timothy R.
Scully contend that the successful consolidation of democracy is contingent on the
institutionalization of a party system.81
The democratic peace theory is one of the more controversial theories of
democratic development literature. Its proponents and detractors remain divided over its
utility. David Mares researched the notion that democracies do not go to war with each
other in relation to the Americas. He found that democratic peace theory did not hold
true for the region. Mares found that the assumption that voters in a democratic society
want peace was not something that should be assumed. He also found that, “Variations
among democratic institutions affect the immediacy and directness of voters’ ability to
punish or even observe decision-makers.”8"

80Jorge Dominguez, International Security and Democracy: Latin America and
the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1998), ix.
81 Scott Mainwarring and Timothy R. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions:
Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1995), 1.
82 David Mares, Violent Peace: M ilitarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 107.
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A body of literature that addressed the need for democratic reform in Latin
American states dominated by military rule can also be included in the state-level school
of thought. Latin American militaries were at one time viewed as the largest impediment
to democracy in the region. Some works viewed the problem as connected to any state
with a weak civilian government since the military by nature was organized and
motivated.83 Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Biss has determined that military threat
to democratic governments has subsided, and the main problem is now the disintegration
of regional militaries since many lack a clear mission.84 Some of the state-level literature
focuses on economic reform in Latin America, believing that democracy is dependent on
a flourishing market economy. Regional agreements such as the NAFTA, the Southern
Common Market (Mercosur) and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
are all topics of economic development category.
State-level explanations do not have the ability to fully explain the lack of U.S.Latin American security cooperation. They focus on variables that describe
characteristics of states, but cannot explain how these characteristics directly impact the
system. By contrast the systemic level perspective allows the scholar to observe and
address the reoccurring patterns in regional security relations without having to explain
the internal dynamics of each state. The structural approach allows this study to explore
the stress points that emerged over time as indicators of the level of security cooperation
between the U.S. and Latin America.
83For a good example o f work on this topic see, Alfred Stepan. Rethinking
M ilitant Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1988).’
84Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin
American M ilitary in Transition (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1996), p. vii.
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CONCLUSION
A foundational point of hegemonic stability theory is that a concentration of
power into one dominant state breeds stability. At the heart of hegemonic stability theory
is the assumption that the presence of a strong hegemon is equivalent to a system more
conducive to cooperation, a secondary effect being stronger international organizations.
This study challenges the notion that the presence of hegemon only creates
cooperation, and the logic that increases in hegemonic strength only leads to more
cooperation. Although it may seem intuitive that increasing the power of the hegemon
leads to more security cooperation, since domination increases and with it the power to
dictate terms and support more institutions, this study maintains that there is a point at
which higher levels of power concentrated in the hegemon creates mistrust between the
hegemon and weaker states. In turn, this distrust creates an undercurrent of noncooperation that may erode the benefits of stability imparted by the hegemon.
There are two ways the hegemon spreads its influence, through manipulation of
material incentives and altering the substantive beliefs of weaker states. Their
differences help explain the mechanics of how distrust is manifested under power
asymmetry. Altering substantive beliefs occurs over long periods of time, socializing
weaker states so their views are in basic compliance with the hegemon. By comparison
the manipulation of material incentives are more direct in serving the hegemon’s
immediate goals, such as ending a conflict or stemming a monetary crisis. Weaker states
are much more sensitive to the use o f material incentives since this expression of
hegemonic power is far more visible. During times when strong power asymmetry
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exists, the sensitivity of weaker states increases, just as the likelihood of hegemonic states
to rely on material incentives as a means to spread its influence increase.
Applying hegemon stability theory to the current power alignment in the
Americas region demonstrates that the region has a hegemonic structure. Although the
Cold War affected U.S. hegemony in the region during the last century, the U.S. was still
considered as the primary regional power. Power indicators demonstrate the point, as
well as the number of U.S. interventions in Latin America compared to Latin American
regional interventions. Much of the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations
reinforces this point.35
Many hegemonic stability scholars concentrate on the economic power of the
hegemon in creating stability in the hegemonic system, however this study focuses on the
security aspects of hegemonic stability. As Gilpin and others agree, security is an under
emphasized element of hegemonic stability because the distribution of public goods will
give rise to a relative gains problem. The relative gains dilemma introduces security
issues and assures that weaker states in a hegemonic system will compete by finding
alternatives to the hegemon or aligning with the hegemon. The alternatives to the
hegemon can be found outside of the system or by forming an internal alliance against
the hegemon, as the case study chapters will demonstrate.

35The following is a truncated sampling of the literature that supports the thesis of
U.S. hegemony in the region: Blaiser, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to
Revolutionary Change in Latin America', James Petras and Morris Morley, U.S.
Hegemony Under Siege: Class, Politics, and Development in Latin America (New York:
Verso, 1990); Guy Poitras, The Ordeal o f Hegemony: the United States and Latin
America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
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The power asymmetry argument supports the assumption that one dominant state
in a system creates stability, but allows the scholar to make inferences in regard to the
ebb and flow of the power of the dominant state, and its affect on the system. In other
words a hegemonic system does not create the same amount of stability in the system
over time. Power asymmetry assumes that if a particular hegemonic power has a
comparatively high level of power asymmetry then a reduction of the hegemon's power
may result in greater security cooperation. The goal of an analysis utilizing power
asymmetry is that it seeks to explain the lack of cooperation and the instability it causes
in a hegemonic system.
The history of the OAS is an important example of this dynamic. The U.S.. as the
hegemonic power, was fundamental to the creation of the organization, but within ten
years of its inception, the inability of the U.S. to pass motions favorable to its regional
foreign policy became apparent. The cause can be attributed to power asymmetry. The
hegemonic relationship allowed enough regional cooperation to create the OAS. It also
helped that when the OAS was created. U.S. strong hegemony did not yet affect regional
relations. By 1965 the strength of U.S. hegemony reestablished itself and regional
security relations suffered accordingly. After this time the OAS ceased to operate as a
consensus building institution for regional security crises. Hegemonic stability and
power asymmetry maintain a symbiotic relationship. Hegemonic stability is the
framework and power asymmetry may provide insight when hegemonic stability is most
likely to create security cooperation.
The questions raised by power asymmetry are important. The current and
foreseeable future tells us that the U.S. will remain the primary regional power.
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Nevertheless, it is far more beneficial to elucidate how to derive and sustain cooperative
behavior under these conditions. Furthermore, the process provides insights for other
regions.
The review of state level theories of regional cooperation demonstrated that they
lack utility in trying to explain the broader dynamics of hemispheric cooperation.
Theories that focus on forms of government, types of economic systems or culture point
to differences between states. However, these differences do not point to a causative
reason for problems in U.S .-Latin American security relations simply by implicating the
actions of a state. An explanation of how states interact should not be based on lists of
characteristics that make them distinct, but of the consistent behavior of units despite
their individuality. Theories that pertain to culture, to form of government, or to structure
of economy are not particularly useful at explaining broad patterns in international
relations. A synthesis o f state-level theory usually involves a normative judgment, such
as Harrison and Schouitz's essays on culture. Harrison makes the final judgment that
Latin American culture is responsible for its own lack of development and subsequent
problems with the U.S. By comparison. Schouitz comes to the opposite conclusion: the
U.S. is the reason for ongoing problems in inter-American relations. The prescription
recommended in each case is that the culture of either Latin America or the U.S. must
change. Not only is such a recommendation highly unlikely, but also has polarizing
effects bound to increase any divide the authors hope to ameliorate. The consideration of
power asymmetry might explain the fluctuation of security cooperation among regional
states and recommend courses of action to improve regional security cooperation.
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The next four chapters will review particular time periods in U.S.-Latin American
relations to note when systemic power asymmetry occurs, and how it relates to security
relations. Chapter three will specifically focus on the roots of hemispheric relations,
covering the time period from the 1820s until after World War II. During this period the
U.S. grew into the role of a strong hegemon by the early twentieth century, became a
weaker hegemon with the onset of the Depression, and at the end of World War II rose to
strong hegemony once again. The chapter will address the question, as all the case study
chapters: Did the periods in which the U.S. had a high level of power compared to Latin
American states result in lesser or greater security cooperation?
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CHAPTER HI
THE FORGING OF U.S. HEGEMONY (1823-1944)

This chapter offers a brief review of the history of Latin American-U.S. security
cooperation, from its beginnings in the early 1800s to the end of World War II. The level
of U.S. power, relative to Latin America, fluctuated from one extreme to the other during
this time period. The U.S. ascended to regional hegemon after the end of its Civil War.
By the end of the 1800s it was widely acknowledged as the dominant state in the region.
The hegemonic status of the U.S. was signified by its initial attempt at building a regional
security institution, the Pan American Union. As the power of the U.S. grew in
comparison to Latin American states, so did its penchant to intervene in the Caribbean
and Central America. By the 1920s regional relations deteriorated to the point that the
Pan American meetings generated little cooperation and many Latin American leaders
were suspicious of U.S. motives.
The U.S. economy collapsed because of the Depression and ushered in a new era
in regional relations. Relations steadily improved, paving the way for close security
cooperation during World War II. After the war U.S. power swung again in the opposite
direction, increasing the dominance of the U.S. once again. The power fluctuations
during this time period provide an important test of this work's main research question.
If there was a notable decrease in security relations between the U.S. and Latin American
when the U.S. power was at it peak during the early 1900s, and relations improved during
the time period from 1930-1944, then the conclusion lends support to this dissertation's
central assertion. Chapter 3 is by no means a comprehensive historical review of all
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security related events during this time frame. The chapter specifically concentrates on
issues especially pertinent to regional security.

GROWTH OF POWER ASYMMETRY
Simon Bolivar and James Monroe were the authors of the two initial efforts to
create institutionalized inter-American security. Simon Bolivar attempted to integrate
Spanish American states by proposing a security pact. Bolivar and Jose de San Martin
led their forces to victory over Spanish troops during a war that lasted fifteen years,
ending in 1825. The victory resulted in the independence of Argentina, Bolivia. Chile,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.1Bolivar was motivated to bring the former Spanish
American colonies together in a security pact involving Argentina. Central America.
Chile. Colombia. Mexico, and Peru." Bolivar's ultimate goal was “to form a truly
American League, a society of brotherly nations, a society whose federated strength
could oppose [European powers].'0 To this end he proposed a meeting, the Congress of
Panama, inviting the representatives of former Spanish American colonies in 1826.

‘Bolivar's dream of a united Spanish American Republic never reached fruition
and in 1830 the Gran Colombian Union ceased to exist when Venezuela and Ecuador
withdrew. Bolivar commented. “America, is ungovernable. Those who have served the
revolution have plowed the sea.” See, Thomas E. Skidmore, M odem Latin America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 33-35.
2Although Argentina signed a formal treaty with Colombia, it was only a
demonstration of friendship rather than a deeper expression of security cooperation. J.
Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1961), 30-31.
3Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1969), 411.
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The U.S. was supportive of the arrangement as a security measure against
intrusive European powers, and was invited by Bolivar to participate to the extent the
U.S. was interested.4 Despite the invitation, Bolivar was not seeking U.S. membership.
As he once stated, “The North Americans and Haitians would be a foreign substance in
our bodv.*° He actually viewed the U.S. as an equal rather than a guarantor of Latin
American independence, thinking that a united Spanish America would compete with the
U.S. for power and authority.6 Bolivar viewed Great Britain as the guarantor of the
security for his new state, a plan Britain opposed because its over-extended security
commitments during the period.
President James Monroe was supportive of Bolivar's initiative to keep European
states from seeking to re-colonize Latin America. He stated to a British minister on the
topic of Latin American independence that the system of modem colonization was in his
mind an abuse of government and should immediately come to an end. The British were
already showing their antipathy to the diffusion of U.S. influence in the Caribbean.8
British concerns caused the U.S. to be cautious in its support of Bolivar's security
commitment to the Pan-American initiative. As a consequence Monroe instructed the

"^Mecham. The United States and Inter-American Security. 31-33.
5Masur. 411.
•ibid.. 417.
'Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Presidency o f James Monroe (Lawrence, KA:
University Press of Kansas, 1996), 439.
g

John P. Humphrey, The Inter-American System: A Canadian View (Toronto:
privately printed, 1942), 25.
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U.S. attending the meeting to show support for the growing republican movement, but
not to commit to any arrangements during the Congress of Panama.9
Monroe had set the tone for future U.S. policy when he issued what came to be
known as the Monroe Doctrine in late 1923. Bolivar’s document and the Monroe
Doctrine differed although both aimed at creating regional solidarity against European
intervention. Bolivar’s pact was issued through a multilateral process in the Congress of
Panama, the original Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration. Both documents
were opposed to European intervention in the Americas. Monroe was ambivalent about
supporting the emerging republican sentiment in Latin America, and avoiding the
provocation of European powers, particularly Great Britain. As former President Thomas
Jefferson advised Monroe. ’’Great Britain is the nation that can do us the most harm of
any one. ... and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world.” 10 The hope was
that the Spanish-American republics could consolidate themselves into a single state, an
ambition that seemed tenuous at best. Therefore, the U.S. had to avoid a situation in
which it was forced to face a hostile European power alone. U.S. leaders were also
concerned that political turmoil in the newly independent Latin American Republics
would make an enticing opportunity for ambitious European states. As Monroe's
Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams said, “It was one thing to tell Europe to keep its
hands off the Western Hemisphere, but it was another to join hands with those weak

9Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 38-39.
l0Paul L. Ford, The Works o f Thomas Jefferson (New York: G P . Putnam's Sons,
1904), 318-321.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
Latin American governments in the spirit of equality and fraternal affection.” 11 The
Monroe Doctrine was an internal compromise created to defend U.S. ideals abroad, and
protect U.S. domestic interests. It boldly warned the more powerful monarchies of the
world, chiefly Spain and France, to not meddle in American affairs. However, it
moderated its audacious warnings by stating the U.S. did not seek to interfere in the
internal matters of Europe.12 The Monroe Doctrine amounted to a foreign policy
statement with no enforcement mechanism.
In 1847 a second Latin American conference convened in Lima. Pern. This
meeting was focused on repelling the efforts of Spain to reestablish its control over
Ecuador, a former colonial possession. The former President of Ecuador. General Juan
Jose Flores, headed the effort. He created an army composed of Spanish and British
forces and garnered the support of Britain and Spain. The states of Bolivia. Chile.
Ecuador. New Granada (present day Colombia), and Peru attended the Lima meeting. A
U.S. delegation was invited in an observer capacity. The U.S. Charge d* Affaires. J.
Randolph Clay, led the contingent.13 Attending states were able to agree on at least one
important point: Reaffirmation of the nonintervention principle originally proposed at the
Pan American meeting. Clay wholly supported the conclusion, assuming it was directed
at Europe and therefore coincided with U.S. policy goals. However, some analysts point
out that the principle of territorial integrity was directed against the U.S.. as the U.S. was
1Barnes C. Humes, My Fellow Americans: Presidential Addresses That Shaped
History (New York: Praeger, 1992). 33.
l2Dent. 3. The original message was not intended to be controversial, but Dent
points out that the Library of Congress lists over 425 analytical works focus on this piece
that make it the most studied presidential doctrine in the history of U.S. policy.
l3Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 41.
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involved in a war against Mexico at the time.14 The U.S. sought security measures to
guarantee regional state sovereignty from any threat outside o f the region, Latin
American states also wanted the same guarantee, but also to include protection from U.S.
interference. This important difference would be a key issue in how both sides viewed
regional security through the twentieth century.
Latin American states were wary o f U.S. expansionism, but they were even more
alarmed at the more imminent threat o f European intervention. From their viewpoint a
powerful U.S. could be not only a potential competitor in security and trade issues, but
also an advocate in keeping European interventionism at bay. Despite its doubts about
the U.S., "the victory o f the Union in the U.S. ks Civil War drew the U.S. and the sister
republics o f the Western world into closer bonds o f friendship.” 13
The growing power differential between the U.S. and Latin America created a
short-term impression that the U.S. could play the role o f a benevolent security guarantor
for the region. In the later part o f the nineteenth century it was the only state in the
Americas that had the power to deter colonial ambitions. However, at the first sign o f
U.S. interventionist activity, the security arrangement’s unilateral origins would
eventually lead to problems in the regional security dialog. During the U.S. Civil War,
France and Spain attempted to regain former possessions in the new world. Spain tried to

,4John Bassett Moore, The Principles o f American Diplomacy (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1918), 381.
l5SamueI Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy o f the United States (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), 115. The Union victory provided an
obstacle for European regional ambitions not only in Latin American, but in the U.S. as
welL British support o f the Confederacy also promised a return o f British influence in
the U.S. if the Confederacy had been victorious. A Confederate victory also would have
allowed a new wave ofEuropean conflict and colonization in Latin America.
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bolster its presence in the Caribbean by reoccupying the city of Santo Domingo. Spain
also took the Chincha guano islands off of Peru, rich in valuable nitrate deposits. After
the Union’s victory in 1864 the U.S. pressured Spain to vacate both territories. Spain
relented, cognizant of the military capability of the U.S. Under U.S. insistence Spain left
Santo Domingo, and the Peruvian islands by 1865.16
France invaded Mexico with the support of Britain and Spain. At the cessation of
Civil War hostilities Secretary of State William Seward demanded France remove its
troops from Mexico. Seward invoked the Monroe Doctrine and placed 25.000 soldiers
under the command of General Sheridan on the U.S.-Mexican border.1 The threat forced
France to capitulate, fully withdrawing from Mexico by 1867. These examples of the
U.S. defending Latin America from aggression outside the hemisphere gave legitimacy to
the Monroe Doctrine as a regional security institution, despite the fact it was unilaterally
mandated and enforced.
The U.S. also played a positive role in regional security relations, playing a
leading role in trying to bring the Paraguayan War to an end, which lasted from 18651870. The war began by a series of events that escalated the conflict to a major war by
1865. Paraguay began the conflict by seizing Brazilian territory in what it believed to be
a preemptive strike. The attack pitted Paraguay against Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
The war was enormously destructive, killing an estimated 200,000 Paraguayans alone.

t6Ibi<L, p. 112.
I7Ibid.
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and reducing its prewar national population of 75 percent.18 The Triple Alliance lost over
100.000. The conflict was the bloodiest in Latin American history.
In 1867 the U.S. began to make notable efforts to broker a peace treaty between
the combatants.19 Although the combat continued until the Brazilian led forces crushed
the Paraguayan opposition, the role of the U.S. was notable in that it assumed a
prominent regional struggle that did not directly involve U.S. interests. The actions of
the U.S. helped secure its maturing position of regional hegemon, demonstrating
leadership in most security issues, even when the U.S. was not directly affected.
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War the status of the U.S. changed from a
major regional power to a world power. U.S. foreign policy became more assertive in
defending its foreign interests. In the mid-1800s U.S. presidents had been constrained
from aggressively asserting U.S. interests because of the Monroe Doctrine. By
comparison, after the Civil War. the growing power of the U.S. allowed President
Ulysses S. Grant to pursue a regional security policy using the Monroe Doctrine as a
validating tool. Grant harbored ambitions of expanding U.S. influence in the Caribbean
in order to secure naval bases. Permanent basing could strategically position the U.S. to
protect the Atlantic sea-lanes from European encroachment. Grant wished to annex the
Dominican Republic to this end.20

I8Thomas E. Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries o f Change (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 62.
l9Ibid.
20Bemis, 114.
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The U.S. Congress actively blocked Grant's plans for expansion, doing so in the
name of anti-imperialism. However, the preponderance of U.S. power continued to have
an influence on the realignment its interests and foreign policy. As U.S. military and
economic capability began to dwarf Latin America's, its ability to affect change, through
military and economic means increased. From the perspective of weaker states, outside
involvement in domestic affairs, whether the cause altruistic or not, still amounted to
unwanted intrusion into their internal affairs and smacked o f the European imperialism
many American states had fought so hard against in gaining their independence.
At first the growing asymmetry benefited regional relations. Its newfound stature
was used to arbitrate disputes between Europe and Latin American states. In one such
case Venezuela asked the U.S. to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in 1881 to defend it from
the British. The U.S. agreed, and through diplomacy brought the British to arbitration.*1
By the end of the nineteenth century favorable opinion of the Monroe Doctrine was not
universal in Latin America, but it was still viewed positively in many quarters. In 1894 a
monument was erected in Rio de Janeiro in honor of Monroe. The official U.S. dispatch
to Washington read:
“Their [the Brazilians] aim is to erect a monument in honor of the great American
statesman and the doctrine that bears his name. It is also their desire to bring
about the solidarity of the American Republics, carrying them from without
European influence or interference.”**
The year after the monument was dedicated in Brazil the Dominican Republic’s Charge
de Affaires. Mr. A. Wos y Gil. requested U.S. assistance against a potential French
Gaddis Smith, The Last Years o f the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1994), 24.
~ Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1895 (Washington. D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1896), 48.
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intervention.23 Republican political movements throughout Latin America viewed the
U.S. as the model for the hemisphere. As early as 1878 Brazilian liberals openly
contemplated U.S. institutions as a “splendid illustration of the principles of free
government... who constructed a great free government in defiance of the traditions of the
monarchies of Europe.”24
It is notable that Latin American states did not seek a separate security
arrangement to balance against the U.S. at this time. The natural distaste of the U.S. for
conquest, due to its anti-colonial history, contributed to a Latin American sense of
security. The U.S. was certainly in a position to press its economic and military
advantage farther. Former U.S. Secretary of State Seward wrote to this point:
“I can confidently say that the United States is not seeking nor desiring any
conquest here or abroad, and that, contrary, they seek and desire nothing more in
regard to any part of America than that it may safely remain, under the care of its
own people, in the enjoyment of republican institutions.”25
The Latin American perception of the U.S. was benign since there was no
collective response to the growing power differential between regional states and the U.S.
This fact is demonstrated by the lack of an active security dialogue among Latin
American states. However, the more the U.S. intervened during the close of the century.
the more Latin American faith in the U.S. as a guarantor of regional security eroded.

23The statement reads, “In case of such an event transpiring (French intervention),
I beg to say to your excellency that my Government, in defense of its rights and the
principles of justice upon which its cause is based, is disposed to resist all coercive acts
and to solicit the assistance of the Government of the United States.” Ibid., 240.
Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1879 (New York: Kraus Reprint Group,
1966), 130.
25Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1864 (New York, Kraus Reprint Group,
1965), 19-20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74
When U.S. power grew, and Latin American states remained weak, the U.S. was able to
intervene nearly unhindered. As some Latin American states politically faltered, the U.S.
continued to intervene to prop up or replace regional governments. The repetition of
these events began to force a Latin American realization that the U.S. perceived other
regional states as a second-class citizen in regional security affairs. H.S. Ferns noted the
growing Latin American resentment:
"They [the U.S.] had robbed the Mexicans of their frontier lands: Texas. New
Mexico, and upper California. They had bought the Russians of Alaska. By the
1890s they were looking for fresh fields of influence to control. The purely
defensive doctrine of President Monroe was subtly transformed into a claim to
primacy in the two American continents.” 26
Whereas the Monroe Doctrine worked to the advantage of Latin American states when
they sought to marginalize European ambitions, the opposite effect was that the U.S. was
able to invoke the document without being concerned that regional states may disagree
with their reactions.
Most of the goodwill shared among the states of the new world began to dissipate
as the century drew to a close. The Baltimore Affair, a regional incident that occurred
between the U.S. and Chile, demonstrated the level of growing anti-U.S. sentiment
during this time-period. The Baltimore Affair was precipitated by U.S. involvement in
the internal political affairs of Chile. The U.S. was supporting the government of
President J.M. Balmaceda against the forces of the Constitutionalist. Balmaceda claimed
the presence of a U.S. Naval warship, the San Francisco, was present to directly support
him. These claims were denied by the ships captain, but to no avail: the
Constitutionalists considered the U.S. as a threat. Supporters of Balmaceda filled the

26H.S. Ferns, Argentina (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 119.
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U.S. embassy for protection, and the new Chilean government demanded they be turned
over to them for trial."7 The U.S. embassy refused, and popular sentiment in Santiago
rose against the U.S., prompting large demonstrations outside the U.S. compound.
During these events sailors from the U S.S. Baltimore were permitted to visit the
city on shore leave. There was an altercation in a saloon between two U.S. sailors and a
Chilean sailor. When the U.S. sailors attempted to leave they were assaulted by a mob,
one being killed, the other being seriously injured. Thirty-six other crewmen from the
Baltimore were detained over night then released.28 Tensions dissipated by January of
1892 due to three separate acts by the Chilean Government. To avoid war Chile
withdrew a request for the recall of the foreign representative of the U.S..29 "disavowed
an offensive statement by its own Washington envoy, and suggested that the Supreme
Court of the U.S. adjudge the question of damages suffered in the Baltimore matter.”30
The U.S. responded favorably to these measures ending the crisis and averting open
conflict.
The Baltimore Affair had a lasting impression on Chileans. Joyce Goldberg
explains. "The Chilean abhorred the arrogance and impatience of the U.S. in the

2'Henry Clay Evans, Jr.. Chile and Its Relations With the United States (Durham:
Duke University Publications, 1927), 144-145.
28Ibid, 146.
29Oscar Espinosa Moraga. La Postguerra del Pacifico y la Puna de Atacam
(1884-1899), (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1958), 66.
30Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing o f Power in South
America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 197.
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Baltimore affair—the insulting way in which they were forced to capitulate.”31 What the
U.S. considered a minor incident had a strong affect on the Chilean national outlook
towards the hegemonic power of the U.S. Chile realized that the U.S. could have a large
impact on its internal affairs, but Chile had little impact on the foreign policies of
Washington. Resentment towards the U.S. led Chile to refuse participation in the
Chicago Exposition of 1893, and to support Spain against the U.S. in the War of 1898/*
As the power of the U.S. grew and European influence waned. U.S. interventions
in the Americas tended to look less altruistic and more in U.S. self-interest. By this time
the U.S. government was fully recovered from the economic and political consequences
of the Civil War. National industrial development was flourishing, the Western frontier
was mostly settled, and the growth of U.S. capital had to be invested outside of the
country. Some analysts believed growing U.S. prosperity influenced the tendency to
intervene during this period. The U.S. had to look abroad for other markets in order to
compete with European rivals. In support of these ambitions the U.S. began to increase
its sphere of influence to protect growing U.S. foreign interests and trade routes in the
Caribbean.33
The U.S. became a world power during this period, and most of Latin America
could not maintain the same level of growth. The pattern of colonization in Latin
American, compared to the U.S., is one potential explanation for the divergence in

Joyce S. Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press. 1986), 141.
32Ibid.
33Bemis, 123.
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development. The Spanish and Portuguese colonists were more interested in exploiting
the wealth of the new world with hopes that this would increase their social status in their
home countries of Spain and Portugal. The driving force behind Iberian colonization was
to ... "seek their fortune in the shape of gold and silver and to return home with it as soon
as possible.”34 Since their time in Latin America was to be as brief as possible families
were almost always left in Europe, only occasionally visiting the Americas if at all. Not
only did the families of colonizers remain in Europe, but frequently their capital was sent
home as well, depriving Latin American states the ability to foster the development of
financial institutions. This experience contrasted markedly to that of the U.S. and Canada
that were primarily settled by families looking for new life rather than supporting the old.
Another contrast between U.S. and Latin American colonization concerned the
settlement of border issues. As the U.S. embarked on its era of manifest destiny—
spreading from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific—Latin America remained mostly in
political turmoil. The U.S. filled in its continental borders by 1868; today many parts of
South America are still plagued by border disputes.35
Latin America's political turmoil contributed to a weaker position, making their
ability to expel European domination difficult. The Argentine and Brazilian elite
supported British economic investment. This situation eventually led to a natural distrust

34Ibid.. 12.
35It must be noted that the expansionism of the U.S. during this era was primarily
accomplished at the expense of Mexico (acquisition of the territories of Texas. California
and Oregon). Bemis* analysis blames Mexico's political anarchy and poor decision
making as much as manifest destiny policy of the U.S. for the Mexican American War
(1846). Bemis, 54.
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o f Britain by both states. The degree of entanglement led to calls for British intervention
in Argentina by English businessmen when Argentine political instability occurred.36
By contrast, because the U.S. was bom upon the military defeat of the strongest
European power, colonizing powers avoided direct confrontation with the U.S. The same
could not be said for most of Latin America. In Mexico there was little resistance to
French occupation during the mid to late nineteenth century due to monarchist
sympathizers among Mexican elite. Brazil existed as a monarchy with strong ties to
Portugal from 1823-1889, and if not directly under the control of a European power,
severely constrained by them because of debt or political pressure. Schnieder believes
that in the case of Brazil its late political development is mostly responsible for its overall
development problems: "Although it contributed to a prolonged period of internal peace and
stability, this system [monarchy! had negative implications for political development because
parties lost any capacity to serve as vehicles for modernization and change—a situation prevailing
to the present.” 37 The fractured societies of Latin American, lacking a significant middle
class, did not seem to be cohesive enough to form strong institutions that could withstand
outside influences or create internal political stability.

THE PROMISE OF PAN AMERICANISM AND THE REALITY OF
WILSONIANISM
Under the rubric of the changing power dynamic between the U.S. and Latin
America, the first Pan-American Conference was held in 1889. Since the time of Bolivar
and Monroe the power of the U.S. had grown considerably. The U.S. had traditionally
36Fem, 118.
37Ronald M . Schneider. Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial
Powerhouse (Boulder Westview Press, 1996), 42.
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sought to keep European interests from interfering in its domestic affairs. Secretary of
State James G. Blaine particularly viewed Great Britain’s extensive commercial
involvement in Latin America as a threat to the U.S. Blaine's purpose for convening the
meeting was to establish the U.S. as the leading economic and military power in the
region, and by this action, countermanding British influence.38
Blaine's personal experiences led him to regard all European powers with
suspicion. France's and Spain's attempts to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation
with the Civil War angered him. but British partiality for the Confederate side during the
Civil War instigated a extreme Anglophobia within him /9 Many Latin American leaders
shared Blaine's opinions. Based on these mutual interests, the U.S. and Latin American
delegates agreed to oppose any territorial acquisitions by aggression or conquest.40
Blaine thought that a security agreement might support Latin American stability, and this
stability would increase trade between the U.S. and the rest of region. To this point he
said "First, to bring about peace and prevent future wars in North and South America;
second, to cultivate such friendly, commercial relations with all American countries as
would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States..."41 The U.S.
began to assume duties as the regional hegemon as it continued to arbitrate regional

38Edward P. Crapol. James G. Blaine: Architect o f Empire (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1998), 118.
39Joseph Byrne Lockey. Essays o f Pan-Americanism (Port Washington N.Y.:
Kennikat Press, 1939), 5 1.
•“ Crapol, 120.
4lLockey, 53.
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conflicts, such as the War of the Triple Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay, and the Pacific War involving, Chile Bolivia, and Peru, among others.42
Blaine's opening comments to the thirty-seven delegates emphasized his
ambitious goals 4j During the opening moments Blaine noted to participants, “...no
conference had ever assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions so vast,
or to contemplate the possibilities of a future so great and so inspiring."44 Blaine
followed his introduction with a statement that he regarded as the Pan-American Creed:
We believe that we should be drawn together more closely by the highways of the
sea. and that at no distant day the railway systems of the north and south will meet
upon the isthmus and connect by land routes the political and commercial capitals
of all America.
We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty confidence, will save all
American States from the burdens and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted
the older nations of the world.
We believe that a spirit of justice, of common and equal interests between the
American States, will leave no room for an artificial balance of power like unto
that which has led to wars abroad and drenched Europe in blood.45
Despite Blaine's visionary words, and extensive efforts, the conference did not
accomplish all that he had hoped for. Some progress was made. He was able to gain
consensus on the adoption of four declarations, and more importantly the establishment
of a bureau of information in Washington. This bureau was titled the International Union

42The War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) pitted Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay against Paraguay. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) resulted in the defeat of
Bolivia and Peru by Chile. Blaine personally involved himself in the mediation of the
War of the Pacific by attempting to arbitrate an end to the conflict. Crapol, 72.
43Ibid., 26.
■“Ibid, 74.
45Ibid.
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o f American Republics. This institution still exists, evolving into the Pan-American
Union, and in 1948 becoming the Organization o f American States.
The efforts o f Blaine continued as the U.S. and its Latin American counterparts
committed to meet in Mexico City. Despite growing resentment o f the U.S. during the
period, the meetings continued in Rio de Janeiro, and then in Buenos Aires. None o f the
Pan American conferences before the Great Depression made notable progress on
security issues. U.S. regional assertiveness was an impediment. The eviction o f the
Spanish from Cuba in 1898, and subsequent occupation o f the island angered some
hemispheric leaders. Howard J. Wiarda explains, The Spanish-American War o f 1898
led to “considerable sympathy in Latin America toward Spain and to a common suspicion
o f and even hostility toward the United States, which had humiliatingly defeated
Spain.”46 Latin American states interpreted President Theodore Roosevelt’s “big-stick”
diplomacy as evidence o f a growing policy o f interventionism by the U.S. Roosevelt's
regional policies resulted in Cuba and Panama being claimed as protectorates. The U.S.
assumed customs control over the Dominican Republic. Its unilateral activities created
considerable mistrust by Latin American states. J. Lloyd Mecham points out that this era
gave rise to an embedded anti-U.S. element in Latin American society: “Yankeephobe
intellectuals were becoming popular in Latin America.”47
These events influenced the agendas o f Pan American meetings (see Table 3.1
below), and ensured that they avoided important security topics. The most lasting

46Howard J. Wiarda,
Iberian-Latin American Connection: Implicationsfo r
U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 8.
47J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey o f United States-Latin American Relations (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 97-98.
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decision taken during the series of five meetings, after the initial conference, was during
the fourth meeting in Buenos Aires that created the Pan American Union.48 Security
cooperation was not fully absent in the Americas since states committed to meet under
the auspices of the Pan-American conferences. However, their inability to address the
most important issues of the day impeded their ability to make any meaningful progress.
When Woodrow Wilson was elected President, he was determined to reawaken a
moribund relationship between the U.S. and Latin America, and push

Table I. Pan-American Conferences Before World War II
Conference

Citv/Date

Conference

City/Date

First Int’l Conf. of
American States

Washington D.C..
1889

Sixth Int’l Conf. of
American States

Cuba. 1928

Second Int'l Conf. of
American States

Mexico City. 1901

Seventh Int'l Conf. of
American States

Montevideo. 1933

Third Int’l Conf. of
American States

Rio de Janeiro. 1906

Eighth Int’l Conf. of
American States

Buenos Aires. 1936

Fourth Int’l Conf. of
American States

Buenos Aires. 1910

Ninth Int’l Conf. of
American States

Lima. 1938

Fifth Int’l Conf. of
American States

Santiago. 1924

for greater regional integration. The means by which he pursued this goal struck a blow
to his own cause. President Wilson understood that the U.S. needed to regain the trust of
Latin American states in order to pursue the broader strategic goal of minimizing the
European presence in the hemisphere. Wilson’s ambitions ran counter to that of most
■^William Spence Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations with the United States
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), 398. Also, the Pan-American Union was
housed in a million dollar building funded by Andrew Carnegie.
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Latin American states. They were increasingly relying on their European ties as a
counterbalance to U.S. hegemonic regional power, circumventing U.S. security interests
that sought to deflect European influence from hemisphere.49 This pattern would repeat
itself during the 1970s and 80s. It was becoming increasingly clear little progress was
being made in the regional security dialog. The U.S. continually sought regional support
to keep other powerful states away from the Americas. By comparison Latin America
sought support from outside powers to uphold their state sovereignty due to concern of
U.S. dominance.
Wilson’s methods increased Latin American skepticism concerning U.S.
intentions. His regional policy reconciled his democratic ideals with the core interests of
the U.S.50 As many past U.S. Presidents: Wilson believed that Latin American political
instability created a security problem for the U.S. It formed an environment that allowed
powers from outside the hemisphere to manipulate the internal affairs of these states.
Wilson also believed that it was the responsibility of the U.S. to push Latin American
political development by guiding fellow American states towards constitutional
democracy. Therefore Wilson had a moral and realpolitik solution: intervene when Latin
American governments became untenable. Wilson’s policies were considered extremist
in Latin America. For example, Wilson refused to recognize any regional government
that came to power that was not democratic. In essence, every Latin American
government had to be certified by Washington as democratic. This was an unacceptable
49Mark T. Gilderhus, Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western
Hemisphere 1913-1921 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1886), 2.
^ G . Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International System (New York: The Free
Press, 1977), 107.
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encroachment on the sovereignty of Latin American states, a paternalism that brought
regional relations to an all-time low. The U.S. traditionally recognized any Latin
American government that came to power, its legitimacy judged by the stability it
created. Wilson’s policies towards the region was a reflection of what Kaman refers to as
a uniquely U.S. brand of “utopian pragmatism”.51 Latin Americans considered Wilson’s
policies towards the region as an indirect form of intervention.52
Under Wilson the U.S. militarily intervened in Haiti, Dominican Republic,
Mexico, and Nicaragua.53 The U.S. also pursued a policy of electoral intervention in
states it occupied. Repeated intervention stirred Latin American animosity. Latin
America’s displeasure manifested itself in many ways. Mexico supported the Nicaraguan
rebel. Augusto Sandino. who fought against U.S. occupation. Argentina was at the
forefront of regional efforts to push the ideal of hemispheric nonintervention that was
directed specifically against the U.S. Argentina became a regular antagonist of all U.S.
led security initiatives during Pan American meetings.54
Two dynamics may have soothed Latin American antipathy towards the U.S.
First. Latin American economic growth surged for sixteen years without pause in the

51Michael Kaman. People o f Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins o f
American Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1973), 298.
52Atkins, 223.
53For example. Wilson's occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914 lasted a halfyear and provoked an unexpected backlash against the U.S.. surprising the Wilson
administration. Jan Bazant, A Concise History o f Mexico: From Hidalgo to Cardenas.
1805-1940 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 143.
54Argentina viewed itself as a rival to the U.S. as its economy significantly grew
before World War I and Argentine leaders frequently played Britain against the U.S.
Ferns, 119.
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early twentieth century before the Great Depression, averaging thirteen percent a year.53
Second, most U.S. interventions took place in Central America and the Caribbean, far
away from Bogota. Buenos Aires. Caracas, and Rio de Janeiro. However, by the 1920s
Latin American leaders viewed Pan-American cooperation in a negative light due to
continued U.S. unilateral interventions. Rather than seeing it as a forum for inter
regional cooperation, many Latin Americans viewed Pan-Americanism as a moniker to
justify the U.S. imperialistic ambitions.56

RENAISSANCE OF SECURITY RELATIONS
From 1929-1945 there was significant improvement in inter-regional security
cooperation.5' This was primarily due to the secondary effects of the Great Depression
on U.S. foreign policy. These secondary effects included President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's “Good Neighbor Policy”, resulting in less U.S. regional intervention, and the
corresponding growth of Latin American trust. The U.S. became more conciliatory on
regional security issues, ameliorating concerns of U.S. regional ambitions. The goodwill
generated by this era aided the U.S. as it recruited regional allies during World War II.
A key component of the Good Neighbor policy was the Roosevelt
Administration's affirmation about the principle of nonintervention. Roosevelt
understood the benefits of a ‘hands-off approach. Domestically, this strategy paid

55Salvatore Prisco m and John Barret. Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study o f a
Commercial Expansionist. 1887-1920 (Birmingham, AL: The University of Alabama
Press, 1973).
36Mecham, A Survey o f United States-Latin American Relations. 101.
^Ibid., 86.
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dividends by giving Roosevelt's Democratic Party strong support in the U.S. South.
Roosevelt had decided that federal directives on U.S. racial relations should be curbed,
and to that end let southern state and local governments decide how race relations should
be managed. Roosevelt hoped to transfer his domestic 'nonintervention policy' to the
hemisphere and reap similar rewards.38
Roosevelt's strategy sought to avoid regional intervention, but also the advent and
continuation of the depression played an important role in dampening U.S. enthusiasm
towards incursion to the south. Because of the depression the pragmatism of the U.S.
outweighed its idealist impulses. The U.S. could not afford to maintain its past
interventionist policy as it also dealt with the burden of the depression. Frederick Pike
remarks “Just as they [U.S. leaders] had found high principles with which to justify
intervention that sometimes sprang mainly from hopes of economic gain, so now they
found rationales to justify discarding interventionist policies that cost too much.''39
Although the depression of 1929 affected both Latin America and the U.S.. it
comparatively affected the U.S. to a greater degree. The U.S. lost the market for its
manufactured goods, severely impacting its substantial middle and upper classes. By
comparison, the Latin American elite suffered loses in South and Central America, but
since the middle class was modest in size there was less disruption in Latin American
societies. A large part of the population was involved in subsistence agriculture, an

38Roosevelt let the South determine how to run its race relations without federal
interference, giving the Democrats a great deal of popular support in the region.
Frederick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years o f Generally Gentle Chaos
(Austin: University of Texas, 1995), 164-165.
59Ibid., 165.
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endeavor that continued despite the downturn in U.S. and European demand for Latin
American raw materials.
Both academics and politicians broadly supported Roosevelt's Good Neighbor
Policy. Part of the motivation behind U.S. interventions into Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua and the Philippines was tied to the Wilsonian idea that the
U.S. could recreate its domestic success abroad through direct political, cultural and
economic change in a given state, brought about through military intervention. By the
1920s it was becoming clear to policy-makers in the U.S. the "uplift or cultural change
could not be imposed on others, and therefore...change should not be imposed on
others."60 After the depression the lesson was underscored by the failure of the economy
of the U.S. The U.S. had lost faith in its superior economic, political and cultural
structures, and therefore lost the impetus to wish it on other states.
What seemed to be a setback to U.S. power and self-esteem seemed to benefit
regional relations. The Good Neighbor Policy was well received in Latin America. Even
Latin American populists admitted that. "It was a step forward as far as the aggressive
behavior of the United States was concerned...".61 Argentine leaders traditionally
viewed all U.S. policies of the era with suspicion. However, several commentaries in
Argentina were effusive about Roosevelt: “Mr. Roosevelt governs a democracy and
personifies its ideals of welfare and tranquility, which are the ideals of the whole of

60Ibid.
61Alonso Aguilar, El Panamericanismo de la Doctrina Monroe a la Doctrina
Johnson (Mexico: Cuardemos Americanos, 1965), 69.
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America.”62 The New Deal and Good Neighbor Policies made Roosevelt “a symbol of
high achievement and of roseate hope for the future” in Latin America.63
At the Seventh International Conference of American States, in 1933. all states
repudiated the practice of unilateral armed intervention. This time, the noninterventionist
statement was championed by the U.S. delegation. During the Buenos Aires (1936) and
Lima Conference (1938) the U.S. augmented its popular noninterventionist policy with
an economic policy designed to increase U.S. imports from the region. The outcomes
were beneficial for the cause of interregional cooperation. Between 1929-32 the U.S.
accounted for 35 percent of total Latin American trade, and by 1938 this increased to 45
percent. During this period trade increased by a total of 236 percent between the U.S.
and Latin America, comparing favorably to Latin Americas trade with Europe, that
increased at a substantially lower percent.64 The increase in U.S. trade and decrease in
intervention improved relations and reduced Latin American concerns of U.S.
domination.
The amelioration of tensions between the U.S. and Latin America came at a
fortuitous time for the U.S. Because of the improved climate the U.S. was able to lobby
Latin American states to support its war efforts against axis powers after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. Brazil allowed the U.S. to construct air and naval bases in the
northeast to defend the Atlantic and against a potential German invasion from Africa.
Further a Brazilian expeditionary force of 25.000 men fought in Italy, sustaining 451
62Dozer, 28.
63Ibid.. 27.
64Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation o f the United
States fo r the Calender Year 1937 (Washington, D.C.: 1939), 785-786.
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casualties and 2,000 wounded.65 Other countries contributed. Guatemala allowed the
construction of a bomber base in its sovereign territory, and Nicaragua a naval patrol
station near Corinto. Other facilities were erected in Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and
Peru.66 Brazil and other regional states gave the U.S. preferential pricing on important
raw materials. Concerns about U.S. intervention gave way to a high degree of security
cooperation never previously experienced. The only two states that did not immediately
cooperate were Argentina and Chile. Chile later relented and chose the Allied side. It
had been concerned with the problem of defending its long coast from Axis attack.
However, Argentina remained friendly to the Axis cause during the war due to the proGerman disposition of its military and monetary payments it received from Germany.
The creation of the Inter American Defense Board (LADB) in 1942. at Rio de
Janeiro, was a notable milestone for regional security relations. The LADB was directed
to be a consulting agency designed to deal with communications security, aviation, naval
protection of shipping and transportation.67 It was created to allow closer coordination
between the U.S. and its allies during the war. but due to its success has endured until
today. The security cooperation by Latin American states would not have occurred
without the sharp decrease in U.S. power that essentially abrogated the interventionist
policy of the Wilson era. When U.S. power decreased, regional security cooperation
improved.

65E. Bradford Bums, A History o f Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993). 359.
66Mecham, The U.S. and Interamerican Security, 221.
67Ibid.. 224.
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Today the LABD mission's include: providing technical military advice and
consultant services to the OAS. overseeing an academic program through the InterAmerican Defense College, and convening a meeting with member states representatives.
The meeting is composed of an organization, the Council of Delegates, are from twenty
member countries, and meets bimonthly to review approaches on common security
issues.

CONCLUSION
As U.S. hegemony grew during the 1800s two discemable trends emerged in
order. The first was that the U.S. was increasingly recognized as the regional leader. The
second was that as U.S. power asymmetry increased. Latin American attitudes towards
U.S. leadership became less receptive, and U.S. policies became more assertive, forming
another obstacle to productive security relations. These difficulties can be attributed to
the growth of extreme power asymmetry in U.S.-Latin American relations.
As the power gap between the U.S. and Latin America increased under U.S.
hegemony, security cooperation became more tenuous, and as the power gap decreased,
security cooperation became less difficult. During the formative stages of U.S.-Latin
American security relations, from the early 1800s to the period after the Civil War of the
U.S.. neither of the two sides were clearly dominant. Although the U.S. won its
independence from Great Britain, and won Britain's support of the non-interference
clause of the Monroe Doctrine. Latin American states were still unshielded from
European intrigue. The relative equality of regional states was underscored by Bolivar's
view of the U.S. as a regional competitor rather than a guarantor of Spanish American
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security. Despite hegemonic overtones, the Monroe Doctrine was not threatening to
Latin America states, gaining acceptance in Latin America since all regional leaders were
concerned about European encroachment on their sovereignty, but few were
apprehensive that intervention might occur from the U.S. One might be tempted to
conclude that this time period shows multipolarity may generate security cooperation,
however states must regularly meet through an established institution to demonstrate
some level of cooperation. Regional states were mostly in a formative stage and this
stage of regional maturity would not be reached until the end of the century.
The U.S. Civil War had several outcomes that deeply affected the regional
security dynamic. An immediate impact was an increase in regional interventions by
European powers as they sensed a power vacuum, since the U.S. was preoccupied by
internal conflict. Another outcome was the ascendancy of the U.S. to the position of
regional hegemon, a position it has not yet relinquished. The U.S. ended the Civil War as
an emerging world power, championing regional security cooperation by ending the
French occupation of Mexico, the Spanish occupation of Santa Domingo and the attempt
to broker a peace agreement in the Paraguayan War. After this point the Monroe
Doctrine became the focus of regional security, enjoying a degree of support in Latin
America despite its unilateral nature. This period lasted until the 1890s. when Latin
American opposition to U.S. hegemony began to more openly assert itself during the first
Pan American conference, and the Spanish American War.
As U.S. power grew, so did its foreign interests. When the century drew to a
close, U.S. power was increasing in the region. With the growth of U.S. power, the
Monroe Doctrine increasingly resembled a tool for U.S. dominance from the Latin
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American perspective rather than a regional security institution. The growth in U.S.
power coincided with an increasing Latin American mistrust of the U.S.. producing an
environment ill suited to create security cooperation. The Baltimore affair is a
manifestation of this dynamic. The U.S. was able to dictate a favorable outcome in this
situation due to its dominance. Chile grew to resent the influence of the U.S. in its
internal affairs, and its inability to commensurately affect U.S. policy.
Blaine inaugurated the first Pan American conference in 1889 to address mutual
security interests in the region, the first indicator of hegemonic institution building. The
conference produced some positive results, but a single demonstration of U.S. goodwill
was not enough to overcome growing Latin American pessimism about U.S. intentions.
Blaine hoped to draw Latin American states closer to the U.S. by showing the strength of
its economic and political structures. Some Latin American dignitaries were impressed,
but not convinced that they must adopt U.S. practices to achieve the same results at
home. Further, a few delegates interpreted U.S. vitality as a threat.
The Pan American conferences continued despite the growing schism between the
U.S. and Latin America. U.S. military activities in Cuba, Haiti. Nicaragua, and Panama
raised alarms throughout the region. Wilson’s unabashed policy of intervening in Latin
American states was a sign of strong hegemony of the U.S. To many in the U.S..
Wilson's policy that sought to generate more regional democracies was morally correct.
The Latin American perception of these policies was that they perpetuated U.S.
domination. Any positive impact of the Pan American meetings was nullified by the U.S.
rise to strong hegemony, reflected in its active regional interventionism. The irony of the
Monroe Doctrine began to emerge: through the document the U.S. guaranteed the safety
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of the America's from outside intervention; however, Latin American states increasingly
viewed the primary threat as the U.S., emanating from within the region.
The trend of higher levels of power asymmetry and Latin America discontent
continued until the advent of the depression in 1929. affecting regional security by
discouraging states from socializing the political and economic values that the
hegemon openly encouraged. Although the U.S. was able to establish a regional
institution to address security issues, the growing power asymmetry in the system
abrogated the full effectiveness of the institutions. Although the Good Neighbor
Policy ameliorated regional tensions to some degree, the U.S. still did not win support
from Argentina and Chile during World War EL and had to grant concession to Brazil
and Mexico to secure their backing.
The U.S. had neither the ability nor the desire to continue Wilson's
interventionist policies as a result of the depression. The depression dampened U.S.
hegemony and laid the groundwork for a rapprochement between regional states.
The U.S. clearly maintained the status of the dominant state in the region, but lacked
the will or capacity to actively intervene as in the past thirty years. The Roosevelt
Administration's Good Neighbor Policy, that eschewed regional interventions, was a
symbol of the reduced regional hegemony of the U.S. The cooperative behavior
among regional states slowly resuscitated the concept of a regional security
partnership. World War II was the catalyst to introduce a new era in regional security
cooperation by prompting the creation of the IADB that was specifically tasked with
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researching security issues and recommending actions based on the studies it
produces.68
The strength of U.S. hegemony after World War II foretold that the OAS would
have limited effectiveness as a security cooperation institution. The actual level of power
asymmetry was at its apex after World War II, when the U.S. comprised half of the
world's GDP. Despite the high ambitions for regional security after the war. cooperation
minted during the early 1940s seemed to completely dissipate by the late 1950s. Chapter
four demonstrates a pattern repeated in the study: the growth of U.S. power compared to
Latin American states leading to difficulties in regional security cooperation.

68

The Organization O f American States A nd The Inter-American Defense Board
(Washington, D.C., OAS, 2000), http://www.oas.org/csh/engIish/newdocOas%20Jid.htm,
October 4,2001.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RISE OF STRONG HEGEMONY (1945-1969)

From 1945 to 1969 U.S.-Latin American security relations began from a solid
foundation, freshly minted by four years of economic and security cooperation against
the axis powers during World War 13. Rather than sustaining this solid foundation the
following fifteen-year period had a corrosive effect on inter-American security relations.
By 1969 security cooperation levels had deteriorated to their lowest point since before the
depression.
The 1945-1969 time-period supports the argument of this dissertation that
extreme power asymmetry may erode the security cooperation gains realized by
hegemony. The more state leaders are made aware of the over-bearing presence of a
dominant hegemon the less likely they are to participate in security cooperation schemes.
Multiple interventions reminded Latin American states that the U.S. had the capability to
interfere without consultation in their domestic affairs. Each successive intervention
during this time period provoked even stronger reactions from regional states against U.S.
policy. Interventions during this period included Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959), and
the Dominican Republic (1965). Instead of bolstering regional unity against the
perceived threat of co mmunism , each intervention served to unify Latin America against
the U.S. as it reminded them the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. gave it the
capability to manipulate regional politics with ease.
Unilateral actions by the U.S. eroded the effectiveness of the OAS. The OAS was
the only multilateral tool of consultation, and when it began to fail Latin American states
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began to reconsider their economic and military dependencies on the U.S., realizing the
extent to which U.S. dominance had grown. Suddenly, Latin American leaders
scrutinized every aspect of U.S. Latin-American relations.
The Kennedy Administration noted the ground swell of anti-American sentiment
and initiated the Alliance for Progress to shore-up regional support for the U.S. Although
appreciated, the Alliance for Progress did not mark an effort on the scale of the Marshall
Plan, as many Latin American nations hoped, and in reality only demonstrated a modest
increase in total U.S. aid to the region. It is likely, the effort had a positive impact of
some kind in suppressing radical anti-U.S. sentiment, but the beneficial impact of the
Alliance for Progress was offset by what Latin American leaders perceived as the U.S.
preoccupation with Soviet expansion that was one cause of U.S interventionist activity.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY
Table 2 demonstrates the significance of the power differential between Latin
America and the U.S. Latin America's total GNP was only fourteen percent of the GNP
of the U.S. in 1963. and by 1969 remained at fourteen percent. Brazil has the largest
economy in Latin American, and it grew by 27 percent during the six-year period.
Mexico's GNP had a higher rate of growth at 36 percent. By comparison, the growth of
the GNP of the U.S. was only 24 percent. Although Latin American growth rates were
higher than the growth rate of the U.S.. it was not enough to substantially alter the
fourteen percent gap in total GNP.
The amount of total U.S. military expenditure displayed in Table 3 also
demonstrates the dominance of the U.S. in the region, hi 1964, the lowest year of U.S.
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Table 2. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1963-1969
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1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: USACD, 1975), 17. 23,46. 61.

defense expenditure, the total equaled nearly $52 billion. The combination of
Argentina’s, Brazil’s. Mexico’s and Venezuela’s defense spending equals roughly $1.3
billion. The U.S. far exceeded Latin American spending as a percent of total GNP well.
In 1967 the U.S. spent 9.5 percent of its GNP on defense. The highest rate of defense
spending in the same year was Brazil at 2.7 percent of total GNP.
These statistics show that despite the fact that Latin American states did not have
comparable resources, Latin American states did not feel threatened enough to
dramatically increase defense spending to match U.S. annual levels. This reinforces the
notion that the system was hegemonic and not purely based on dominance or rule of
force. Defense spending remained relatively consistent during the eight-year time frame
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Table 3. Annual Military Expenditure, 1963-1970

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

Argentina

Brazil

Mexico

U.S.

Venezuela

308
393
414
473
342
380
435
486

333
678
487
625
740
746
803
1054

112
128
136
168
168
188
205
220

52,295
51.213
51,827
63,572
75.448
80.732
81.443
77.854

181
144
166
172
198
194
193
204

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World M ilitary Expenditures and
Arms Trade. 1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: USACD, 1975). 23, 31, 35. 36. Numbers
are millions of U.S. dollars, in current 1972 dollars.

for all states. Since Latin American states did not directly respond to U.S. economic and
military strength by increasing their own defense expenditures, it seems U.S. dominance
was relatively accepted, meaning that although the U.S. might not enjoy total support for
its leadership, the resentment was not strong enough to overcome the benefit of public
goods produced by the U.S. It is also interesting to note that Mexico’s total military
expenditure was the lowest among the Latin American states listed on Table 3. despite its
geographical proximity to the U.S. Although Mexico was one of the greatest detractors
of the U.S. in the region during this period, it apparently did not view the U.S. as an
imminent threat.

FORMATION AND DEGENERATION OF GOODWILL: 1945-1959
At the beginning of the post World War H era there were few outward symptoms
of the problems that later came to characterize hemispheric security relations. Significant
cooperation between the U.S. and most regional states during World War n , along with
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almost twenty years of a lack of U.S. military and political involvement in the region,
contributed to a constructive era of regional relations. However, the dramatic economic
and military growth of the U.S. in the World War II era led to new global responsibilities
that made the U.S. redefine its regional role to the detriment of regional security
cooperation. The U.S. began to view the region less as a partner in security cooperation,
and more of a detriment as its rivalry with the Soviet Union ensued. The threat of
communism became a regular focus of U.S. policy.
The growth of U.S. power during the war was impressive: during World War H
fifty percent of the global GNP was concentrated in the U.S. Yet by the end of the war
the U.S. had ninety-eight divisions stationed overseas.1 The military posture of the U.S.
resumed less exaggerated proportions as the post World War II era emerged, however,
they demonstrated the preponderance of U.S. regional strength compared to Latin
America. The vast asymmetry in regional power that resulted in the strong hegemony of
the U.S. did not immediately translate into a deterioration of relations. Just as after the
Civil War. when the U.S. quickly ascended to the top tier of states in the global
community, the sudden rise of the U.S. seemed to bring a flurry of security cooperation
that deteriorated in the following years.
Immediately following World War II security cooperation coalesced around PanAmericanism. Several Latin American states directly aided the U.S. cause by ensuring
the supply of critical war materials; in return the U.S. cooperated with Latin American
governments to solve internal economic problems associated with Latin American efforts

lJoseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f American Power
(USA: Basic Books, 1990), 71.
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Table 4. U.S. Lend Lease Aid to Latin America
Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador

Amount in $
Millions
NA
5.5
361.4
23.2
8.3

Amount in $
Millions
3.1
1.4
.4
39.3
.9
NA
18.9
7.1
4.5

Country

Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
6.6 Peru
1.6 Uruguay
7.8 Venezuela
.9
Total

493.0

Source: John Child. Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System. 1938-1978
(Boulder: Westview Press. 1980). p. 48.

to support the allied cause.2 The U.S. demonstrated part of its economic support for Latin
American states that cooperated during and after the war through a program called LendLease aid/ Child states “Lend-Lease was the major component of the U.S.-Latin
American military bilateral relationship and was. in effect, the precursor of the Military

2For example the Commodities Credit Corporation, credits supplied by the
Export-Import Bank, contracted to purchase most the crops of Latin American states
(e.g.: wool of Uruguay, cotton of Nicaragua, etc.) since Latin America lacked adequate
markets during the war. Edgar B. Brossard, “The Effect of the War on Trade in the
Americas,” Pan American Union. Bulletin. LXXVT (December 1942), 661-667.
’The lend-lease program was an arrangement for the transfer of war supplies,
including food, machinery, and services, to over thirty nations whose defense was
considered vital to the defense of the United States in World War n . The Lend-Lease
Act. gave the President power to sell, transfer, lend, or lease such war materials. Leon
Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans. and the Coming o f the Cold War: A Study o f the
Implementation o f Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).
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Assistance Program of the post-War years.”4 Table 4 shows that Brazil received seventythree percent of the aid. Brazil was the primary benefactor because of the costs associated
with the construction of airbases in the North of Brazil, and financial costs associated
with its direct military involvement in the European theater. Many Latin American
states joined the allied cause during World War II. One exception was Argentina that
remained neutral— in reality leaning towards the Axis side— until March 1945, on the eve
of Germany's surrender. During the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Pan-American Conference,
Argentina actively sought to dissuade other Latin American states from siding with the
U.S. The U.S. retaliated by halting arms sales and loan credits. Argentina maintained its
stance due to concerns of U.S. overt aggression and due to the strong U.S. alliance with
Brazil.5
Although most countries did not have the military capability to directly aid U.S.
operations in the Pacific or European theaters, they instead gave the U.S. raw materials at
well below market prices. For example, Chile honored an arbitrary price placed on
copper during the war. Chile’s acceptance below market prices incurred economic losses
estimated in value from S 107 to $500 million.6 Brazil not only gave raw materials such
as rubber and coffee to the US at devalued prices, but also directly took part in the war
effort. In August of 1942 Brazil declared war on Italy and Germany. President Vargas

4John Child. Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American M ilitary System, 1938-1978
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 47.
5See, David Rock. Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin
(Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1987), 247-253.
^Theodore Moran. Multinational Corporations and the Politics o f Dependence:
Copper in Chile (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 61.
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sent a 25,000 man expeditionary force, one division, to fight in the Italian campaign in
late 1944. The division saw significant action in Italy, sustaining loses of 451 soldiers
with 2.000 wounded.7
With the norm of security cooperation pervading hemispheric relations, the IADB
was created to aid with the war effort. The IADB was the first dedicated security
institution of the Americas, created in 1942 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The organization’s primary focus was to plan the defense o f the Western Hemisphere
against the Axis threat. U.S. strategists thought that German successes in North Africa
would provide them with further motivation to invade South America from East Africa.
After the war there was much debate about the mission of the IADB. The U.S. wanted to
maintain the Board, other states, such as Brazil, wished to create a permanent
organization since the LADB was designed as a temporary measure.s The role of the
IADB is defined by the OAS "to strengthen the ties of military cooperation between the
American nations with a view to their common defense."4 Many Latin American States
that had contributed to the allied cause were expecting greater rewards for their loyalty
than the U.S. offered. What they did not expect was to witness the U.S. channel billions
of dollars into Asia and Europe, primarily benefiting former axis enemies, while scant
attention was given to Latin American economic conditions.

' Bums, 359.
SM. Margaret Ball, The OAS in Transition (Durham NC: Duke University Press.
1969). 38 L
9OAS Secretary General Annual Report, 1964-65 (Washington. D.C.: Pan
American Union, 1965), 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
The divide between U.S. goals and Latin American goals were reflected in how
each sought to take advantage of inter-American relations. To solidify its position as
regional hegemon, the U.S. sought to standardize military equipment in the region by
exporting its arms surplus to regional states.10 The effort had two advantages:
standardization of equipment would guarantee some degree of interoperability among
armed forces in case they had to face a common threat, and it guaranteed the U.S. as the
primary supplier of arms to the region, also keeping foreign powers out the hemisphere.
The 1948 inter-American conference at Bogota, established the Organization of
American States. In some ways this occasion symbolized the gulf in Latin American and
U.S. perceptions about inter-American relations. Regional security cooperation that led
to the Bogota conference began during the opening stages of World War II. During the
inter-American conference that took place in Havana. July 1940. the delegates approved a
statement “ ...an attack on one American state is considered as an attack on all American
states.” 11 At the Bogota Conference the U.S. understood the creation of the OAS as a
symbol of hemispheric solidarity based on common democratic principles, overlooking
the fact that most of its regional allies were at best partial democracies. The U.S. also
viewed the OAS as a tool to manage Latin America: “Americans could run their own
affairs far away from the UN Security Council where Soviet veto power might be
decisive.” 12

l0Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America
(New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1984). 92.
11Foreign Relations o f the United States, Vol. V, (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1940), 188.
12Ibid., 93.
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By comparison Larin American states viewed the OAS as means to address
economic and social problems. David Green points out that Larin America thought the
special relationship endowed them with the right to expect more economic aid to alleviate
its underdevelopment: “Seeing a growing U.S. economic commitment to European
construction, some Larin Americans feared that all the prewar and war time plans for
postwar development projects in Larin America would once again be relegated to
oblivion."’13 The divergence of views contributed to the deterioration of relations that
seemed destined to become more polarized. As one analyst explained. “PanAmericanism moved into the 1950s with its Northern component growing increasingly
conservative, its Southern component increasingly restive, and much of the glue being
supplied by alleged Soviet threats to hemispheric security, the Panama Canal, and *our
way of life.* *’14 With two divergent sets of expectations, security cooperation soon
began to erode.
The cooperation generated by convergence of American states against the axis
powers became institutionalized with the creation of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance in 1947. The Rio Treaty is part of the triad of institutions that constitute the
Inter-American system, the other two being the Charter of the OAS and the Pact of
Bogota. The Rio treaty was originally proposed in 1945, before there was a specific
threat from the Soviet Union. The treaty directs that members must come to the aid of
any regional state endangered by an outside power. Any armed attack by a power outside
l3David Green, The Containment o f Latin America: A History o f the Myths and
Realities o f the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 170.
I4Lawrence E. Harrison, “Waking from the Pan-American Dream.” Foreign
Policy 5, no. 1 (Winter 1971-72), 2.
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of the region is considered an attack against all. Signatories to the Pan-American Union
Treaty are obliged to recall chiefs of diplomatic missions, break diplomatic relations,
engage in economic sanctions and armed force against any outside aggressor.13 No state
is bound to use armed force until all members approve the measure. In order for a
measure to pass, two-thirds of the signatory members must agree to the action. Perhaps
the greatest achievement of the Rio Treaty was that it turned an informal regional
association into a formal regional security association. The success of the founding of
regional security institutions symbolized growing trust between regional states, and a
general acceptance of U.S. hegemony.
The Rio Treaty was followed by the creation of the OAS in 1948 at the Bogota
conference. The document became known as the Bogota Charter and served as the
constitution for the members of the nascent organization. The Charter established three
primary organs. An assembly was established to deal with broad policy guidelines. The
most important organ was the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to act as the Organ
of Consultation for hemispheric security threats, settling inter-regional disputes and
collective security measures against outside aggression. The Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs consults with the Advisory Defense Committee that is composed of high
ranking military officers from each country.16 The Council of the Organization of
American States (CO AS) is composed of one ambassadorial representative from every
member state. The most important role for CO AS turned out to be the prominence of one

l5Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 282.
l6Atkins, 317.
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of its subordinate organs, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council that
coordinates OAS economic and social programs.17
The Pact of Bogota, or Inter-American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, was created
during the 1948 Bogota conference to mediate regional disputes and consolidate the
obligations undertaken in connection with previous treaties. The Pact of Bogota entered
into effect with thirteen states ratifying it at the initial conference in 1948.
Regional security cooperation during this period continued outside the realm of
hemispheric structures. Latin America was a key ally to the U.S. in the UN assembly
during the pre-World War II years. For example, during the pre-World War II years they
wholly supported an U.S. sponsored resolution concerning the Korean conflict, enabling
the legislation’s passage, even if they did not volunteer to send troops directly supporting
for U.S. in the Korean War.18

DECREASING COOPERATION UNDER HEGEMONIC BEHAVIOR
Signs of impending problems between the U.S. and Latin American security
relations began to surface a few years after World War II. Argentine leaders were
traditionally the greatest impediment to U.S. leadership since the first Pan American
conference in 1889. and despite the degree of regional security cooperation after the war.
remained antagonistic. President Juan Perdn led a populist ‘third way’ movement that

I7Ibid.. p. 318.
l8John A. Houston. Latin America in the United Nations (Westport CT:
Greenwood Press, 1978) 105, 290.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107
sought a path between capitalism and communism.19 The goal of Perdn was to obtain a
position of neutrality for Argentina and encourage other regional states to do the same.
The reality was that these efforts were aimed squarely at constraining the regional
hegemony of the U.S.
Argentina had never been a strong regional ally to the U.S.. so although Peron's
actions were evocative, they did not generate much concern in Washington. However,
other problems began to appear. As previously stated, Latin American states were
generally disappointed at the amount of resources the U.S. made available for Latin
American development. Regional states that allied themselves with the U.S. expected a
greater reward for their loyalty during the war, and the lack of U.S. attention drew a
negative response. Latin American disappointment over the lack of U.S. economic
support gave impetus to the creation of the Organization of Central American States in
1951. Dozer states that. ‘*this movement of closer Latin American cooperation was
inspired, in part, by the desire of some Latin Americans to free themselves from
domination by the United States.*’20 The Latin American movement towards regional
trade agreements gained momentum into the 1960s. resulting in the creation of the
Andean Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). Gavin
Boyd and Yale Ferguson trace the inception of these organizations directly to insufficient
support of the OAS. leading some countries to bypass the OAS.21

I9Dozer, 316.
20Ibid., 321.
2lGavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson, “Latin American Regionalism,” in Regionalism
and Global Security, ed. Gavin Boyd (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), 143.
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After years of the institution of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy the U.S. began
a pattern of intervention in Latin America once again. The most controversial of these
was in Guatemala (1954). Cuba (1959), and the Dominican Republic (1965). Although
the U.S. did not directly intervene by the use of U.S. troops in the first two cases, it
played an important role that concerned the U.S. Latin American security partners. The
strength of U.S. regional hegemony began to express itself through the increase in
interventions, just as the Good Neighbor Policy had represented U.S. weakness, resulting
in a decline of intervention.
The willingness of states to participate in U.S. sponsored regional security
cooperation was diminished by U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Guatemalan
Government in 1954. Guatemalan instability began after a coup by General Ponce in
1944. As a result, Juan Jose' Are'valo was elected President of Guatemala. His platform
of social, political and economic reform polarized the national political debate because of
the general perception of his communist leanings. Ponce wanted to overthrow Arevalo
and sought help from the U.S. In 1951 President Arbenz was elected, and he intensified
Arevalo's controversial policies.
Under the direction of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the U.S. prompted
other OAS states to support a resolution that called for appropriate action against the
domination of the political institutions of an American state.”

Although the U.S. sought

OAS approval to take action in Guatemala, Secretary of State Dulles warned that the U.S.

~Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1952 (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1972), 299-300.
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was prepared to take unilateral action with or without regional support.23 On June 18.
1954, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and two hundred men that had been
trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) entered Guatemala to take control of
the government. The plan depended on the psychological impact, utilizing the radio to
convince Arbenz a massive invasion was taking place, when actually a far smaller action
occurred.24 The Guatemalan Army refused to defend Arbenz, leading to his resignation
on June 27.
Although the U.S. was able to procure the support of the OAS, it resorted to
strong-arm tactics that raised issues about the ability of Latin American states to make
independent decisions. Latin American diplomats at the tenth inter-American
Conference in Caracas were pressured by the U.S. to support a measure that allowed the
Guatemalan intervention to occur.25 Latin American delegates were disillusioned by U.S.
tactics, and by the fact that the U.S. did not announce any new aid programs as a favor
for their loyalty. Richard Immerman reports that general Latin America disillusionment
resulted from the response of the U.S. to events in Guatemala and performance during the
Caracas Conference.26 Piero Gleijeses writes that Latin American governments were
frustrated over the outcome of the Guatemalan Conference. They supported what they
^Gaddis Smith, The Last Years o f the Monroe Doctrine (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1994), 81.
24Cole Blaiser, The G iant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh:
Pittsburgh University Press, 1987), 27.
^Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story o f the
American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co, 1982).
26Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f
Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).
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viewed as a weakening of the Pan American ideal yet received no pledges of economic
aid in return.27 The actions of the U.S. worked to de-Iegitimize the OAS as a multilateral
tool, in the process sensitizing Latin American states to the U.S. hegemony.
Latin American states objected more strongly to U.S. actions against the Cuban
revolution. In I960 Fidel Castro began to expropriate all U.S. owned properties in Cuba.
In response, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador from Havana.28 The Eisenhower and
Kennedy Administrations approved the military training of Cuban exiles to be used in an
operation to overthrow Cuban leadership. The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April
of I960 and failed primarily due to poor operational and strategic planning. Castro's
increasingly pro-communist stand reduced his popularity within his own army and with
the general population.29 However, the inability of the exile forces to coordinate
operations with anti-Castro elements on the mainland doomed any chance of success/0
President John F. Kennedy sensed failure and ordered no further support for the
U.S. trained force as it invaded Cuba. Without U.S. naval and aircraft support to provide
cover for the invasion force, the operation was doomed to fail. After Cuba's success at
repelling the invasion, internal security forces smashed the domestic resistance through
the mass arrest of any real or suspected collaborators. The Bay of Pigs failure abrogated

2'Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United
States. 1944-54 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 340.
28Jaime Suchlicki. Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (Washington: Brassey's US
Inc.. 1990), 163.
29Ibid., 164.
■^Suchlicki reports that anti-Castro forces were only told about the invasion the
day it happened since the exile community believed their ranks may have been penetrated
by Castro informers. Ibid.
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any further direct attempt to unseat the Cuban government by Cuban exiles or U.S.
leadership.
Latin American reaction to the U.S. intervention was far from the total support
that U.S. leaders had sought. Latin American states understood the Cuban-U.S. dispute
as a dominant power exerting influence over a weaker one. not as part of a larger
communism vs. democracy ideological struggle. Latin American leaders became more
inclined to side with Cuba because they could identify with Cuba’s vulnerable position in
regard to the U.S. The Latin American view of the U.S. deteriorated after the Bay of Pigs
incident, and support of Castro increased throughout the region/1 Even before the Bay of
Pigs. Paterson found that as the U.S. explored OAS mediation to the Cuban Revolution.
Latin American diplomats had already began to express sympathy for C astro/' The
Cuban dilemma provides a looking glass into the deeper problem of U.S.-Latin American
security cooperation during the Cold War. The U.S. viewed the security threat as
emanating from outside the region whereas Latin American states increasingly viewed
the U.S. as the security threat. The difference in perception is intimately tied to the
overwhelming power of the U.S. in the region. Because of strong hegemony, the U.S.
was free to act unilaterally. Regional approval was usually sought by the U.S., but was
not perceived as a determining factor by policy makers in Washington. Because Latin
American leaders understood the U.S. only used the OAS as a pretext for its policies and

3IBoris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York:
Praeger Publisher, 1966), 241.
32Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph o f
the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257.
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demonstrated an unwillingness to accept decisions against it as binding, they began to
lose faith in the institution.
Once Fidel Castro gained power and became a self-proclaimed communist the
U.S. continued to encounter difficultly garnering regional support against Cuba. The
U.S. contended that all forms of communism were instigated by a foreign source the
Soviet Union. Latin American policy makers disagreed. As Ball states: “Latin
Americans were disposed to feel that an indigenous communist movement represented a
legitimate exercise of self-determination against which the American republics were
precluded from taking action...“.JJ> The U.S. requested that the OAS condemn Cuba for
inviting Soviet and other communist intervention into the region. Cuba responded by
counter-condemning the U.S. for its aggression and intervention. Latin American states
at the meeting accepted neither statement, another blow to the U.S.34
In the autumn of 1961 a resolution was introduced in the OAS to call a meeting
about the issue of Cuban human rights abuses and conducting subversive activities
against its neighbors. Six Latin American states did not support the position of the U.S.
on the matter: Argentina. Bolivia. Brazil, Chile Ecuador, and Mexico. Although the
conference was finally held, the best result the U.S. procured from the proceedings was
an agreement from other states that Marxist-Leninist principles were antithetical to the
values of the inter-American system /5 A tepid anticommunist proclamation was quite

33Ball, 459.
34Ibid.. 460.
35Gordon C onneil-Sm ith, The Inter-American System (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), 177.
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different than the U.S. goal to have unanimous support in its quest to have Cuba expelled
from the OAS. Fourteen states eventually voted with the U.S., while six abstained. Brazil
and Mexico abstained from approving the measure, important regional players the U.S.
needed to demonstrate unanimity.36
If U.S. support o f interventions in Cuba and Guatemala disillusioned regional
states and polarized them against the U.S., the direct intervention against the Dominican
Republic in 1965 increased Latin American determination to bring U.S. dominance under
control. Lowenthai points out that when the U.S. Marines landed in the Dominican
Republic, the last time the U.S. had committed to such an action was over forty years
earlier. “Despite repeated involvements in Latin American politics— in Argentina, in
Guatemala, and particularly Cuba—the United States had, since 1928, always kept its
actions short o f overt military intervention.”37 The U.S. not only broke the norm o f direct
intervention, a norm established by Hoover and Roosevelt that dramatically improved
relations over the years, but it did so without consulting the OAS, knowing the OAS
would disapprove. This act significantly damaged inter-American relations and solidified
the impression o f the U.S. as a malignant hegemon throughout much o f the region.
The Dominican Republic was continually in turmoil under the increasing
unpopular Rafael Trujillo regime. Out o f twenty security incidents in the Caribbean

36Ibid.. 178.
37Abraham F. LowenthaL, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1972), I.
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between 1948 and 1959 the Dominican Republic was the focus of nine of them.38
During this time, the U.S. utilized the inter-American forum to address the situation in a
regional setting. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter emphasized the inter-American
commitment to nonintervention over other principles. He believed that overthrowing
regimes, even when regarded as anti-democratic, produced disorder and gave a political
opportunity for the manifestation of communism/9
Actions by the Dominican Republic gave the OAS reasons for consternation. In
1959 an aircraft, flying with the complicity of the Dominican Government, accidentally
dropped leaflets over Curasao that were intended for Venezuela. The leaflets implored
the Venezuelan Army to overthrow the current regime. In later incidents Trujillo was
found to have ordered the assassination of the Venezuelan leader and further supported a
military uprising in Venezuela. Despite the Dominican Republic's acts against the interAmerican norm of non-intervention, and the distaste of Trujillo throughout the region, the
OAS agreed to sanctions but would not support direct intervention.40 This was the first
time the OAS agreed to sanctions but was motivated by other reasons than U.S. pressure.
Latin American states strongly disapproved of Trujillo's attempted assassination of
another regional leader; they cared little for the anticommunist agenda of the U.S.41

j8G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson. The Dominican Republic and the United
States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia
Press, 1998). 92.
39Herter*s position was stated as the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs in Santiago Chile, 1959. Ibid., 97.
40Ibid., p. 100.
41Ibid., p. 102.
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In 1961 Trujillo was assassinated and the U.S. dispatched eight ships with a
Marine contingent of 1,800 men as a deterrent against any movement by the Trujillo
family to retake power. Although the U.S. did this without consulting the OAS, there
was no open Latin American criticism of the action.42 The U.S. committed forty-five
military advisors to retrain Dominican forces under the U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group. Aid was increased by the Kennedy administration to validate the
Alliance for Progress program, the aid disbursed after democratic elections resulted in the
nomination of President Juan Bosch. However, U.S. efforts were to no avail, Bosch was
overthrown by the military in 1963. In April 1965 pro-Bosch forces, or constitutionalists,
clashed with military supporters, or loyalists, throwing the Dominican Republic into civil
war. The loyalists requested U.S. intervention, and by the end of April, five hundred U.S.
Marines landed when it appeared the constitutionalists would win. Eventually, the U.S.
reached a total of 20.000 troops at the apex of the intervention.43
The Dominican intervention was a turning point in U.S .-Latin American relations.
The U.S. helped prevent the constitutionalists from gaining power but the action had a
deleterious impact on relations since the U.S. had not consulted with the OAS before it
intervened.44 The U.S. worked to receive OAS approval after the intervention by

42Connell-Smith, 176.
43The U.S. viewed Bosch and his supporters as being too far to the left and
therefore the U.S. believed his leadership was inviting another Cuban-style revolution.
As a consequence the U.S. did not want to suffer the same fate twice in its own backyard.
Dent. 146.
44Bruce Palmer Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis o f 1965
(Lexington: Universtiy Press o f Kentucky, 1989), 139-143.
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supporting the creation of an OAS force to assume peacekeeping duties.45 The OAS
voted to pass the measure with the minimum number of votes allowable, fourteen. The
force was composed of soldiers from Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Paraguay. The regional nature of the force symbolically demonstrated
unity, however. Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela strongly objected to U.S.
actions.46 Further, the cosmopolitan nature of the OAS force seemed to be a maneuver to
give the appearance of OAS support, when in reality the U.S. unilateral action took the
organization by surprise. President Johnson wanted to bring the operation under the
OAS umbrella, undoubtedly to use the organization as a legitimizing tool.4' As in the
case of Guatemala and Cuba, the U.S. Latin American states believed the U.S. was using
the OAS as a tool of dominance rather than as a tool of security cooperation where it
consulted with states as equals.
Although the U.S. demonstrated that it would rather have regional approval in the
Cuban. Dominican, and Guatemalan, interventions it also showed that its dominance
allowed it to act unilaterally when it chose. The U.S. urge to act unilaterally was
compounded by other differences with Latin American states. Latin America thought
economic and social issues were the most relevant to their security and the U.S. thought
the Soviet threat was of primary significance. As the schism between the U.S. and Latin
America became increasingly apparent to Latin Americans, their support of U.S.
interventions declined. They felt they had little to gain by approving of this behavior
45Ibid., 138.
^Connell-Smith, 176.
47Palmer, 46.
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when the U.S could similarly identify their states as security threats. In short, the
region's power asymmetry eroded security cooperation.
The U.S. also played a role in the Brazilian military coup that took place in March
and April, 1964. President Juan Goulart. a controversial figure in Brazilian politics,
polarized the Brazilian electorate and alienated the military by handpicking military
leaders sympathetic to his political cause. Goulart increased tension by signing decrees
that enforced expropriation of private land and industries without compensation and
declared the Constitution unjust and obsolete.48 Brazilian military leaders assumed from
these remarks that Goulart was closely allied with communist revolutionaries and sought
to usurp the Brazilian constitution.49 Mass demonstration occurred both for and against
Goulart. convincing the military that a coup would be widely popular. At the height of
the crisis the governors of all the major states aligned themselves against Goulart.
Goulart had some support by the military, but only in the senior enlisted ranks. The
lower ranking enlisted and officer corps were largely against the Brazilian President. By
April Goulart was on his way to exile in Uruguay.
The U.S. was indirectly involved in the coup, being responsible for providing
training and support for the Brazilian military. One-third of the Brazilian active duty
generals in the Brazilian Army received some form of education and training from their

■^Ronald M. Schneider. The Political System o f Brazil: Emergence o f a
Modernizing Authoritarian Regime (New York: Columbia University Press. 1971), 93.
49Robert Wesson, The United States and Brazil: Limits o f Influence (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1981), 36.
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U.S. contemporaries.50 U.S. training focused on the perceived communist threat,
teaching counterinsurgency tactics to Latin American students.31 The Central
Intelligence Agency was also indirectly involved by infiltrating Brazilian labor unions,
and waged a campaign to alter Brazilian public opinion.52 The U.S. embassy played a
role by letting potential military conspirators know that the U.S. would not disapprove of
a coup if it occurred.33 The role of the U.S. is perhaps best summed up by Lincoln
Gordon, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil during the crisis: “Brazil is a very large country
with a very active political life of its own, and the American voice, although a significant
one, is in no sense a controlling one."54
Although the U.S. was not directly involved, the U.S. was partly responsible for
the military coup. Its power was so great in the region that any Latin American political
leader must have the implicit backing of the U.S. as the regional hegemon or they would
find their ability to rule much more difficult. In Goulart’s case, he firmly embraced many
policies that placed him in the pro-communist camp. This prompted the U.S. to be less
active in helping the Goulart government with its debt renegotiation and to lessen

30Alfred Stepan. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971), 130.
51Wesson. 40.
52Winslow Peck. "The AFL-CIA,” in Uncloaking the CIA, ed. Howard Frazier
(New York: The Free Press, 1978), 264.
53Wesson, 40-41.
54U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination o f Lincoln Gordon
(Washington D .C .: Government Printing Office, 1966), 7.
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economic aid.55 The degree of U.S. control resulted in a backlash by 1968. Brazil's
military leadership took an authoritarian turn at this time, leading the U.S. to further its
distance from the regime. When the Brazilian military consolidated its control, the move
contributed to the nationalist sentiment of the Orlando Geisel government. Growing
nationalism combined with growing condemnation from Washington caused the Geisel
regime to end close relations with the U.S.56 Attacks occurred against U.S. interests,
protesting the U.S. role in Brazil. In 1966 the home of the U.S. consul was bombed in
Porto Allegre. the U.S. Information Service building was bombed in Brasilia. Radical
students and Catholic activists blamed U.S. ’imperialism* for all of Brazil’s problems.57
In protest, nationalist kidnapped the U.S. Ambassador on the date of Che Guevara's death
as a symbolic gesture.
Most U.S. presidents shared Eisenhower's outlook towards inter-American
relations. He believed that regional peace and prosperity would benefit Latin American
states, but more importantly keep communism at bay, and therefore serve general U.S.
interests.58 This was the primary impetus behind President Kennedy's ambitious Alliance
for Progress initiative (AFP). Policy makers in the Kennedy Administration thought ”the

55Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil: An Experiment in Democracy. / 930-1964
(New York: Oxford University Press. 1967), 271.
56Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics o f Military Rule in Brazil. 1964-85 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 192-193.
^Ibid., 101.
58Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy o f
Anticommunism (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 64.
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U.S. must seek to bring about stability at a tolerable level of social organization without
leaving the transformation to be organized by communists.'00 To this end twenty-two
billion dollars were disbursed to the region from 1961-1970. The Kennedy
Administration devoted eighteen percent of the foreign aid monies of the U.S. to Latin
American, whereas the Truman Administration spent three percent and Eisenhower nine

TableS. Latin American Aid Sources, 1961-1970
1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

US Bilateral Aid

1.403.1

838.8

897.0

450.5

950.5

International
Financial Institutions

1.025.6

898.9

733.6

577.4

1.017.6

Bilateral OECD Aid

85.9

151.9

197.2

180.8

208.0

2,514.6

1.889.6

1.827.8

2.208.7

2.176.1

1966

1967

1968

Annual Total

1969

1970

US Bilateral Aid
International

1.072.0

1140.8

1114.6

693.2

687.1

Financial Institutions

1.067.6

978.7

1.433.4

1.215.3

1.508.8

176.7

157.6

157.6

81.2

192.8

2316.6

2,277.1

2.705.6

1.989.7

2.229.5

Bilateral OECD Aid
Annual Total
Accumulated Total

32.911.30

Source: Organization of American States, Inter-American Economic and
Social Council. Latin Am erica's Development and the Alliance fo r Progress (January
1973). p. 79.

39John Lewis Gaddis. Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press. 1982), 224.
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percent.60 Table 5 shows that bilateral aid from the U.S. formed a significant amount of
total aid to Latin American during the 1960s. During 1961 U.S. bilateral aid made up
55.7 percent of total aid, and in 1968 it comprised 41.2 percent.
The AFP sought to stabilize the economies, societies, and government institutions
of all Latin American states. The Kennedy administration frequently made comparisons
between it and the Marshall Plan, eventually regretting the comparison. As the Marshall
plan had to instigate the recovery of shattered economies, the AFP was weighted with
changing the entire foundadon of a society. As pointed out by one observer
“The new program called for new industries, new ways of farming, new systems of
education and health care, new attitudes toward government and community
responsibility, new relationships between city and country, landlord and peasant,
manager and worker.*'61 The indicators of success for the AFP were to improve the life
and welfare of Latin Americans, and to this end stimulating economic growth in Latin
America at the rate of at least 2.5 percent per year. Although it is difficult to measure the
program's impact since many of the infrastructure projects give indirect benefits, the
stated goal of 2.5 percent annual growth was not met. In a broad sense neither did it
engender regional democracy in the short-run as Latin America experienced a wave of
dictatorships during the late 1960s and 1970s.

60

Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1999), 154.
6‘Lincoln Gordon, “The Alliance at Birth: Hopes and Fears,” in The Alliance fo r
Progress: A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 76.
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Despite the ostensibly constructive intentions of the AFP, in some way the aid
further reinforced Latin American perceptions of U.S. regional dominance. Many Latin
American observers perceived the AFP to be a method of further subjugating Latin
America to the U.S. These critics point to the fact that money was given in the form of a
loan rather than grants, grants being the preferred method and was the primary form of
monetary disbursement under the Marshall Plan. Arthur Schlesinger. Jr. counters this by
pointing out.
“If the Alianza's secret purpose was to lock Latin America more firmly than ever
into U.S. capitalist hegemony, presidential speeches stimulating and legitimizing
Latin American ambitions for economic independence and structural change
seemed an odd way of going about it.” 62
What was stated fifteen years prior to the beginning of the AFP was ironically reinforced
during the programs ten year period. “The more favors we (Latin Americans) receive
from the Yankees, the less we like them”.63 Henry Kissinger noted that the AFP’s
“programs for social and economic improvement were both welcomed and resented.”64
The ubiquitous presence of the U.S. in Latin American minds was reinforced by the
Cuban. Dominican, and Guatemalan interventions, although the AFP was aimed at
ameliorating these tensions it reminded Latin Americans that the U.S. had more influence
over their lives than their own governments. It is no surprise that the AFP bought the
U.S. positive, but limited goodwill from Latin America.

62 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.. “Myth and Reality,” in. The Alliance fo r Progress. ed.
L. Ronald Scheman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 69.
63Enrique Santos. El Tiempo. (Bogota) I March 1945.
64Henry Kissinger, Years o f Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999),
704.
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CONCLUSION
The power asymmetry of the U.S. substantially grew after World War H, as
measured by basic power indicators. Because the hegemony of the U.S. went through a
period in which it avoided entanglement in regional politics from the late 1920s to the
early 1950s, Latin American security cooperation with the U.S. did not immediately
suffer from the extreme power asymmetry. Before the end of World War II. when the
power asymmetry had been diminished by the Depression, there was great improvement
in the willingness of Latin American states to work with the U.S. on security issues. The
period immediately after World War II witnessed the fruits of hegemony, represented by
the establishment of the LADB. the signing of the Rio Treaty and the creation of the OAS.
all three institutions remain important in the inter-American security relationship.
Maingot makes an interesting distinction concerning the U.S. and the Latin
American view of sovereignty that began to emerge as security relations deteriorated
during the 1950s and 1960s. Latin Americans began to increasingly define sovereignty in
a state-centric way that allowed them to resist U.S. leadership, and the U.S defined
sovereignty as democratic governance, that gave them a virtual mandate to intervene in
the region.65 As extreme hegemony began to emerge between the U.S. and Latin
America. Latin American leaders increasingly sought to use the non-intervention
principle of the OAS as a tool to contain U.S. dominance.
Based on this interpretation of sovereignty Latin American states became less
willing to commit to security cooperation endeavors with each incident of U.S.
involvement in the internal affairs of regional states. Regional states disliked U.S.

65Maingot, 190-191.
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activities in Guatemala, but still supported U.S. declarations in the OAS that recognized
the new government. There were stronger reservations against U.S. involvement during
the failed Cuban invasion that coalesced against U.S. anti-Cuban activities in the OAS.
The U.S. role in the 1964 military coup awoke a Brazilian nationalist sentiment that
opposed the U.S., manifested by attacks against its interests and the nationalist policy of
the Geisel administration. The direct U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic drew
alarm throughout the region that an era of strong U.S. dominance had returned and had to
be resisted.
Divergent Latin American and U.S. views on the goals of security cooperation
and the execution of it nullified some of the goodwill generated by the AFP. The goal of
the AFP was to reduce regional instability by ameliorating Latin American poverty:
institutionalizing democracy and spreading free markets, all typical of many U.S.
regional foreign policy initiatives since the time of President Grant. However, the U.S.
sought to help Latin America deter what it perceived as communist activity. The U.S.
considered all revolution as indicators of Soviet intervention into the region. Many Latin
American leaders viewed the revolutions as originating from domestic causes. They
considered them indigenous and therefore protected by the right of state sovereignty.
Since the Nixon Administration considered the AFP unsuccessful, it was inclined
to look elsewhere to deter what it perceived as a communist threat. The logic was that if
normalization of relations with China could deter the Soviet Union, then Soviet efforts to
foment revolution in Latin America could be abrogated, and U.S.-Latin American
security relations would improve. The improper assumption in this policy is that tensions
between the U.S. and Latin America had global roots, when the nature of the quandary
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was primarily regional. What the U.S. viewed as a problem of communism supported by
Soviet activity, Latin America leaders perceived as aggressive and unilateral U.S. foreign
policy.
Chapter five concentrates on the 1970-1979 time frame. The problems created by
the U.S. interventions in the 1960s had a lasting impact on regional security relations in
the next decade, acrimony reaching even higher levels. The U.S .-Brazilian special
relationship that lasted throughout most of the century came to an end in the mid-1970s.
Several Latin American states signaled their uneasiness with U.S. hegemony by making
attempts to lessen their dependency. They sought out other trade partners to counter U.S.
dominance in trade, arms supplies, technology, and financial support. The regional
security relation's difficulties were made worse by the two global economic crises that
occurred during the 1970s. These downturns weakened the U.S. economy, but also
severely afflicted the growth of Latin American states, further hampering efforts at
security cooperation.
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CHAPTER V
CONTINUED DETERIORATION (1970-1979)

Security cooperation continued to deteriorate during the 1970s. This dynamic
was complicated by the surge in Larin American economic growth followed by the
impact of the world oil crisis in the early 1970s and U.S. recession in the late 1970s.
Although U.S. political activities were less prominent than during the 1960s, any benefit
accrued was nullified by other factors. The U.S. reiterated its policies maintaining that
Latin American economic growth was not a regional priority. Instead it continued to
focus on Soviet expansionism brought to the forefront by the Guatemalan and Cuban
situations from the 1950s. Even the military government of Brazil that the U.S. helped
bring to power in 1964 began to distance itself from the U.S. because of diverging
interests. Larin Americans leaders reinforced their position that what the U.S. perceived
as communist activities in the region, were largely of domestic origin, not a threat posed
from the Soviet Union that would legally call for the enforcement of the Rio Treaty. The
U.S. quietly disagreed, realizing it would not win regional support in the OAS for its
view, and continued to have the perception that any communist movement symbolized
foreign intervention through the Soviet Union until the election of President Carter. U.S.
interventions declined during this period, but it did not ameliorate Larin American
suspicions of U.S. dominance.
Regional relations in the 1970s took place against a backdrop of economic
turmoil. The oil crisis and U.S. recession both affected Larin America worse than the
U.S. The U.S self-perception was that of a state in decline, and its foreign policies
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toward the region became less engaged as a result. Although the U.S. was experiencing
economic problems, the collateral effect was worse in other states of the region. Latin
American economic decline after several years of growth furthered reinforced insecurities
about U.S. hegemony.
Latin American economies substantially grew in the early 1970s along with
domestic spending. Its spending spree in the early 1970s caused most of the region to
mirror U.S. gloom when the global economic crisis ensued. Although basic indicators
show that asymmetry between the U.S. and Latin America remained constant. Latin
America was suffering from hyperinflation and indebtedness, giving its leaders the
perception the power asymmetry gap was growing. The further deterioration of regional
relations prompted many Latin America leaders to actively search for an alternative to
U.S. hegemony.
Chapter five begins by reviewing the basic power indicators of the U.S. and
compares them to those of the two largest Latin American economies. Brazil and Mexico.
In order to emphasize U.S. hegemony, the GNP of the U.S. is compared to an aggregate
of all Latin American states. The second section addresses the popularity of dependency
theory in the region as a means to describe the negative aspects of the hegemonic
relationship. Dependency theory was derived as an explanation for the lack o f the
development in particular areas of the world. It focused on external factors such as their
colonial history and the capitalist world system, rather than internal factors such as the
presence of traditional societies. For example. Francis Fukuyama notes that traditional
societies that are dependent on familial ties rather than the state for their well-being. In
turn Fukuyama believes this dependency on the family perpetuates “low-trust” societies.
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undermining state legitimacy.1 The rise of dependency theory seemed to be a reflection
of the deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Latin America. The role of the Soviet
Union was also an important factor in regional security relations during the 1970s. How
Soviet political and economic actions shaped the U.S .-Latin American security
relationship are discussed.
This chapter describes how U.S. policy under President Jimmy Carter sought to
reengage Latin America in a security dialog. However, his initiatives had mixed results,
and security cooperation continued to decline. The inability of regional states to
effectively cope with the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua was symbolic of the
enduring impediments to regional security cooperation. Despite attempts by U.S. leaders
to address the crisis in a multilateral fashion, the failure of this effort was another setback
for the hegemonic relationship between the U.S. and Latin America.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY
Table 6 shows that the hegemonic status of the U.S. remained intact despite the
economic problems of the U.S. in the mid 1970s, and a recession in the later pan of the
decade. In 1970, the GNP of the U.S. was slightly more than $1.5 trillion, increasing to
over $2 trillion by 1979, representing a 25 percent increase. By comparison Latin
America's cumulative GNP stood at $311 billion, increasing to $511 billion by 1979. a
forty percent increase. Brazil has the largest Latin American economy. Its GNP was $95
billion in 1970, increasing to nearly $200 billion by 1979, a 50 percent increase. Latin

‘Fukuyama, 62-63.
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Mexico's GNP increased by 34 percent during the same time frame. Despite gains by
American economies as an aggregate, they still only amounted to a quarter of the GNP of
the U.S.
In terms of total GNP the U.S. gained more than Latin America as an aggregate.
However, Latin American exports and imports from and to the U.S. decreased during the
1970s, also decreasing Latin American dependence on the U.S. The Inter-American
Development Bank reported that in 1950 Latin America exported 48.3 percent of its
goods to the U.S., this decreased to 32.1 by 1975.

Table 6. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP. 1970-1979
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Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World M ilitary Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1970-1979 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1982), pp. 45,51, 69, 81. The
numbers in the Y-axis are in constant 1978 million dollars.

Imports decreased just as sharply, from 50.1 percent from the U.S. in 1950, to 35.9
percent by 1975. The same trend occurred in trade with Europe. Inter-Latin American
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trade picked up some of the surplus, with Latin America exporting 9.6 percent of its
goods to other Latin American states from 1960-64, but increasing this total to 14.3 by
1975. The import numbers are similar, Latin American importing 12.6 percent of its
goods internally in 1960-64. and increasing to 19.4 percent by 1975.'
The annual military expenditure of the U.S. and Latin America also demonstrates
the continuation of U.S. hegemony.

Table 7 shows that the military expenditure of the

U.S. was $122 billion in 1979. By comparison the four states combined equaled not quite
S5 billion, or less than five percent of the U.S. total. Brazil's expenditure as a percent of
GNP remained relatively steady, hovering at an average of 1.2 percent; Mexico's was

Table 7. Annual Military Expenditure. 1970-1979
Argentina

1978

594
489
483
600
804
1.206
1.290
1,535
1.793

1979

1.640

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

Brazil
882
988
1.096
1.288
1,392
1.480
1,859
1.890
2,042
1.719

Mexico
249
285
333
364
414
582
553
567
444
466

U.S.

Venezuela

77.854
74.862
77.639
78.358
85.906
90.948
91.013
100,925
108.357

279
369
356
388
463
551
560
632
643

122.279

569

Source'. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World M ilitary Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1970-1979, pp. 45, 51.69, 81. Numbers are in constant 1978 millions of
U.S. dollars.

zEconomic and Social Progress in Latin America (Inter-American Development
Bank, 1976).
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roughly half of that. Argentina had the highest expenditure as a percent of GNP.
reaching its zenith in 1978, at 2.8 percent. The lowest year of U.S. expenditure was
1978, at 5.1 percent of GNP, still much higher in comparison to Latin American states.
The general trend in the hemisphere was a decline in defense expenditure, probably due
to global economic problems in the 1970s. The only state to defy this trend is Argentina
that actually increased defense spending from 1.6 percent to 2.8 percent of GNP in 1978.
These statistics broadly demonstrate that the hegemony of the U.S. continued
during the 1970s. Despite the continuation of U.S. dominance there are also indications
of a lessening in comparative power to Latin American states. Latin American imports
and exports to the U.S. decreased, and Latin American economies as a region increased
proportionately more than U.S. economy, a trend accentuated by Brazilian and Mexican
increases that had a greater average than the region. These statistics suggest a decrease in
power asymmetry. However, this time period demonstrates why power indicators may
not always tell the complete story. Both the U.S. and Latin America experienced
economic difficulties that in turn affected their willingness to cooperate. The U.S. also
suffered from unprecedented domestic unrest due in part to the Vietnam War. The
remainder of this chapter will detail the effects of these events on regional security
cooperation to determine if the change in power asymmetry increased or decreased the
level of security cooperation.

THE FAILURE OF DISENGAGED HEGEMONY
The disengagement of the U.S. in the region was instigated by the combination of
Latin American recalcitrance and the continued U.S. preoccupation with the Soviet
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Union. The Vina del Mar Consensus was presented through the Special Commission for
Coordination of Latin America (CECLA), by Latin American leaders, to President Nixon
in 1969. It stated that the inter-American system was in a state of crisis.3 It explained that
the interests of Latin America were not those of Washington and that Latin America gave
more than it received from the United States.4 The declaration demonstrated the
cumulative impact of the continuation of strong hegemony.
During the Nixon Administration domestic economic crisis and external security
issues preoccupied the U.S. leadership. The U.S. had lost the Vietnam War. and suffered
through an oil embargo and inflation. One U.S. mainstream weekly magazine declared
that the U.S. was “clearly facing a crisis of the decay of power”.5 Although these events
did not signal the permanent decline of U.S. power, they certainly helped give context to
the foreign policies of both President Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, that consciously
sought to limit the expression of U.S. power.
Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger realized that the U.S. needed to extricate
itself from the Vietnam conflict due to its growing unpopularity at home and due to
concerns that the U.S. had globally over-committed itself. The U.S. gradual withdrawal
from Vietnam represented the limits to U.S. power and a change in U.S. strategic
thinking. The ensuing U.S. policy became known as the NLxon Doctrine. The Nixon

3HeraIdo Munoz and Carlos Portales. Elusive Friendship: A Survey o f U.S.
Chilean Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1991).
'‘Heraldo Munoz. “The Inter-American System: A Latin American View,” In
Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship. eds.
Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1990), 30.
5“The Decline of U.S. Power,” Business Week, 12 March 1979: 37.
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Doctrine began as an innocuous press briefing and boiled-down to three constituent
elements: the U.S. will keep all of its treaty commitments, the U.S. will provide a shield
if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an ally, and in cases involving other types of
aggression, the U.S. will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in
accordance with our treaty commitments. However, the U.S. would look to the nation
directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for
its own defense.6 Kissinger’s concise summary of the Nixon Doctrine was. “our interests
must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.” '
Neither Nixon nor Secretary Kissinger considered the Nixon Doctrine a retreat
from the international arena, but the oil crisis of 1973 made U.S. leaders realize limits
and the concurrent need to reduce U.S. commitments. On October 19. 1973, Arab oil
producing countries decided to begin an oil embargo in order to express their collective
displeasure concerning U.S. support of Israel during the fourth Arab-Israeli War of the
same year.8 The Arab embargo was lifted in less than a year. March of 1974. but the
impact on the U.S. economy coalesced to the national perception of decline and
vulnerability that began with the Vietnamese conflict.
Even before the oil shock of 1973. the U.S. was recovering from inflation induced
by the combined effects of soaring food prices and currency devaluation. Table 8

6Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, 298.
Annual foreign policy report. February 18, 1970. Public Papers o f the
Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1970, 118-119.
8United States Energy Information Administration, World OilMarket and Oil
Price Chronologies: 1970 - 1999, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ chron.htmI#al973, June
19, 2001.
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Table 8. Increasing Oil Prices, 1970-1980
40
35

Official Price of Saudi Light
Refiner Acquisition Cost of Imported Crude
Oil
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Source: United States Energy Information Administration. World Oil Market and Oil
Price Chronologies: 19 7 0 - 1999. Available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/
chron.html#al973. June 19. 2001. The Y-axis is in $ per barrel of oil.

shows that the price of oil dramatically increased in a short time causing global economic
destabilization, from the end of 1973 to the beginning of the 1974. The oil crisis
negatively affected the U.S. as inflation increased and supply dwindled. The shock of the
oil crisis was a turning point in how the U.S. viewed the world. It affected not only the
average U.S. consumer, but also changed the worldview of the average citizen. The U.S.
was forced to surrender the comfort of energy self-sufficiency and accepted the reality of
oil dependence. The U.S. regularly preached to trading partners the benefits of
interdependence but never thought that it might impact the U.S. as well. The panic over
the oil crisis was magnified by the nationalization of U.S. oil concerns during the last
decade in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Venezuela.
The realization of U.S. limits led the Nixon Administration to view Latin America
as a distant foreign policy priority. The U.S neither paid attention to Latin American
interests in social and economic development, nor tried to push its anti-Soviet Union
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agenda in the OAS. Blaiser points out that the U.S. was more secure about the non-threat
of Soviet imperialism during the early 1970s than it had been during the 1950s and
1960s.9 This led to the continued deterioration of the OAS as a center of security
cooperation. The U.S. ignored Latin American complaints that led to a continued erosion
of the ability of the U.S. to lead the region. Changes supported by Latin American states
occurred during the proceedings of the 1975 OAS San Jose meeting. The first change
resulted in the introduction of an amendment to expand the definition of security to
include development issues. Another important change led to the modification of the Rio
Treaty so that only a simple majority vote was needed to lift sanctions as opposed to twothirds majority rule.10
While the U.S. seemed to abdicate its regional leadership under the Nixon and
Ford Administrations. Latin American states began to fill the vacuum by charting
independent foreign policies. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had a common economic
experience during the 1970s. They each celebrated strong growth based largely on
dependency-inspired economic planning, only to see their progress deteriorate due to a
combination of over-borrowing, the oil crisis, and the downturn in the U.S. economy. All
these factors combined to cause hyperinflation.
Towards the end of the 1970s Argentina suffered through the storm of economic
extremes. Through direct government control of business, subsidization of domestic
industries, and import substitution policies, the Argentine economy began to show signs
of improvement in the early 1970s. However, constant hyperinflation and the inability of

’Blaiser, The Hovering Giant, 260.
I0Munoz, “The Inter-American System, 30.
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domestic industries to mature beyond government sponsorship eroded the Argentine
economy, reducing domestic support for the federal government. By the mid-1970s
inflation was consistently in the triple digit range. In 1976, the Argentine government
attempted to resuscitate the economy with a stabilization plan that temporarily slowed
inflation, but it did not restore growth. Despite inflation Argentina was able to guide its
economy away from raw product exports to manufactured goods, increasing
manufactured goods exports from 15.6 percent of total exports to 21.5 percent by 1975.
However, these gains did not last. Government subsidies were rescinded in 1976 and
exports dramatically decreased without direct public sector support.11
By the mid-1970s the Mexican economy surged due to the discovery of petroleum
reserves. In 1974 Mexico produced 2.75 million barrels of oil per day. only consuming
half of that amount.12 Mexico found a ready customer in its neighbor to the North; the
U.S. was already suffering from shortages and high prices. Mexico began to mortgage its
future on its newly discovered wealth, borrowing and spending millions on infrastructure
projects. When the price of oil sharply declined, Mexico's debt soared from SI 4.5 billion
in 1975 to $85 billion by the mid-1980s, leading to inflation and monetary crisis.13
Although Mexico was partially inoculated against the oil crisis because of its domestic
reserves, these reserves did not last due to the improper management of fiscal policy.

"Rock, 327.
i2E. Bradford Bums, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 1990), 198.
I3Ibid., 199.
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Brazil fared no better than Argentina and Mexico. From 1967 to 1974 the
military leadership remained popular due to soaring domestic and export production,
leading to growth frequently exceeding ten percent a year.14 The oil crisis reduced
Brazilian economic expansion that fueled projects such as the design, construction and
inauguration of an entire capital city, to extreme debt and a trade imbalance. After 1975
inflation reached triple digits and the foreign debt rose from $5.5 billion in 1970. to $60.8
billion in 1980.15
The oil crisis reduced Latin American self-confidence, hindering attempts at
regional security cooperation. Because of its economic vitality in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Brazil considered itself ‘the country of the future’. Since the economic crisis
that began in the mid 1970s Brazilians amended the expression. ‘Brazil is the perpetual
country of the future'. Before the economic chaos of the oil crisis Latin American
leaders began to increasingly consider their states as more independent of U.S.
hegemony, despite the consistent U.S. advantage in GNP and military expenditure.
Perceptions of growing equality were demonstrated by increasingly independent foreign
policies. Leaders in Latin American states began to act less restrained in criticizing the
U.S. in forums such as the OAS and the UN. Whereas before Latin American states felt
compelled to consider the desires of the U.S., they were now actively seeking
independence on all fronts.
During the 1970s many Latin American leaders increasingly believed the
hegemonic relationship was decreasing in value. This view was likely promoted by the

I4Bums, A History o f Brazil, 467.
l5Ibid.
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economic crisis, in e fifed reminding Latin American states o f their dependence on U.S.
power in terms o f financial backing and as an importer o f Latin American goods. Latin
American leaders were reminded yet again o f the inability to modify or escape strong
U.S. hegemony.

DEPENDENCY THEORY AS A REACTION TO ASYMMETRY
The effect o f power asymmetry under strong U.S. hegemony eroded hemispheric
relations, with the trend becoming worse during the 1970s. Latin American disapproval
o f the status quo found an expression in dependency theory. Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, who later became President o f Brazil, was one o f the early proponents o f
dependency theory. He and other academics developed the construct while trying to
explain underdevelopment in the Latin American region. Dependency theory is closely
related to the Marxist theory o f imperialism. Both schools o f thought maintain that
European colonization and capitalism are the root causes o f the Latin American plight
rather than domestic structures, such as economic policy or the lack o f political
stability.16 Dependency places the responsibility o f Latin American poverty on shoulders
o f the U.S. and Europe: Europe for its historical exploitation o f the region and the U.S.
for perpetuating imperialistic policies. Bradford Burns defines dependency in the
following way:
“Dependency describes a situation in which the economic well-being, or lack o f
it. or one nation, colony, or area results from the consequences o f decisions made
elsewhere. Latin America was first dependent on the Iberian motherlands, then in
the nineteenth century on England, and in the twentieth on the United States,
l6See, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia e
Desenvolvimento na America Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1973).
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whose decisions and policies directly influenced, or influence, its economic
prosperity or poverty. Obviously to the degree a nation is dependent, it will lack
“independence” of action.” 17
Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz make a direct connection between under-development and
development, claiming, for example, that the development of the U.S. came at the
expense of Latin America's underdevelopment.18
In contrast to dependency theory, the modernization school of thought proposed
that with an higher level of education and economic investment any state could increase
its standard of living. The Alliance for Progress was planned around these ideas. The
designers of the Alliance for Progress hoped to jump-start economic development in
Latin America by giving regional states access to knowledge and financing. In theory,
institutions rapidly develop, creating political stability as they evolve. Modernization
theory implicitly blames underdevelopment on indigenous factors. Dependency refutes
this assumption by claiming exogenous variables are primarily responsible.
Modernization calls on Latin American states to assume responsibility for their problems
since it directs them to change political and economic policy to engender domestic
changes, dependency calls on the outside world to change in order to upgrade domestic
problems, or support policies that limit external control in the domestic economy.19 The
economic policy of dependency theory is likely to promote import substitution, strict
government control of important economic sectors and strict limits on foreign

I7Bums, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History, 355-356.
l8Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz, El Subdesarrollo Latinoamericano y la Teoria
del Desarrollo (Mexico: privately published 1970), 6.
l9Howard J. Wiarda, “Did the Alliance Lose its Way?,” ?” In, The Alliance fo r
Progress'. A Retrospective, ed. L. Ronald Scheman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 97.
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investment.20 The implementation of these policies led to widespread nationalization of
many U.S. industries in the 1970s, and growing Latin American antipathy towards the
U.S. that prompted Latin American leaders to search for alternatives to U.S. hegemony.
The ascendancy of dependency theory demonstrates the growing adverse Latin American
reaction to U.S. hegemony. The theory is similar to hegemonic stability in that both
assume the important role of a central power in the system. Hegemonic stability focuses
on the positive aspects of hegemony, dependency theory focuses on the deleterious
impact of the core state on the system. Hegemonic stability focuses on the benefits of
U.S. leadership, dependency on its problems. The spread of dependency theory during
the 1970s highlighted the growing resentment towards U.S. leadership.

SEEKING ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. HEGEMONY
Latin American states began to actively seek non-U.S. regional cooperation and
other world powers as alternatives to U.S. hegemony. Gavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson
observe that. “Most of the states in this region have strong economic links with the
United States, but because there is a general desire to overcome traditional U.S.
dominance, opportunities for U.S. initiatives to encourage and assist Latin American
ventures in regional cooperation are limited.”21 During this time period several regional
organizations were initiated, including the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). Latin

20See. Osvaldo Sunkel, “Big Business and Dependencia: A Latin American
View,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51. No. 2 (April 1972).
2‘Gavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson, “Latin American Regionalism,” in.
Regionalism and Global Security, ed. Gavin Boyd (Lexington MA: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1984), 119.
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American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Latin American Economic System
(SELA).
LAFTA was established in I960 when participating states signed the Montevideo
Treaty. The firee-market established by LAFTA came into effect in 1973. Its members
included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay. Peru. Uruguay
and Venezuela. LAFTA's goal to create inter-regional trade had only modest success,
increasing from seven percent in the pre-ffee market era of I960 to fourteen percent by
1980.22 The states that most benefited were the larger regional powers, Argentina. Brazil
and Mexico. However, trade with states outside of Latin America was growing at a much
higher rate. Due to this disparity leaders began to realize that pursuing regional trade
agreements accrued small gains in GNP and so they focused their efforts elsewhere.
Smith points out that although LAFTA did not accomplish much in terms of encouraging
trade between Ladn American states, “it came to represent Latin America's persisting
desire for regional unification."23
In 1968 the Andean Pact was formed between Bolivia. Chile, Colombia. Ecuador
and Peru with the goal of accelerating economic development by isolating large power
influences. The pact limited the amount of foreign investment in member countries, a
move at least in part aimed at the region's largest investor, the U.S.24 Latin American

~IbicL, 125.
"^Peter H. Smith, Talons o f the Eagle, 206.
24Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, A History o f Latin America (Boston.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), 403. It is contended that the Andean Pact was also formed
against other regional powers such as Brazil and Argentina. See, Elizabeth G. Ferris,
"The Andean Pact and the Amazon Treaty," Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs 23, no. 2 (May 1988): 147-148.
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states watched their once promising economies deteriorate during the mid-1970s, the
growing asymmetry with the U.S. prompting them to redress the mounting imbalance.
During the 1976 Santiago meeting of the OAS, Lievano and Facio memorandums were
circulated that called for preferential trade agreements to stimulate Latin American
economies.25 Inspired by the Group of 77, an organization that was unified by the theme
of third world development, Latin American states pushed for a treaty of collective
economic security directed against the U.S. The treaty would have penalized states that
were judged to act against the economic welfare of others.26
During the 1970s the Soviets made a determined, but subtle, economic and
political push in Latin America. This was part of a broader Soviet strategy. Porter
explains: 'T he Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had been involved
militarily in local conflicts before, of course, but the magnitude, scope, and apparent
success of its efforts in the 1970s were perhaps without precedent."2' Soviet global
ambitions were muted in the Americas because of U.S. dominance and recent history.
The Cuban missile crisis forced Soviet regional strategy to alter course. The Soviets
discovered that aggressive action in the Americas was met by fierce U.S. resistance and
caused greater problems than the effort was worth. Geographical separation made strong
Soviet support in Latin America economically difficult. Therefore regional Soviet

■^Stephen H. Rogers, “Trade Relations in the Inter-American System," in The
Future o f the Inter-American System, ed. Tom J. Farer (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1979), 59.
26Ibid.
27Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and
Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1.
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political ambitions were largely funneled through their lone regional ally, Cuba, in order
to make their actions less conspicuous.
Although the Soviet Union policy was self-limited in the political arena, it was
more ambitious in trying to form economic partnerships. Latin American insecurities
about the asymmetric power structure, and their precarious economic situation, led many
regional states to actively and passively pursue economic relations with the Soviet Union.
Some Latin American states viewed a partnership with the USSR as a means to
circumvent the imposing influence o f the U.S. in their domestic affairs. Cuba being the
most obvious example. Open relations with the Soviet Union demonstrated their
independence from the U.S., and gave Latin American states a potential alternative to the
U.S. as a trading partner.28 Blaiser states to this point
“They [Latin American leaders] welcome ties with the Soviet Union, first and
foremost as the right o f an independent state. Second, such ties give them room
to maneuver and bargaining leverage in disputes with the U.S. Finally, relations
with the USSR can bring material benefits.”
Even the states that stayed firmly opposed to the USSR benefited gained from the
presence o f the Soviet Union in the Americas.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were the most important states for Soviet
strategists.29 Argentina began diplomatic ties after World War II, and Brazil renewed
relations with the Soviet Union in I960. The USSR made a push in the 1970s to
strengthen their Latin American ties. The USSR had maintained diplomatic relations
with Mexico since the Bolshevik revolution. However, this one example was not the

28BIaiser, The G iant's Rival, 158.
29Ibid., 159.
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norm: ten of nineteen Latin American states began diplomatic relations with the USSR
during the 1970s.
Argentina began a push to broaden relations with the USSR in the early 1970s by
offering their grain for export; an agreement that increased Argentine exports to the
USSR until they comprised nearly ten percent of their national output. It was an
agreement convenient to both sides: the Soviet Union badly needed grain to reconcile the
difference in their domestic harvest, the Argentines needed hard currency to reconcile
their debts and trade imbalance. Both sides had the common strategy of using their
relationship as leverage against the U.S.: the USSR increased its visibility that worked to
challenge the U.S.. and Argentina used trade as a tool to increase its national
sovereignty.30
The Soviet Union had broader ambitions for the incipient relationship with
Argentina, especially when they lost Chile as a key ally after the overthrow of Allende in
1973. However, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Argentina never obtained
a political dimension. President Juan Domingo Peron had similar anti-capitalist
economic policies that the Soviets identified with but Peron was considered a nationalist,
rather than a communist. Peron used the domestic Marxist political party as a tool to
maintain power, but dissolved them once his purposes were served.31 After the military

j0Edward S. Milenky, Argentina’s Foreign Policies (Boulder: Westview Press.
1978). 156.
3lDonald C. Hodges, Argentina, 1943-1987: The National Revolution and
Resistance (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), 140-141.
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coup led by General Jorge Videla in 1976, it became clear that the relationship would
only be economic in nature thereafter.32
The Brazilian relationship with the USSR was similar to Argentina’s in that it
primarily focused on economic issues, but also as a way to balance its dependency on the
U.S. Because the U.S. had begun to limit arms sales and foreign credit, and ruled against
nuclear technology transfer in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazilian military rulers
felt the need to broaden their relationship with the Soviet Union. Dependency based
import substitution policies were beginning to show their limits in generating economic
growth, in turn making the increase of exports an imperative to Brazilian leaders.33
In 1973 President Echeverrfa of Mexico went on a State visit to the USSR with
the goal of diversifying the country's financial and economic ties.34 Mexico's trade
balance with the U.S. was tilted heavily in Washington's favor. The U.S. was also in the
midst of an isolationist mood due to problems associated with the Vietnam conflict and
its economic troubles, so talks on the topic were unlikely to yield any progress. Although
President Jose Lopez Portillo also visited the USSR in 1978. and reported substantial
progress trade between the two states, actual trade between the two states was erratic at
best. Venezuela also sought out Soviet trade ties in the early 70s. hoping to find
alternative markets for its oil in the Eastern bloc/5 Venezuela previously demonstrated

3_NicoIa Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-87 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 156.
33Ibid., 172.
34Ibid., 182.
35A. I. Sizonenko. La URSS y Latino-America A yerv Hoy, translated by Venancio
Uribes (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 149.
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its will to break free o f U.S. influence when it signed the Declaration o f Bogota in 1966,
calling for the exploration o f trade agreements with Eastern Europe. Despite its efforts
little trade actually materialized.
Actions taken by the U.S. to remove President Salvador Allende o f Chile from
office served to remind Latin Americans o f U.S. dominance. Allende was elected in
1970. He immediately began to institute foreign and domestic policies unfriendly
towards the U.S., including the expropriation o f U.S. privately owned industries and a
pro-Cuban foreign policy.
The U.S. did not militarily intervene in Chile, but nonetheless was deeply
involved in events that led to the overthrow o f Allende. The U.S. tried to avert the
election o f Salvadore Allende in 1970 through subsidizing his opposition and the use o f
propaganda.36 The U.S. also acted against Allende, once elected, by limiting credit from
financial institutions, terminating new Export-Import Bank guarantees, and using its
influence to limit credits from international financial institutions/7 The U.S. also
financed strikes that preceded the Chilean coup.38
The actions taken by the U.S. to oust Allende added to the problems o f regional
security relations. The incident reminded Latin Americans that there were no shields
against the pressure the U.S. might exert to serve its policy goals. Even when
democratically elected, their political systems were not immune from U.S. dominance.

36Paul E. Sigmund, The United States and Democracy in Chile (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1993), 54.
37Ibid., 57.
38Atkins, 234.
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Whether Chileans supported Allende or not, Chilean citizens learned that the U.S. had the
ability to control their domestic political and economic outcomes, and Chilean citizens
were unable to influence the policies of the U.S. The indirect influence of U.S.
hegemony by the means of socialization, such as through culture, raised an awareness of
U.S. dominance. This form of hegemonic influence was usually considered benign.
However, the hegemon's diffusion of power through more direct actions, manipulating
material incentives leading to an impact on Latin American economies and politics, led to
a direct awareness of the control of the U.S., and therefore more resistance to the
hegemon.
Attempts by Latin American leaders to find alternatives to U.S. hegemony
demonstrated their unease with the status quo. Their efforts to initiate regional trade
blocs and sponsor Soviet relations were an expression of dissatisfaction with U.S.
policies.

REGIONAL RELATIONS UNDER MODERATED WILSONIANISM
President Jimmy Carter was elected because voters were disillusioned with the
status quo. Carter took the opportunity to reformulate U.S. foreign policy. Carter's
foreign policies were motivated by the effort to steer the opposite direction of realpolitik
that characterized the Nixon years.39 The Carter Administration seemed determined to
soothe the U.S. public's concerns about dependence by building a foreign policy that
embraced interdependence. As Jerel A. Rosati observed. “Carter administration officials

39Critics pointed out that Carter was seemingly unable to think in large strategic
terms, that directly led to many of his foreign policy failings. See, Robert W. Tucker,
“Reagan Without Tears,” The New Republic 182 (May 17, 1980): 23.
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believed that new issues and actors had to be addressed in a world o f greater
interdependence and decentralization.”40 Carter believed the traditional conduct o f U.S.
foreign policy was responsible for creating enemies where cooperation had been possible,
particularly in the case o f Latin America. The administration believed that policy
devoted to self-interest, like Kissinger’s practice o f realpolitik, became a detriment as
other states might become suspicious o f all U.S. actions. Carter and his advisors listened
to Latin American complaints o f what they viewed as the U.S. preoccupation with the
perceived Soviet threat, and tried to craft a policy that was more tolerant o f indigenous
political movements. The Carter Administration thought the U.S. needed to accentuate
the positive by pursuing a multilateral approach, believing that other states would
reciprocate the positive gestures. Therefore Carter purposely cultivated an image that
Gaddis Smith describes “As the prophet assailing American wickedness.”41
Many o f Carter’s critics, foreign allies and enemies, viewed his concessions as
signs o f diminishing U.S. power, rather than as an honest effort to improve regional
relations. To some, the Russian invasion o f Afghanistan, the intransigence in finalizing
SALT II. the temerity o f Middle East states in their policies with the U.S., were all
indicators that global actors perceived and formulated policy based on declining U.S.

4°Rosati came to his conclusion after exhaustive research that indicated the Carter
Administration’s primary foreign policy issues by polling the number o f tunes that an
issue was discussed by key administration officials. Jerel A. Rosati, “The Impact o f
Beliefs on Behavior The Foreign Policy o f the Carter Administration,” in Foreign Policy
Decision Making, eds. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (New York: Praeger. 1984)..
166.
41Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter
Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 242.
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power.42 U.S. fortunes in Latin America were no different. Despite Carter’s efforts to
demonstrate U.S. good will by showing more tolerance for Latin American revolutions,
such as in Cuba and Nicaragua, and the regular denouncement o f past interventionist
policy, Latin America responded with indifference.
Carter Administration policies that had ramifications on hemispheric security
relations included his initiatives toward Cuba and Nicaragua, arms control, and the
human rights. During the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter made an issue o f the large
arms exporting industry o f the U.S. One o f his first orders o f business was to issue
Presidential Directive 13 that introduced six new categories o f controls on arms sales and
declared arms sales as an 'exceptional’ tool for foreign policy.43 The sudden reduction
o f arms exports had for-reaching ramifications for inter-regional security relations,
further weakening inter-American security relations and the growth o f Latin American
arms industries.
The Carter Administration chose to link U.S. aid with a state’s human rights
record in order to bring greater morality and consistency to U.S. foreign policy. The
State Department was told to assign personnel to monitor human rights in every other
nation, including traditional democratic allies such as Canada, Great Britain, Japan and
West Germany so as not to show discrimination. These critiques were issued to states
receiving U.S. aid, having an immediate impact on U.S.-Latin American relations. Each

42For a more in-depth analysis on this point see Robert W. Tucker, “American in
Decline: The Foreign Policy o f Maturity”, Foreign Affairs 58, no. 3 (May/June 1980):
451-484. Smith also discusses the perception that the U.S. lost the SALT H negotiations
in Morality, Reason and Power.
43Thomas E. Skidmore, Reversing Course: C arter’s Foreign Policy, Domestic
Politics, and the Failure o f Reform (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), 132.
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nation offered aid with the human rights report rejected the offer, citing the U.S. was
interfering with their internal affairs.44 The move alienated Brazil, a regional ally of the
U.S. Brasilia made its displeasure with Washington known when it abrogated its mutual
defense treaty with Washington in 1975 that existed since the end of World War II.
Latin American antagonism towards U.S. human rights and arms control policies
grew, as the lack of progress on security issues important to Latin Americans stalemated.
Indigenous arms industries began to flourish and Latin American states found alternative
arms suppliers 45 South and Central American leaders thought that Carter’s foreign
policy measures were an unconcealed attempt by Washington to gain even further control
of their internal politics. For example. ’"President Carter, by making Argentina a prime
target of his human rights campaign, had minimized his leverage over the highly
nationalistic Argentine generals, who bitterly resented what they regarded as outbursts of
American hypocrisy.”46
U.S. actions further weakened their decaying regional influence in security
affairs. The U.S. allowed its growing isolation from Latin America to be replaced with
interests that did not always share Washington’s political and economic agenda.47 For

^Donald S. Spencer. The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style
o f Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1988), 58.
45SpecificalIy by France. Israel, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and other
European states.
46Miller, 162.
4'ChiId predicted this outcome, stating: “...local drives to become self-sufficient
in arms, show a strong potential for further weakening the IAMS (Inter American
Military System) and replacing the old system with a new one which might exclude, or
even be antagonistic to, the United States.” Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American
Military System, 7955-1978, 189.
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example, the military regimes in Brazil and Peru both adopted policies that marginalized
U.S. influence in their national affairs, meaning that the U.S. was less able to encourage
political and economic reforms. In both instances there were opportunities to influence
their internal policies as they adjusted to meet the economic problems affecting the lower
and middle classes.48 U.S. human rights and arms control policies fed the nationalistic
tendencies of these regimes and reduced the effectiveness of U.S. policies designed to
reintroduce democracy.49 U.S. arms embargoes led to the creation of Latin American
arms industries. As the political tides in the U.S. turned against the funding of Latin
American militaries, indigenous industries began to flourish. These industries became
important centers of nationalism, allowing regional states to express their independence
vis-a-vis the U.S.
President Carter improved regional relations with Latin America by negotiating
an agreement with Panamanian officials that gradually transferred the canal to Panama by
1999.50 Before assuming office he had been warned by other Latin American leaders that
if he did not mediate the Panama Canal issue to a successful closure, the tarnished
reputation of the U.S. would become worse. Heeding the advice of regional leaders, his

48John Child. “The Inter-American Military System,” in The Future o f the InterAmerican System, ed. Tom Farer (New York: Praeger, 1979), 170-171.
49For example, Brazil made an agreement to obtain nuclear technology from West
Germany. The U.S. criticized Brasilia and insisted that the agreement be modified with a
promise of enriched uranium. Brazil rejected the offer confirming a long-held Brazilian
suspicion that the U.S. was striving to keep underdeveloped states technologically
dependent. See, Roger W. Fontaine, “Brazil: The End of Beautiful Relationship,” in
Foreign Policy on Latin America 1970-1980, eds. Staff of Foreign Policy Journal
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 104-105.
^ e t e r H. Smith. Talons o f the Eagle, 271.
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own advisors, and acting on his personal views, he was able to push a settlement through
Congress by a narrow margin.51 Despite his good faith efforts. Carter did not witness
significant improvement in regional security relations.
The multilateral front was equally unsuccessful during the 1970s. The Rio Treaty
and Bogota Pact were proving to be ineffective tools to manage security exigencies in the
region. As one author observed, “The Pact of Rio de Janeiro was drawn up in 1947 when
inter-American relations were at the highest level in history.”32 These institutions were
becoming increasingly dysfunctional as inter-American relations deteriorated. Their
ability to address the changes in regional security dynamics made them mostly
ineffective. Latin American suspicions about U.S. interventionist activity remained high,
emphasized by the role the U.S. played in supporting General Pinochet's ouster of
President Allende in Chile, and U.S. policies towards Nicaragua. President Carter had a
strong conviction that the U.S. pursued shortsighted policies in the region, leading to its
unpopular standing in the hemisphere. This conviction led him to be patient with events
in Nicaragua, first attempting to convert President Anastasio Somoza into an overnight
democrat. When this initiative failed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance submitted a
proposal to the OAS that formed an interim government acceptable to all parties, a cease
fire. an OAS peacekeeping force and a major international relief and reconstruction

5lHad President Carter lost votes in the Senate the treaties would have lost, the
final vote being 68-32 for both. Gaddis Smith. Morality, Reason and Power, 114.
52William Manger, “Reform of the OAS: the 1967 Buenos Aires Protocol of
Amendment to the 1948 Charter of Bogata,” Journal o f Inter-American Studies 10, no. I
(January 1968): 5.
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effort. Not a single Central or South American state supported the plan.33 Worse,
President Portillo of Mexico actively lobbied other Latin American leaders to reject the
peace plan, and “although other Latin Americans pursued a similar objective, Mexico
efforts at the OAS were interpreted as particularly hostile and anti-American by U.S.
officials.”34 The experience demonstrated to the Carter Administration that the
multilateral approach to hemispheric problems was not beneficial in some security issues,
a lesson the Reagan Administration would utilize. Despite the best effort of the U.S. to
act in good faith in the Nicaraguan case, the negative impact of power asymmetry on
regional security relations was too great to overcome.

CONCLUSION
Power indicators reveal the gap in relative power levels between the U.S. and
Latin America remained firmly intact during the 1970s. Despite the continuation of U.S.
dominance. Latin American GNP grew at a faster rate than the U.S., and its
interdependence with the U.S. was partly diverted by a concerted effort to increase inter
regional trade. A curtailment of arms sales by the Carter Administration in the later part
of the decade further reduced Latin American dependency on the U.S.. making Brazil and
Argentina seek out European partners to bridge the gap.
An analysis of the power indicators shows the potential for a reduction in power
asymmetry, however the influence of economic crisis in the U.S. and Latin America

53Gaddis Smith. Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter
Years, p. 159.
54Robert Pastor and Jorge G. Castaneda, Limits to Friendship: The U.S. and
Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 160.
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makes such it difficult to draw such a conclusion. Several events, such as the two
economic crises, and the loss of the Vietnam War, decreased U.S. power during the
decade. Scholars and policy-makers of the era believed that the U.S. had to reduce its
foreign commitment due to shrinking influence. These events are similar to conditions
after the Depression that led to Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. However, Latin
America also experienced severe economic crisis, resulting in the accumulation of
extreme debts. Latin America suffered equally from the oil crisis of 1973 and from after
shock of the U.S. economic downturn. These conditions caused hyperinflation
throughout South and Central America. During the Depression Latin America had
comparatively less manufacturing capacity, and was less affected by the economic crisis.
However, by the late 1970s many Latin American states had become more dependent on
industry, and therefore were more affected by the economic crisis than forty years before.
Despite a reduction of U.S. activity in the region, especially during the last half of the
decade, it seemed that extreme power asymmetry continued.
The continuation of extreme power asymmetry in the U.S .-Latin American
hegemonic system continued to erode the regional stability. The 1970s began with the
Vina del Mar Consensus that demanded more public goods from U.S. hegemony,
alienating the Nixon Administration, and setting the tone for the rest of the decade. The
U.S. began to disregard multilateral tools to solve regional security problems sensing the
uncooperative atmosphere of the period. Its problems in the region were approached in a
bilateral manner. The unilateral behavior of the U.S. hardened the Latin American
position against the overwhelming regional power of the U.S., resulting in their active
search for alternatives to U.S. hegemony. The Carter Administration attempted to
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remedy the U.S. position by relying on the OAS to bring a peaceful transition of power to
Nicaragua, but was rebuffed by Latin American states.
Carter's policies towards the region in the last half of the 1970s provided
excellent litmus to test the negative impact of power asymmetry on regional security
cooperation. Carter sought to demonstrate that he represented a break from business as
usual. His strategic motivation was that once Latin American leaders understood that the
U.S. was not a threat, regional security tensions would dissipate. Despite a concerted
effort by U.S. policy-makers to correct the ‘sins of the past’. Latin American leaders
remained doubtful about all policy that emanated from Washington. Carter
misinterpreted Latin American complaints about what they claimed was a pattern o f U.S.
actions to subjugate them. The Carter Administration thought using U.S. power for
beneficial regional interests, and not purely U.S. self-interest might improve relations.
Latin American states, highly sensitized to U.S. dominance, interpreted almost any
expression of U.S. power as detrimental to their interests. Initiatives by the U.S. were
viewed as coercive rather than cooperative, and therefore security cooperation reached
new lows despite the progressive efforts of Washington in the last half of the decade.
Carter misunderstood the basic underlying problem in the Americas. He thought
it was a general U.S. malaise towards the region, reflected in the foreign policy priorities
of the U.S.. which created security problems. The true culprit behind the anemic security
relationship was the continuation of the large power differential between the U.S. and
Latin American. Latin American leaders were less willing to accept U.S. hegemony as it
had been in the past. Latin America perceived it was receiving less of the public goods
offered by the U.S. than was sufficient. The U.S. offered security from revolution as a
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public good and some economic support. By contrast Latin American governments
continually sought more support for economic and social development, but its requests
were largely unanswered. Latin America’s willingness to work under power asymmetry
was quickly deteriorating.
Under Carter, U.S. regional policy was not as one-dimensional as in the past,
containing overtones of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy. It is no coincidence
that the Good Neighbor policy was instituted during a period of economic weakness, just
as Carter’s policy was initiated under a perceived power decline as well. Since
Roosevelt’s policies engendered better relations, the Carter Administration was hoping
for the same reaction. Under deteriorating Latin American economic conditions, creating
the Latin American perception of growing asymmetry despite economic problems that
affected the U.S. as well, these initiatives accrued very little goodwill in the region.
The popularity of dependency theory reached its apex during the 1970s. The antiU.S. thrust of dependency theory, reflected in the economic policies of most Latin
American states of the period, was an indicator of negative Latin American perceptions
of U.S. hegemony. The core-periphery relationship described by most forms of
dependency theory runs counter to hegemonic stability theory. It described the
relationship as detrimental to the peripheral states that were subservient to the core state,
with little hope of increasing their standard of living. By contrast, hegemonic stability
views the relationship as beneficial to both sides. The growth of the dependency
paradigm in Latin America was perhaps a manifestation of the detrimental impact of
extreme power asymmetry.
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Latin American states began to actively search for ways to alleviate U.S.
hegemony during the 1970s. The two primary alternatives were regional organizations
and the bipolar rival of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Many analysts viewed the Soviet
Union as the primary culprit in the deterioration of U.S.-Latin American security
cooperation during the 1970s. The reality was that problems in U.S.-Latin American
relations led to the deterioration in security cooperation, the Soviet Union was simply a
convenient alternative for Latin American states. Latin American states became
increasingly less cooperative towards the U.S. as it became apparent that after thirty years
since World War II. there would be no Marshall Plan for the region. Faced with
accumulating economic and social problems at home, Latin American states believed the
U.S. all but turned their backs to the true needs of the region. Latin American leaders
believed the U.S. was obsessed by their concerns over revolutionary activity, so much
that many thought it to be a ruse to justify further interventions and increase U.S.
dominance.
The early 1970s witnessed strong growth in Argentina. Brazil, and Mexico,
bolstering national confidence in each country. However, deteriorating economic
conditions associated with the oil crisis negatively impacted the national confidence of
most Latin American states. Latin American debt began to accrue, as they could not
finance their domestic fiscal commitments of the early 1970s. Feelings of insecurity
were bolstered by Carter's foreign policies towards the region despite the
administration's efforts to take regional concerns into account in case of the Panama
Canal and Nicaraguan revolution. The Carter Administration's focus on grading the
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human rights and democratic levels of regional states was viewed as another tool of U.S.
domination.
The 1970s mark a low point in regional security relations and the 1980s would not
be significantly better. Chapter six reviews the nature of U.S. hegemony during the
1980s as well as any attempts at regional security cooperation. The Reagan
Administration controlled U.S. foreign policy from 1981-1989 and maintained a
unilateral approach to security matter except when left with few other options. Whereas
the Carter Administration seemed to mimic Wilson's democratic activism. President
Ronald Reagan mimicked another element of the Wilson legacy, the concern over U.S.
interventionism.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

159

CHAPTER VI
THE MARGINALIZATION OF SECURITY COOPERATION (1980-1989)

U.S. hegemony remained steady throughout the 1980s, as did the power
asymmetry gap. Power asymmetry meant the U.S. would continue to give low priority to
Latin America, also guaranteeing a minimum of regional security cooperation. The lack
of regional security cooperation manifested itself in several major events including the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict; U.S. interventions in Grenada, and Panama; Latin American
aversion to the anti-Cuban policies of the U.S.; Latin American reaction to U.S. Central
American policy; the U.S. policy of supporting democratic reform and principles;
continued Latin American arms exports and arms proliferation; and Latin American
anger over U.S. technology transfer policy. Each of these topics was contentious in U.S.Latin American relations, and therefore provided a basis for an analysis on the broader
implications of regional power asymmetry on inter-American relations.
The return of interventionist U.S. policies in the 1980s did not go unnoticed by
Latin American states. The role of the U.S. in the Malvinas Islands crisis; renewal of
anti-Cuban policies; and interventionist actions in Grenada. Panama and Nicaragua all
drew strong criticism from Latin American states. Latin American states demonstrated
solidarity with Argentina by supporting Buenos Aires in the Malvinas Island conflict.
The opposition between the U.S. and the rest of the region signified a diminished ability
to execute security cooperation. U.S. direct intervention in Grenada, and covert
intervention against Nicaragua, was strongly opposed by regional states. The U.S. and
Latin America continued to disagree over the issue of Soviet ambitions in the region.
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Latin American leaders attempted to circumvent the subject as a means to derail what it
viewed as U.S. preoccupation with the topic.

During the Carter years, the U.S. signaled

to Cuba that it sought a more constructive relationship with Havana. Reagan ceased
these efforts and revived a hard-line posture. Cuba, symbolic of competing regional
security agendas between the U.S. and Latin America, once again, ignited divisions
between the two sides.
Other areas besides U.S. interventions and Cuba policy continued to irritate
regional security relations. The Argentine and Brazilian arms-exporting industries,
weapons proliferation, and technology transfer are interrelated issues separating Latin
America from the U.S. during the 1980s. Although both Argentina and Brazil were
experiencing hyperinflation during the 1980s they invested huge sums of money in their
domestic arms industries. Policy-makers in the U.S. did not understand Latin American
reticence in curbing their exports to Third World countries, primarily in the Middle East.
In mm, many Latin American leaders did not comprehend why the U.S. was so
concerned, and explained U.S. behavior by believing that it was part of a continuing
effort to dominate Latin America.
During the 1980s the Reagan Administration continued the practice of using
democracy and human rights as focal points for its relations with Latin American
countries, policies originating with the Carter Administration, albeit in a more subdued
manner. Despite general agreement in Latin American states that democracy and
observance of human rights were desirable, and indeed there were strong movements in
the 1980s away from authoritarianism, both South and Central American states were
angered by Washington's efforts to shape Latin American political reform. Regional
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tension increased over the emergence of the drug trade as a theme in regional security,
which increased U.S. diplomatic and military activity in the coca growing and exporting
states. There was very little improvement in inter-American relations during the 1980s
compared to the previous decade.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY
A direct GNP comparison in Table 9 shows that the U.S. maintained its
dominating economic performance over the primary states of Latin America, including
Brazil and Mexico. During the 1980s Latin America dependency on the U.S. became
more pronounced in terms of imports and exports as demonstrated in Table 10. Four key
states in the region. Argentina. Brazil. Mexico and Venezuela, all increased their exports
to the U.S.. and imports from the U.S. Brazil and Venezuela generally imported less than
they exported to the U.S.. while Argentina and Mexico mostly imported more from the
U.S. than they exported. Judged in a vacuum. Table 6.2 does not demonstrate Latin
American dependency as increased exports and imports to the U.S. conversely meant that
the U.S. was able to maintain some degree of influence over their trade. This trend seems
to denote growing mutual interdependence. However, when taken into consideration
with Table 9. a case can be made for the lack of reciprocity in growing U.S.-Latin
American trade. The U.S. total GNP is much larger than all of Latin America combined,
therefore significant increases in Latin American trade to the U.S. does not translate into
a similar dependency on the part of the U.S.. since their overall GNP is much higher than
Latin American states. In other words, $50 million worth o f goods reciprocally
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Table 9. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1980-1989
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Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and
Arms Transfers 1980-1989 (Washington. D .C .: Government Printing Office. 1990). 49.
55, 73, 85. The Y-axis is in Smillions, in constant 1989 dollars.

traded between the U.S. and Latin America does not carry the same influence in both
economic sectors. It is less significant to the U.S.. but might be very significant to a
particular Latin American state. The continuation of GNP growth in Latin America
during the 1980s without Latin American gains vis-a-vis the U.S.. could eventually lead
to a decrease in regional security cooperation, as the asymmetry gap might be perceived
as widening. Table 11 shows that U.S. military dominance remained intact during the
1980s. The year of greatest U.S. defense expenditure was 1989. with a $304 billion total.
The highest Latin American figure is from Brazil in 1988, close to $6 billion, but still
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Table 10. Import/Exports To U.S. (As a Percentage of Total World Trade)
1980
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Venezuela

Export
Import
Export
Import
Export
Import
Export
Import

1985

1987

1989

14.6
16.5
27.9
20.7

12.4
21.2
24.6
20.9

63.2
65.6

12.2
18.2
27.1
19.7
60.4
66.6

60.4
66.6

70
70.4

27.8
48.2

46.0
47.5

573
44.6

51.6
44.6

8.9
22.6
17.4
18.6

Source: James W. Wilkie. Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. Statistical
Abstract o f Latin America. Vol. 34 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center
Publications, 1998), 691.

Table 11. Annual Military Expenditure. 1980-1989

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Argentina

Brazil

Mexico

U.S.

Venezuela

1359
1.647
2.793
2.112
2.347
1,847
2.075
2.017
1,989
1.858

1,899
1,955
2.666
2331
2,561
2,793
3.579
4.185
5,731
NA

456
671
686
714
970
1.049
967
937
962
875

144.000
169.900
196.400
268,000
237.100
265.800
280.900
288.200
293.100
304.100

317
310
480
617
580
358
490
1307
647
407

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1980-1989. 87. 95. 100. 101. Numbers are millions of U.S. dollars, in
current 1989 dollars.

just two percent of the U.S. total. The cumulative totals of the four South American
states in 1988 equals $93 billion, which is still only three percent of U.S. expenditure.
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U.S. NATIONAL RENEWAL AND LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE
The 1980s was a decade of U.S. economic renewal. Conversely. Latin American
economies remained unstable, prone to hyperinflation that contributed to a greater debt
burden. The combination of the opposing trends did not bode well for the probability of
regional security cooperation. In the 1970s. the U.S. public elected two presidents that
introduced foreign policies designed to manage U.S. decline. The 1980 election of
President Reagan signaled a shift in the national outlook. The era of deterrence during the
1970s gave way to a new era of activism in the 1980s. Whereas deterrence was
pragmatic, it also seemed to implicitly acknowledge the limits U.S. power. The
formation and institution of the Reagan doctrine reflected growing U.S. confidence. In
turn, this confidence signaled a return to more traditional U.S. regional policies but did
not seek to reinvigorate the moribund multilateral security organizations that might have
increased security cooperation.
With a return to more active involvement in regional politics, the U.S. also
became less tolerant of any Soviet economic or political initiative in the region. Latin
America always maintained that what the U.S. viewed as Soviet activity in reality had
domestic origins. The difference in opinion, and resulting U.S. policy, would have a
strong impact on regional security relations during the 1980s. Soviet regional
involvement reached its zenith during the 1980s and was the focus of U.S. consternation
in regional security issues. The USSR had diplomatic representation in three Latin
American states in 1960. maintained trade with four states, and had no serious political or
military involvement- By the late 1980s Soviet activity had dramatically increased. The
USSR had representation with eighteen Latin American states; traded with twenty; hosted
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thousands of Latin American students: furnished military equipment to Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Peru; and had close political relations to Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua.1 At the same
time U.S. financial and military assistance to the region was dramatically reduced in most
cases, due to U.S. concerns about instigating another Vietnam-type conflict, and due to
controversy over U.S. support of regional military regimes. Receding U.S. power and
encroaching Soviet influence during the late 1970s reawakened traditional U.S. policies
that the Carter Administration had shunned, and became entrenched in the Reagan
Doctrine.
The Reagan Doctrine had a significant influence on U.S.-Latin American relations
during the 1980s. The Reagan Doctrine was never officially stated, as in the case of the
Nixon Doctrine. It emerged from the Reagan Administration's policies towards Soviet
expansionism through proxies in the developing world. Charles Krauthammer succinctly
defined the Reagan Doctrine as a demonstration of unabashed support for perceived
anticommunist uprisings and “...is intended to establish a new foundation for such
support by declaring equally worthy all armed resistance to communism, whether foreign
or indigenously imposed.”2
The Doctrine had its roots in Reagan's strong anticommunist beliefs and Jeanne
Kirkpatrick's expositions on authoritarianism. Kirkpatrick did not label all authoritarian
dictatorships as antithetical to democracy. It was her perception that dictatorships, such
as Cuba under Castro, were incapable of evolving into a democracy because of their

‘Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin American America
in the 1990s. 37.
2Charles Krauthammer, "The Reagan Doctrine.” Time, 1 April 1985,54.
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Marxist orientation. By contrast, other dictatorships had the potential to become
democratic states.3 Therefore, the U.S. actively supported insurgencies that it perceived
as anticommunist throughout the world, including. Afghanistan. Angola and Nicaragua.
Since the Cuban revolution, the island nation became a symbol of anti-American
sentiment throughout Latin America. Leaders of the U.S. viewed Cuba as a surrogate of
the Soviet Union that had to be held in-check due to the perception that Soviet gains
might result. The rest of Latin America was averse to any U.S. efforts to destabilize the
Cuban government. Cuba had become a symbol of the growing Latin American
sentiment wishing to be independent of U.S. hegemony. As President Portillo of Mexico
once stated. “We will in no way allow anything to be done to Cuba because we would
feel that it is being done to ourselves.”4 Although there was a perception by some Latin
American governments that Cuba activity supported revolution in Central and South
America, regional states felt more threatened by the U.S. encroachment on Cuba's
sovereignty. The U.S. viewed its efforts to isolate Cuba as part of a global strategy to
contain communism: Latin American leaders understood U.S. actions as regional strategy
to dominate them. Latin American suspicions of U.S. Cuban policy were exacerbated by
domestic economic instability during the last half of the 1970s and the 1980s, in contrast
to the recovery of the U.S. during the 1980s.
The foreign policy of the U.S.. in order to actively engage what it perceived as
communist activity, brought the Cuban issue to the forefront of regional politics in the

'Thomas Carothers, In the Name o f Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin
America in the Reagan Years. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 77.
4Pastor and Castaneda, 161.
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1980s. The confrontation policy was a reversal of the Carter Administration that sought
to downplay the differences of opinion between the U.S. and Latin American leaders over
Cuba. Many regional states strongly believed the U.S. regularly over-reacted against
Cuba. The more candid of these opinions expressed the idea that the U.S. engaged in a
policy geared toward regional domination. Some critics of U.S. policy during the 1980s
believed Washington purposely provoked Latin American revolutions to seek alliance
with the USSR to provide a pretext for U.S. intervention. Critics noted that U.S. policies
actually encouraged Latin American communist revolution, as Walter Lafeber claimed
that “Nicaragua, faced such intensified CIA and U.S. military pressure that it moved
closer to Cuba and the Soviet bloc—exactly the kind of dependency the Reagan policies
supposedly sought to prevent."3
The OAS played almost no role in the Nicaraguan conflict after its initial rejection
of the attempt of the U.S. to broker a peaceful transition of power. The Reagan
Administration clearly ignored the OAS. as “Haig addressed the problem of Nicaraguan
subversion unilaterally and in and East-West framework rather than regionally and as a
violation of the Rio Pact."6 Latin American states seemed to abandon the OAS as well.
Brazil and Mexico issued a joint communique' in 1983 opposing U.S. intervention in
Central America and SELA unanimously approved a resolution condemning the U.S.
economic boycott of Nicaragua in 1985.' After difficult negotiations, known as

5LaFeber. 303.
R obert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United Stares and Nicaragua
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 232.
'Munoz, “The Inter-American System,” 32.
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Contadora, an agreement was reached in 1987 that introduced a timetable for democratic
elections. Although Contadora was eventually successful, it was not accomplished
through the region's primary multilateral agency, the OAS.
The U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 was roundly criticized throughout
Latin America. An editorial in Folha de Sao Paulo, a nationally distributed paper in
Brazil, stated: “In sum. Reagan ordered the invasion because he considered unacceptable
(sic) the constructions of an economic system which disregards the essence of U.S.
politics...including economics and the '[U.S.] way of life’”.8 Another Brazilian
newspaper was equally critical of U.S. unilateral policy: “The intervention in Grenada is
part of a long history, which has its shameful pages, such as the Bay of Pigs.”9 It
continued by rejecting the assertion that it was a Cold War maneuver, pointing out that
Reagan’s staunchest ally, Margaret Thatcher, did not approve of the action either. The
Canadian and Mexican foreign secretaries emphasized their displeasure with U.S.
unilateral behavior by issuing their denunciation jointly.10 Another editorial bitterly
denounced the invasion as breaking the international law of non-intervention, which is
frequently done by great powers against “ ...weak and poor nations and governments that

sGaleno de Freita. “Limited Sovereignty.” (text). Sao Paulo. Folha de Sao Paulo
in Portuguese (27 October 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS-Daily Report-Latin America, I November 1983 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT1983-V; p. D -l).
9“Invading Lilliput” (text). Rio de Janeiro Journal do Brasil in Portuguese (27
October 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin America, 01 November 1983 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT- 1983-VI; p. D-2).
l0“Sepulveda. MacEachen Criticize U.S. Invasion” (text). Mexico City NOTIMEX
in Spanish (03 November 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 04 November 1983 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT1983-V; p. M -l). ’
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are docile.” It also rejected the argument that the U.S. was pursuing an overly aggressive
anti-communist policy, “Deep down, the arguments are intended to maintain zones of
influence since the force to do so is available.” 11
The strong condemnation by Central and South American states demonstrated
how U.S. unilateral actions further provoked Latin American concerns about U.S.
dominance. Criticisms by Latin American leaders of the U.S. intervention did not seem
to take into account that the U.S. had the approval of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS).12 Also, their strong condemnation of the U.S. seemed to
discount the growing violence in Grenada leading up to the invasion. Under the guidance
of General Hudson Austin soldiers from the People's Revolutionary Army shot into
unarmed crowds of protesters resulting in many civilian casualties. Shortly after this
event Austin ordered the execution of Grenada's leader. Maurice Bishop, three cabinet
members, and two union leaders that had been arrested.13 Latin American concerns were
driven by a broader issue: If they allow any military intervention by the U.S. to occur
without objection, justified or not, they perceived that they risked the U.S. doing the same

" “Grenada and the Nonintervention Principle” (text). La Paz PRESENCIA in
Spanish (27 October 1983). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FBIS Daily Report-Latin America. 01 November. 1983 (PrEx 7.10 FBIS-LAT-83-VI: p.
C-l).
1‘Thorndike states that five of the seven OECS members (Antigua and Barbuda.
Dominca. St. Kitts-Nevis. St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) involked Article 8 of the OECS
Treaty. This Article allowed members to take collective security measures against
external aggression. Tony Thorndike, “Grenada,” in Intervention in the 1980s: (J.S.
Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1989), 259.
13WiIliam C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation
(New York: Facts on File Publishers, 1985), 32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170
to them. Tony Thorndike came to a similar conclusion: “The invasion confirmed the
deeply held suspicions of Central and South American countries that the United States
remained interventionist, thereby increasing long-term anti-U.S. feelings and further
damaging an already suffering image.”14 The regional power asymmetry problem
contributed to the strong Latin American condemnation. Latin American over reaction
and U.S. unilateralism combined to further divide U.S.-Latin American security relations.
Some regional observers interpreted the Grenada intervention as a precursor to a
U.S. invasion in Nicaragua.1' A likely analysis by an observer of U.S. politics would
conclude that the U.S. direct involvement in Nicaragua was very improbable, since the
U.S. public was still leery of committing itself to such large-scale incursions after the
Vietnam experience. However. U.S. funding of anti-Sandinista elements, and covert
activities in Nicaragua, increased Latin American concerns that the U.S. was poised to
directly intervene yet again in Nicaragua. In order to avoid direct U.S. intervention,
many Latin American states vociferously supported negotiations between the Contras and
Sandinistas. Latin American consensus emerged on the issue when the foreign ministers
of the Contadora Group (Colombia. Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) met with
Argentina. Brazil. Peru and Uruguay to expedite the Contadora negotiation process.
Their joint proposal was aimed at establishing an immediate cease-fire and therefore
ending U.S. support for irregular military forces. The goal was to provide a Latin

I4Ibid., 62.
I5For example, see “Paper Says Grenada Prelude to Nicaragua Invasion” (text).
Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish (31 October 1983). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 04 November 1983
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-83-VI; p. M-I).
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American solution that would reaffirm the principle of nonintervention, a message aimed
directly at the U.S.16
During the closing month of the 1980s the U.S. intervened in Panama, drawing
criticism from most states of the region. The U.S. stated that its purpose was to
overthrow the leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, and ostensibly to restore democracy in
the country. Latin American reaction to the intervention was no different than their
negative reactions to other U.S. interventions in the region. The President of Brazil. Jose
Samey. condemned U.S. intervention in Panama and claimed the U.S. infringed on the
ideal of state self-determination.1' The two most prominent Chilean political parties
denounced the U.S. invasion. The Christian Democratic Party, right of center in the
Chilean political spectrum and a natural ally of the U.S.. stated the action violated the UN
and OAS Charters.18 President Carlos A. Perez of Venezuela rejected any justification
for intervention. Although he admitted that Noriega's dictatorship was offensive, he
lamented the breaking of the nonintervention principle, demonstrating the traditional

16Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal, The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central
America and the Caribbean (Lanham. MD: Universitv Press of America. Inc.. 1987),
150.
l Benites. Giselle. “Communique Condemns U.S. Actions in Panama" (text).
Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese (20 December 1989). Translated by Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 21 December 1989
(PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-244: p. 35).
IQ

“PDC Issues Communique." (text). Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in
Spanish. (December 20, 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FBIS Dailv Report-Latin American, 21 December 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-244;
p. 36).
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hierarchy of Latin American security concerns as opposed those of the U.S.19 The
Mexican representative to the UN announced Mexico's official position, stating the
intervention was a distortion of UN principles and called for the withdrawal of U.S.
forces."0 An OAS vote on the matter demonstrated regional concern about the U.S.
unilateral action. Twenty states voted for a measure expressing regret at the U.S. action,
seven abstained, and the U.S. was the lone dissenter.21 The words of the resolution were
muted, but firmly directed against the U.S.. specifically mentioning that the military
intervention was regrettable, and calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
The Panama invasion in 1989 was the last U.S. intervention of the decade.
President Bush was a stronger adherent to multilateral forums than Reagan, and
attempted to empower the OAS by pushing it to resolve the Panama crisis. The OAS
negotiators almost brokered a compromise that allowed a two-year timetable for Manuel
Noreiga to retire."2 Eventually the OAS mission failed, but perhaps there was a small
victory in that the Bush Administration made an attempt to reawaken its role as an active
player in multilateral security cooperation efforts. Despite these efforts, regional reaction

19“Perez Interviewed: Rejects U.S. Action in Panama." (text). Caracas Venezolana
de Television Canal 8 in Spanish (20 December 1989). Translated by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Dailx Report-Latin America. 21 December 1989 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-LAT-89-244; pp. 37-38).’
:o“Foreign Secretariat Rejects U.S. Invasion." (text). Paris AFP in Spanish (31
December 1989). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily
Report-Latin American, 03 January 1990. (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-90-002; p. 17).
21“OAS Resolution Expresses Regret on U.S. Action,” (text). Bridgetown CANA
in English (23 December 1989). FBIS Daily Report-Latin American, 27 December, 1989
(PrEx"7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-247; p. 1).
""Martha L. Cottam, Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin American
America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1994), 158.
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was predictably negative, as Smith states, “From Chile to Mexico, reaction to the
invasion was swift and negative. Bush had not bothered to consult any Latin [American]
leaders beforehand.”23

FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS CRISIS
Some analysts believe the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War was a defining moment
for inter-American security. On April 25. 1982, the Argentine government invoked the
Rio Treaty, a security agreement within the framework of the OAS that calls for
reciprocal assistance among American states to meet acts of aggression generated either
within or outside of the Americas region. The Rio Treaty was a victory for regional
security relations simply by being collectively approved by member states. Ball points
out that ‘T he Rio Treaty had turned the regional association into a regional security
organization.”2'1 Yet the treaty has also served as a reminder of their divisions. Latin
American states began to view the U.S. as a security threat from within, the primary issue
being the importance of the preservation of their state sovereignty against U.S.
encroachment. By comparison, the U.S. viewed the Soviet Union as the most immediate
threat to regional security, with Latin American state sovereignty of secondary
importance. The OAS voted in favor of supporting the Argentine position, with eighteen
for the petition, none against it. and the U.S. abstaining.25 The appearance of a British

"^Peter H. Smith. The Talons o f the Eagle, 274.
24BalI, 27. Further, the Rio Treaty designated security questions to be handled
through the Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Article 11 of the Rio Treaty).
25Ruben O. Moro, The History o f the South Atlantic: The Warfo r the Malvinas
(New York: Praeger, 1989), 56.
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task force two days before the vote rallied several Latin American states to the Argentine
cause despite any misgivings over the role of the Galtieri regime in instigating the
conflict.
Despite the OAS vote, the US came to the aid of the United Kingdom (U.K.).
albeit not through direct involvement in the conflict. The U.S. assisted the U.K. by
allowing the use of Ascension Island as a support base. More specifically, this entailed
supplying fuel; sidewinder and stinger air-to-air missiles for British aircraft; and phalanx,
gun systems for some British vessels. The U.S. also supplied up to ninety percent of the
total intelligence of the U.K. during the conflict.26 The U.S. also supported the British
sponsored Security Council Resolution 502. which called for the withdrawal of Argentine
troops from the Falklands.2'
The inability of Latin American states to prevent U.S. support of the British was
probably not unexpected by OAS members, however the event reinforced growing
cynicism among Latin American leaders concerning the viability of regional security
organization. It demonstrated that U.S. power was the real driver behind any regional
agreement, not Pan American idealism or multilateral principles. More importantly, for
Latin Americans it showed their own impotence vis-a-vis the U.S. Even when the large
majority voted against the U.S. there was no enforcement mechanism strong enough to
curb U.S. dominance. The conflict had the potential of demonstrating a unified regional

26Ibid.. 320.
2TThomas M. Franck, ‘T he Strategic Role of Legal Principles,” In The Falklands
War: Lessons fo r Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law, eds. A. Coll and A. Arend
(Boston; Allen and Unwin, 1985), 23.
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security vision, but had the opposite effect of highlighting the enduring and growing
fissures between Latin American and U.S. security interests.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Under the Carter Administration the U.S. began to apply human rights and
democracy as standards to transcend the traditional power politics approach. When the
Reagan Administration assumed executive powers, it publicly disavowed the former
administration's multilateral initiatives. Despite its public criticisms of Carter
Administration policies, it did not fully scrap the role of human rights and democracy in
policy creation towards developing countries. The approach was domestically successful,
stressing democratic values and human rights, which added credibility to some policy
decisions. It became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy from 1980-1988. and was a
reflection of past U.S. policies. Mari-France Toinet explains that even before World War
I. “...the United States also believed itself to have a civilizing 'mission' even if it did not
use that term, and whenever they decided to intervene anywhere it was always in the
name of democratic principles."28
Whereas the coalescence of U.S. interests and desires to uplift developing states
was successful domestically, it was both perplexing and cynical to many Latin American
observers. Policymakers in the U.S. believed this policy created a more coherent and
predictable standard. leading to a more productive interaction with Latin American
representatives. However, the policy was unable to distinguish between the security

28Mari-France Toinet, "The Lawyers' Verdict,” in The Rise and Fall o f AntiAmericanism: A Century o f French Perception, ed. Denis Lacome (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1990), 196.
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needs of the U.S. and the need for support of Latin American democratic development.
The presence of an anti-democratic competitor in the region, the Soviet Union, put U.S.
interests and support of democracy at odds. In essence, whatever the U.S. did to truncate
the spread of Soviet influence was perceived as a victory for democracy. Latin American
states viewed the two faces of U.S. regional diplomacy as highly inconsistent. The policy
was interpreted as at best, benign neglect of regional and domestic realities, at worst, the
U.S. acting in its interests with no regard for its impact on regional states. The
differences between the U.S. and Latin America created fertile ground for disagreement
because many states south of the Rio Grande thought democracy and human rights were
catchwords to provide new fuel to traditional U.S. interventionist policies.
As proof of their suspicions about U.S. intentions, skeptical Latin Americans
pointed out that the record of the U.S. in supporting democracy was selective. The U.S.
claimed it intervened in Grenada and Nicaragua to overthrow non-democratic leaders, but
looked upon military dictatorships in Chile and Brazil as acceptable.''* As well as taking
exception to the uneven record of the U.S. in supporting democratic reform in Latin
America, critics also thought the criteria of the U.S. for deciding what was considered a
democracy was more than suspect. At one point U.S. policy seemed to treat the holding
of elections as the requirement for a democracy. Guy Poitras noted, “If simply holding
elections were the sole requirement of democracy. Central America would be

29For example Pastor states “In justifying its confrontation with Nicaragua, the
administration [Reagan] discovered and then elaborated a commitment to democracy.” It
must also be said on this issue that Pastor gives the Reagan Administration credit for
communicating to military leaders in Latin American America that U.S. support for them
was contingent on their resolve to institute democratic government. Robert A. Pastor,
U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), 80.
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substantially more democratic than it actually is.”30 Because the U.S. used democracy as
the motivation in the interventions in Grenada and Nicaragua, and its military support of
pro-U.S. elements in El Salvador and Honduras, the policy was judged as either arbitrary
or unequally enforced. The strong support of the U.S. for democratic ideals seemed to be
the cover for justifying politics driven by pure self-interest.
It is not difficult to understand the concern of Latin American leaders with U.S.
regional security policy during the 1980s. since the Reagan Administration’s policies
varied so widely. Carothers found four distinct U.S. policies towards individual Latin
American states during the 1980s: democracy by transition (Costa Rica. El Salvador.
Guatemala. Honduras): democracy by force (Grenada. Nicaragua): democracy by
applause (Argentina): and democracy by pressure (Chile. Paraguay. Panama. Brazil).’1
Democracy by transition was initiated when the U.S. believed a state was threatened by
leftist aggression, and as a response promoted democratic change to provide a bulwark
against potential communist incursion. Democracy by force consisted of direct
intervention to overthrow a regime that was perceived as aligned with the Soviet Union,
which was considered anti-democratic. Democracy by applause refers to a U.S. policy
that demonstrated support for democracy in a particular state, but did so without direct
involvement.

The most important reason being the U.S. wanted to maintain a

relationship with the military regimes in Argentina, but did not want to lose it as valuable
ally in its Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union.32 Democracy by pressure

^ o itra s , 75.
3ICarothers, 192-195.
32Ibid-, 240.
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policies were not directed against a perceived communist threat, but was similar to
democracy by transition in that U.S. policy was proactive in trying to influence
democratic reforms. An example of democracy by pressure is when the U.S. enforced
arms sales restrictions against the Brazilian military dictatorship. The pattern emerging
from Carothers* study is that the U.S. consistently supported democratic reform, but
weighted its most severe responses towards communist dictatorships.^
The same criticisms have been made of U.S. actions to support human rights in
Latin America. Human rights began to assume a high level of importance in U.S.
regional policy under the Carter Administration, and were reinforced to a lesser extent
under the Reagan Administration: “When President Carter was defeated, this growing
human rights consciousness lost its chief spokesperson but not the public basis of its
support.”34 However. U.S. human rights enforcement was inconsistent because under the
Reagan Administration contending political parties controlled the legislative and
executive branches. They were constantly at odds over human rights observance by
foreign states and the proper punishment mechanisms. Reagan Administration officials
wanted a less strict standard to allow them more latitude in policy implementation, the
legislature called for tougher enforcement.
Since the U.S. did not consistently support human rights, criticism from Latin
America grew. From their perspective, the U.S. supported human rights as long as it was

j3This was more or less the stated policy by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the U.S.
ambassador to the UN in the Reagan Administration. She thought that there should be a
two-tiered policy applied to dictatorships. Communist dictatorships were less likely to
reform to democracies so stronger measures were needed. By contrast other dictatorships
were more likely to be led by less direct pressure.
^Carothers, 242.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179
convenient to U.S. security concerns.35 There was also a great deal of Latin American
resentment in that the U.S. behaved as though it was the custodian of human rights,
judging other states and distributing rewards or punishment for a state's performance.36

AUTONOMY THROUGH ARMS PRODUCTION
The growth of Argentine and Brazilian arms producers was another point of
contention between the U.S. and regional arms producing states during the 1980s. The
disagreement typified many of the impediments to broader security cooperation and
demonstrated the lack of trust many Latin American leaders had towards the U.S.
Argentina. Brazil, and other regional states thought U.S. demands on export restrictions
were solely based in self-interest, not due to strategies meant to truncate Soviet
expansionism and control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as U.S.
policy-makers frequently proclaimed. In contrast, the U.S. thought Latin American
industries were leveraging U.S. technology transfer and financial support to sell Latin
American arms indiscriminately to the highest bidder. Each side had a different but still
credible perspective. The middle ground was elusive on the arms exporting issue and the
Latin American arms industry issue remained a point of contention during the 1980s.
Argentina, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, pursued additional capacity in arms
production to obtain greater autonomy, and more specifically, a hedge against U.S.

3:>RafaeI Braun, “The Human Rights Question,” in The United States and Latin
American America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade o f Crisis, eds.
Kevin Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986).
398.
36Ibid., 400.
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influence.37 The motivations behind indigenous arms production expressed the lack of
trust many Latin American states held towards U.S. hegemony. Achieving greater
autonomy for its own sake does not demonstrate a specific policy against the U.S. as
much as a natural need for self-reliance and development. However, autonomy from the
U.S. denotes a particular insecurity directed towards the U.S. During the 1970s and
1980s Latin American states diversified their sources for arms primarily from the U.S. to
France, Italy, Israel, the Soviet Union, the U.K., and indigenous arms production.38
Brazil had been, and remains today, the largest Latin American arms exporter.
Table 12 illustrates the success of Brazilian efforts to gain autonomy in arms production,
which can be gauged over a twenty-year period. In 1975 Brazil was able for the first time
to export S51 million in arms; in 1987-88 the effort reached its apex with $650 and $700
million in sales respectively. Although the statistics show that Brazil never achieved
complete autonomy in the arms sector, it was successful in reducing the U.S.* s influence.
From 1981-1988 Brazil exported more than it imported, while also being able to reach
this goal in 1992 and 1994. Armored vehicles, missiles and rocket systems generated the
bulk of earnings from Brazil's arms sales.

37Argentina. Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico were the only arms exporting states
during the period from 1985-1995. Mexican efforts to export were almost too small to be
considered a directed policy, reaching its zenith in value in 1990 at $23 million. Cuban
arms exports were for the most part not domestically manufactured, for example in 1988
Cuba imported just over $2 billion in arms and exported $287 million. These statistics
demonstrate Cuba's search for autonomy vis-a-vis the U.S., but not exclusive autonomy
in arms production. See James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega,
302-303.
38Lowenthal, 37.
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Table 12. Brazilian Arms Exports and Imports, 1985-1993
Year

Imports

Exports

Year

Imports

Exports

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

82
307
349
655
264
172

330
330
650
700
120
60

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

166
129
168
103
170

80
180
100
195
10

Source: James W. Wilkie. Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, p. 302

The considerable effort by Argentina. Brazil and Chile to produce and export arms was
two-fold: indigenous arms production would give the state greater autonomy and could
earn badly needed export capital. In the Brazilian case, plans to achieve greater
autonomy began in the 1960s, when the Brazilian army's Department of War Material
and manufacturing interests in Sao Paulo formed an alliance known as Grupo
Permanente de Mobilizacao Industrial. The alliance sought to convert underutilized
civilian industries to defense production.39 The goal of greater self-reliance in the arms
sector was also influenced by the advent of military rule in 1964. lasting until 1985.40 In
the late 1970s, for the first time in the post World War II period. Brazilian purchases
from European suppliers and domestic sources were larger than weapon imports from the
U.S.41 The trend was exacerbated by the Carter Administration's policy to tie the
distribution of military aid to human rights. Guidelines to the State and Defense

39Clovis Brigagao, “The Brazilian Arms Industry,” Journal o f International
Affairs 4. no. 1 (Summer 1986): 107.
"^Ken Conca, “Technology, The Military, And Democracy in Brazil,” Journal o f
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 34, no. I (Spring 1992): 143.
4ISchmidt, 5.
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departments prohibited states judged to be human rights abusers from receiving any
military aid.42
Regional arms exporting states also had an economic imperative for their actions.
From 1974-1994 Brazil accrued five billion dollars in export earnings. These export
earnings were one of the few bright spots in Brazil’s value-added exports. Despite their
hard-credit earnings, critics in the U.S. noted that Brazil spent nearly half of its annual
GDP supporting domestic industries.44 Further, research and development in the state
supported armaments industries accounted for 20-25 percent of the country’s science and
technology budget.44 Therefore, whatever profit Brazil gained from arms exports was
diminished by government investment in domestic industries. A point of contention that
spread beyond the arms sector concerned issues related to economic development
strategy. Whereas Brazil and other Latin American states actively pursued import
substitution policies, the U.S. strongly believed that these policies should play a smaller
role in economic development.45

42Partrice Franko-Jones, “Public Private Partnership: Lessons From the Brazilian
Armaments Industry.” Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29. no. 4
(Winter 1987-88): 50.
4j‘Tomorrow’s Italy,” The Economist, 17 June 1987: 20.
^Conca. ’Technology, The Military, And Democracy in Brazil.” 146.
45Krueger states, “Essentially the argument for protection and inward orientation
of the economy rested on the presence of imperfections in the market mechanism that
made it difficult for developing economies to compete and develop. Proponents of
outward-oriented policies pointed to the costs associated with protectionist policies.”
See, Anne O. Krueger, “Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion,” in International
Economics and International Economic Policy: A Reader, ed. Philip King (San Francisco
State: McGraw Hill Inc., 1990), 155.
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The issue of U.S. technology transfer to Brazil and Argentina turned out to be
another stumbling block in regional security affairs. Brazil had become competitive in
the arms export industry by selling robust and easy to maintain equipment. Customers
were not burdened with end-item utilization requirements that the U.S. frequently
attaches to their weapons exports, and were frequendy given licenses to produce
Brazilian designed equipment amounting to a technology transfer.46 These qualities gave
Brazil thirty-six customers willing to buy major weapons systems by the late 1980s.4'
During the early 1980s Brazil held at least nine licenses to produce major ground, sea. air
and missile weapons systems: Argentina held eleven.48
The U.S. objected to Brazilian technology transfer for three reasons, first due to
opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, second it undercut U.S.
regional influence, and third, it increased competition against U.S. arms producers.
Brazilian nationalists contended that U.S. measures and objections to Brazilian
technology transfer were primarily due to the impact it had on arms industries of the U.S.
This explanation seemed unlikely since Brazilian sales, generally to developing states
that could not afford U.S. technology, found Brazilian products far less expensive.49 It is
more possible that U.S. policy-makers were concerned that Brazilian arms sales had the

46David J. Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, Technology Transfer and U.S.
Security Assistance (Boulder Westview Press. 1987), 89.
47Ibid.. 94. These states are:. Abu Dabi. Algeria, Argentina. Bolivia. Canada.
Chile, Colombia, Cypress, Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador. France, Gabon. Guyana,
Honduras, Iraq, Libya. Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria. Panama, Paraguay, Portugal.
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Sudan. Thailand, Togo, Tunisia. United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom. Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
"^Louscher and Salomone, 22.
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potential to undercut U.S. regional influence in Latin America, in the Middle East, and in
Africa. The U.S. frequently utilizes arms sales as instruments o f foreign policy. Former
Secretary o f State Vance summarized U.S. arms sales objectives: support diplomatic
efforts, influence political orientation o f other states, maintain regional balances, limit
Soviet influence, enhance U.S. access to regional governments, and provide leverage and
influence with governments.30 Because Brazil sold arms to nearly every state in the
region and many in Africa, it could potentially stunt U.S. efforts to exercise control via
the arms trade.
The objections o f the U.S. to Brazilian technology transfer were mostly centered
on the possibility o f the proliferation weapons o f mass destruction. The U.S. strongly
objected to Argentine and Brazilian attempts to sell missile technology to Libya and Iraq,
and tried to block the West German sale o f nuclear reactor technology to Brazil due to the
concern the material could be weaponized and resold to other states. Analysts agreed that
with the new reactor Brazil had the ability to produce weapons grade uranium.51 At the
time, the sale o f West German nuclear reactor technology to Brazil was the largest
nuclear transfer to a developing country, and was instantly understood as a threat to
nuclear weapons proliferation.32 Further, the U.S. expressed concern about the potential
for the sale to ignite a nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazil, at the time strong

50Paul Y. Hammond, The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking For Arms
Sales (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers Inc., 1983), 32-33.
5'Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder Westview Press, 1990), 251.
S2Norman Gall. “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for Ail.” in Foreign Policy on Latin
America, 1970-1980, eds. Staff o f Foreign Policy Journal (Boulder Westview Press,
1983), 57.
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rivals. Germany and Brazil couched U.S. objections in terms o f economics: they thought
the true objection o f the U.S. was the entrance o f German companies into a market niche
that was formerly filled only by two U.S. corporations, General Electric and
Westingho use.53
Brazil and Argentina’s missile programs caused consternation in Washington as
well. Two Brazilian companies, Avibras and Orbita, separately worked on missile
systems meant for export to Libya and Iraq.34 After the signing o f the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Brazil was unable to procure the parts needed to
complete its missile sales. Further, the U.S. was able to stop France from supplying
rocket technology to Brazil although it was purportedly meant for launching satellites.
Argentina was also working on a clandestine nuclear weapons program and missile
program, the Condor II. The MTCR signatories expressed concern about the Condor II
program, in part because o f Argentina’s partner states, Iraq and Egypt. Under U.S.
pressure, the Condor II was cancelled in 1990.55
The inability o f Latin American to compromise on these issues was a product o f
mutual distrust between them and the U.S. From the Latin American perspective it was
essentially a question o f autonomy. Latin American states wanted to insulate themselves
from the seemingly capricious effect o f U.S. foreign policy. Latin American states
producing arms resented U.S. interference, at best believing U.S. policy goals only

53Ibid., 63.
54“BraziL Iraq to Develop Rockets Jointly,” (text). Brasilia O Globo (9 March
1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily ReportLatin America, 6 April 1989, (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-240; p. 51).
55Spector, 230-232.
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factored Cold War interests, at worst believing the U.S. wanted to keep the region
subjugated to continue forms of exploitation. As one South American commented,
reflecting broad opinion throughout the region. “Developing countries must develop the
will to break out of the cycle of technological colonialism/06 Many Latin American
observers believed the policies of the U.S. were designed to subjugate them both
economically and in security affairs. It seemed the U.S. had the intent to abrogate
Brazilian success in arms exports, which was one of the few manufacturing sectors that
any Latin American state had succeeded in during the late 1980s. Furthermore, by
denying Latin American indigenous arms production, the U.S. increased Latin American
dependency on U.S. and European suppliers.
The U.S. had a distinctly opposite view. Regional states that should be allied with
U.S. initiatives against weapons proliferation and technology transfer to potential
adversaries were instead turning against the U.S. for profit reasons only. Some U.S.
analysts pointed to the fact that the only reason Brazil and Argentina's defense firms
realized any profits was due to huge amounts of state investment, and due to finances
procured by loans from U.S. controlled financial institutions. Technology transfer, at
times originally procured from the U.S., angered domestic critics.5' Many critics wanted
to see U.S. loans direcdy benefit the Argentine and Brazilian populace rather than the
elite, who reaped most of the financial rewards of the arms trade.

36“Minister Wants to End Technological Colonialism” (text). Bridgetown CANA
in English (31 January 1984). FBIS Report-Latin America 01 February 1984 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-LAT-84-VI; p. S-3).
^Janne E. Nolan, Trappings o f Power: Ballistic M issiles in the Third World
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1991), 36.
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CONCLUSION
In terms of GNP and defense expenditure, U.S. hegemony was perpetuated
through the 1980s. The presence of power asymmetry was demonstrated by the lack of
improvement in security cooperation during the 1980s. Several factors contributed to the
lack of security cooperation, including: the continuation of unilateral U.S. military
intervention. large Latin American investments in indigenous arms production, the
continued Latin American support for Cuba, and signs of Latin American balancing
against the U.S. on certain security issues.
Direct unilateral military intervention in the cases of Grenada and Panama, and
indirect involvement in Nicaragua and Cuba, helped contribute to difficulties in regional
security relations. Because the U.S. by-passed established multilateral forums in most of
these cases, Latin American leaders had no input into U.S. policies that in turn had a
great deal of influence over them. An interesting duality to Latin American reactions
against U.S. unilateral interventions should be noted. Despite the adoption of democratic
principles in the later part of the 1980s. Latin American states were still strongly critical
of U.S. policies to force regime change in Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama. One
might expect statements condemning the unilateral manner of U.S. actions from Latin
American statesmen, but similarly it would be expected that the U.S. receive support for
initiatives to democratize regional states. The strong Latin American reaction to these
events demonstrates the high degree of Latin American distrust towards the U.S.
The exhibition of balancing behavior also demonstrated the regional hegemonic
system was not functioning as effectively as it should be. Latin American states stood
firmly behind Argentina during the Malvinas Islands dispute with the U.K.. and they
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formed a consensus outside of U.S. leadership to ameliorate the Nicaraguan conflict.
Although U.S. leadership was far from abdicated, the system seemed to be under
considerable strain from the use of U.S. power that created a power asymmetry condition.
The OAS and the Rio Treaty continued to be marginalized as tools to facilitate
hegemonic stability. Despite votes in the OAS that condemned U.S. actions in Grenada
and Panama, and that supported Argentina in the Malvinas crisis, the U.S. ignored these
deliberations. The OAS became a forum where Latin American leaders could vent their
frustrations towards U.S. policies but with little impact on Washington.
Latin American support of Cuba remained strong despite the growth of
democracy in the region. Latin American states did not agree with U.S. policy aimed at
undermining the government of Cuba, not because they were ardent supporters of Cuba's
brand of government, but because they viewed U.S. actions as a breach of Cuban
sovereignty. Due to the power asymmetry of the U.S during the 1980s. and a
demonstrated willingness to use it. security cooperation showed little improvement. The
hegemony of the U.S. began to resemble less of a consensual relationship, that is
suggested by hegemonic stability theory, and inched closer to that of a purely unipolar
system, in which power was the primary determinant of state interaction.
The broad base of support for Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
War was another indicator of the schism between U.S. and Latin American security
interests. Despite the fact that Argentina used force to take and occupy a disputed
territory, even as an aggressor since the residents preferred U.K. citizenship, OAS
member states felt compelled to ally with the Galtieri regime. Latin American concerns
about their own weakness compared to the U.S., and therefore incursions on their
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sovereignty, were so great that became the over-riding determinant of their foreign
policies.
Burgeoning nationalism and the quest to reduce dependency on U.S. suppliers
drove the state funding of Argentine and Brazilian arms industry. Despite the
considerable strain placed on the Brazilian economy, a high level of effort continued until
the end of the 1980s. Argentina and Brazil demanded the relaxation of U.S. laws
prohibiting the technology transfer of rocket technology while failing to address genuine
U.S. concerns about weapons proliferation. The prevailing claim from some Latin
American leaders was that the U.S. wanted to keep Latin American states as customers of
U.S. arms, and as a consequence to maintain Latin American indebtedness, when in
reality most U.S. military equipment in the past had been given to many Latin American
states in terms of aid packages that did not produce debt upon purchase.'8 The other
common Latin American argument was that the U.S. only gave its outdated equipment to
the militaries of regional states to keep these states at an inferior level of preparedness,
and therefore dependent on the U.S. The development of domestic arms industries in
several Latin American states during the 1980s was an attempt to circumvent such a
strategy. However. Conca explains that in their search for autonomy from U.S.
hegemony, Brazil conversely created domestic insecurity by increasing its economic
burden through subsidizing defense related industries.59

58For example, the U.S. transferred many arms factories to Brazil under lend
lease. Ken Conca, Manufacturing Insecurity: The Rise and Fall o f Brazil's M ilitary Industrial Complex (Boulder: Lynn Rienner. 1997), 31.
59Ibid.
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The overabundance of U.S. power during the 1980s, magnified by the increased
level of U.S. unilateral policies, gave the impression that the U.S. was more of a security
threat to Latin American states than outside powers such as the Soviet Union. The U.S.
found that when it acted outside of the security agreements established through the
hegemonic relationship, it achieved short-term goals at the expense of diminished trust.
The diminished trust between the U.S. and Latin America created obstacles to achieving
meaningful long-term security cooperation. These obstacles manifested themselves in
policy disagreements related to the topics of Cuba, democracy, human rights,
intervention, and arms control. The inability of Latin American and U.S. leaders to
mitigate their differences worked to destabilize regional security, countermanding the
benefits of the hegemonic system.
Although the 1980s was a step backwards in efforts to solidify regional security
cooperation, the era still witnessed the diffusion of the values of the hegemon in the form
of market economics and democratic political values. The trend laid the foundation for
the solidification of democratic and market reforms in the 1990s, which will be described
in the next chapter. The 1990s witnessed the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.
leading hopeful observers to assume a golden age in inter-American affairs was just over
the horizon. However, their assumption was that the Cold War had been the primary
impediment to regional security cooperation as opposed to power asymmetry. The
primary inhibitor of security cooperation, power asymmetry, was not significantly
alleviated therefore little progress was made. New security issues include; the growing
problem of the drug trade: protection of bio-diversity and the environment; Colombian
instability and resulting migration of citizens to neighboring states, and issues associated
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with regional trade negotiations. Although these issues are not directly related to the
Cold War. they still hinder regional security cooperation. Chapter seven explores the
lack of significant progress in light of the power asymmetry dynamic.
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CHAPTER VH
AN ERA OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES (1990-2001)

The decade of the 1990s potentially ushered in a new era for inter-American
relations. The end of the Cold War alleviated the growing division between the U.S. and
Latin America on the issue of state sovereignty, however other issues emerged to test
regional security cooperation. These issues included border conflicts, the drug trade and
environmental protection. Latin American leaders had good reason to hope that the U.S
would systematically address the economic and social development that they believed
should be the focus of the public goods that the hegemon should provide.
This chapter will review regional post-Cold War security issues, including:
competition among trade regimes and their security implications, the drug trade, regional
relations with Cuba, the border war between Peru and Ecuador, and regional reaction to
any U.S. action involving military solutions. Gauging bilateral and multilateral
interaction of regional states coalescing around these issues will help determine the level
of security cooperation.
The analysis of chapter seven is based on the assumption that regional consensus
has a greater chance of emerging since the U.S. spent less on defense during the 1990s
and that affects the overall power asymmetry comparison. Therefore, security
cooperation should have increased marginally with the slight decrease in the extreme
power asymmetry that persisted since the 1960s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

193

REGIONAL HEGEMONY
The U.S. continued to outpace the GNP performance of leading Latin American
states from 1990-1999, as demonstrated in Table 13. suggesting that there was no
reduction in U.S. hegemony during this period.

Latin America as an aggregate kept

pace with U.S. growth. The U.S. economy grew twenty-four percent from 1990 to 1999:
by comparison Latin America also grew by an equal amount during the 1990s. The two
largest economies in the region also grew at similar rates, Brazilian GNP increasing
seventeen percent and Mexican GNP more closely matching the U.S. with a twenty-five
percent increase in total GNP.

The import/export dependency of Argentina. Brazil and

Venezuela on the U.S. remained relatively unchanged (Table 14). By contrast Mexican

Table 13. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP. 1990-1999
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Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1990-1999 (Washington D.C., ACDA, 2001), http://www.state.gOv/t/
vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/99_00, August 10,2002. The Y-axis is in terms of $US million, in
constant 1999 dollars.
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imports and exports to the U.S. substantially increased during the early 1990s,
undoubtedly due to the effects of the culmination of the NAFTA treaty in 1994.

Table 14. Import/Exports to U.S. (As Percentage of Total World Trade)

A rgentina

B razil

M exico

V enezuela

1992

1993

1994

10.4

11.0

9.1

11.1

21.5

18.0

21.2

22.6

23.1

24.6

24.6

20.2

19.1

20.7

19.0

20.7

20.9

19.8

23.3

24.5

23.6

24.3

60.4

60.4

70

69.3

69.5

68.7

78.4

80.4

66.6

66.6

70.4

66.1

64.8

62.8

68.2

70.6

46.8

50.0

40.3

43.2

1980

1985

1987

1989

1990

Export

8.9

12.2

14.6

12.4

13.8

Import

22.6

18.2

16.5

21.2

Export

17.4

27.1

27.9

Import

18.6

19.7

Export

63.2

Im port

65.6

Export

27.8

Import

48.2

1991

46.0

57.2

51.6

51-5

52.3

48.2

47.5

44.6

44.6

46.4

47.5

48.3

Source: James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. 691.

The defense expenditure of the U.S. continued to be much higher than Latin
America's, as demonstrated in Table 15. Argentina and Venezuela’s defense expenditure
declined during this period, while Brazil and Mexico’s rose. Despite the increase in two
o f four countries U.S. expenditure still dwarfed the region. In this time frame the U.S.
spent the least amount of money in 1996. $271 billion. The total of all four countries
reaches $21.5 billion, or only 12.6 percent of the U.S. total. Despite the anemic
comparison, the Latin American total increased from the last decade, which was only
three percent of the expenditure of the U.S. during a given year. The decrease in the
comparison can be related to the U.S. post-CoId War draw-down that continued until the
end of the decade, and the improvement in Mexico’s and Brazil’s economies allowing for
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military upgrades. This may lead one to conclude that although power asymmetry
remained, the gap shrunk in terms o f overall military expenditure.

Table 15. Annual Military Expenditure, 1990-1997

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

Argentina

Brazil

Mexico

U.S.

3,350
2.730
4,470
4,230
4,730
4,620
4,490
3,700

9,560
7,530
6,640
8,450
8,010
11,200
13,800
14,100

1,330
1,510
1,720
1,940
2,440
2,160
2,100
4,290

306,000
280,000
305,000
298,000
288,000
279,000
271.000
276,000

Venezuela
1,220
2,520
1,870
1310
1,190
1,440
1,050
1,860

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers1990-1997 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 2000), 56, 57, 62, 70. Numbers in
$ millions, current 1998 dollars.

THE REALIGNMENT OF INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAS
The growing convergence o f NAFTA members, and conversely, the growing
division o f interests between the U.S. and Mercosur, is a reflection o f regional security
cooperation. Both trends coincided with the end o f the Cold War and marked a
significant departure from the historical regional norm. Although other sub-regional
groupings exist, including the Andean Group, the Caribbean Community and Common
Market (CARICOM) and the Central American Common Market,' the primary goal o f
the states in these groups was to strengthen their economies and financial institutions for

1Peru, Chile and Mexico are also members.
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the rigors of the global economy, and then they would be positioned to enter into larger
trade schemes such as the proposed FTAA. Although Brazil stated that the creation of
Mercosur was for similar reasons, Brazil's actions during the 1990s seem to prove their
ambitions were different. Many analysts familiar with regional politics believe Brazil
was actively pursuing a sphere of influence in South America and viewed U.S.
hemispheric dominance as an impediment to this goal. If such a strategy formed the
nexus of Brazilian strategy for entering Mercosur, then this could prove to be a
problematic issue for the traditional hegemonic structure of the region.
The 1994 implementation of the NAFTA drastically altered the tone of relations
between Mexico and the U.S. The core of the treaty began in 1987 when Mexico and the
U.S. signed a bilateral agreement concerning trade and investment. In the 1990s,
Presidents Bush and Salinas announced their support for negotiations of a free trade
agreement, and by 1991 Canada joined the talks. After a contentious debate in the
Congress of the U.S.. the treaty was signed on January I. 1994.
The NAFTA Treaty had far-reaching consequences beyond bilateral trade. With
the end of the Cold War the U.S. began to pay attention to the impact of Mexico's
economic and political instability, particularly to the issues of illegal migration and the
drug trade.2 During the Reagan Administration Mexico was crippled by a severe
economic crisis. Washington’s remarkable and costly bailout of Mexico awakened the

2Adolfo Aguilar Zinser. “Is there and Alternative? The Political Constraints on
NAFTA,” in Mexico and NAFTA: Who Will Benefit?, eds. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Nikki
Craske and Monica Serrano (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 126.
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Reagan-Bush Administrations to the threat that Mexican instability posed to the U.S.3
Despite an overwhelming victory against Iraq in the Gulf War, the experience imbued
U.S. leaders with the sense that the Gulf region would be highly unstable in the
foreseeable future. Gulf War instability reminded U.S. leaders of the importance of
Mexican and Venezuelan oil to the vitality of the U.S. economy. The leadership of the
U.S. was increasingly forced to realize the growing interdependence of Mexico and the
U.S., and this realization kept U.S. leaders on course to negotiate and sign the NAFTA
treaty. Further, U.S. leaders became more sensitive to the rise of trade blocs in Europe
and Asia.4 Under pressure from global concerns and bilateral issues with Mexico, the
U.S. was able to pass NAFTA despite its domestic opposition.
The Mexican crisis of 1982 also had a sobering impact on Mexican officials as
well. President Miguel de la Madrid was able to stabilize the Mexican economy through
huge cutbacks in the public sector and opened the Mexican economy to foreign
investment and trade. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari continued Madrid’s policies.
Salinas worked to improve relations with the U.S.. understanding that the key to

3Portillo borrowed heavily against Mexican oil reserves and spent lavishly. When
the market collapsed in the early 80s, so did the Mexican economy. In August of 1982
the Mexican finance minister informed Washington that his country was close to
defaulting on $80 billion in foreign debt, a scenario that would have repercussions on the
global economy. The U.S. quickly intervened by: purchasing a large amount of Mexican
oil in advance, establishing treasury and federal reserve lines of support, restructure
commercial debt, negotiate emergency measures with the International Monetary Fund,
and arranging for credits for the import of grains. See. Clint E. Smith, Inevitable
Partnership: Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2000), 6263.
■*E.V.K. FitzGerald, ‘Trade. Investment and NAFTA: The Economics of
Neighborhood,” in The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda. eds. Victor
Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), 101.
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improving Mexico's economy was to draw from the strength of the U.S. to the North.
After signing several bilateral agreements with the U.S.. Salinas proposed a free trade
area with the U.S. in 1990 for two distinct reasons, to encourage foreign investor
confidence, and because its overtures to Japan and Europe went largely unheeded.5
For the first half of the century Brazil had a policy of near autonomous alignment
with U.S. interests. Growing Brazilian nationalism contributed to the deterioration of the
relationship, culminating in U.S. support of the overthrow of President Joao Goulart.
Under military rule bilateral relations eventually worsened. In the mid-1970s Brazil
signaled the official end to the "special relationship” by breaking military ties to the U.S.
and charting an independent course. During the Carter Administration the issues of
human rights and non-nuclear proliferation became constant topics, driving Brazil farther
way from Washington, and in the process, limiting Washington's influence over Brazil.
Unencumbered by its ties to the U.S.. Brasilia was free to concentrate on achieving the
latent national ambition of Grandeza, or greatness, it traditionally sought since the
1800s.° The Brazilian feeling of entitlement to control the continent of South America
stems from its large size,* its location on the continent of South America, with borders on
all countries except for Chile and Ecuador, its population which is larger than the rest of

5Clint E. Smith, 72.
^Philip Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics o f South America
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997), 54, 178.
7Brazil's land area is almost the same as the land are of the U.S., 8,456,510 as
compared to 9,158.960. CIA World Factbook (Washington. D.C. :Govemment Printing
Office, 2001), http://www.cia.gov/cia/pubtications/factbook/index.html, August 18,2002.
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South America combined and its abundant natural resources.* From the late 1970s,
onward Brasilia seemed to define its interests against the U.S. with more frequency.
The explicit logic for the creation of Mercosur was the same as other regional
trade groups in developing states. Member states wanted to create an internal market and
economies of scale so indigenous industries could survive the rigors of opening to the
global market. The official reason for the initiation of Mercosur was to develop the
markets of member countries to pave the way for broader regional integration. Brazil's
Mercosur partner countries were originally attracted to the idea of membership in the
FTAA as proposed by the first Bush Administration, a proposal based on the expansion
of NAFTA. Argentina and Chile immediately responded they wished to negotiate,
however, due to President Clinton's loss of fast-track negotiation authority, their calls for
inclusion had to be delayed.11 Argentina was pushed into Mercosur since its leaders were
searching for a vehicle to liberalize its economic structure, and was unable to negotiate an
economic agreement with Washington.10 The economies of Paraguay and Uruguay were

sThe typical Brazilian view on this issue can be explained by a poll taken in 1996
that asked the unusual question of respondents if they felt Brazil was making significant
progress towards becoming a great power. Fifty-seven percent of those polled replied
*ves'. “Glad to be Brazilian.” Latin American Weekly Report, 18 January 1996: 16.
Further to the point. Hollerman quoted an official of Itamarti. Brazil’s foreign ministry,
as stating: “Everybody in the Brazilian bureaucracy works in accordance with the
assumption of ’Manifest Destiny,’ although we don't use that expression.” Leon
Hollerman. Japan's Economic Strategy in Brazil (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
1988), 20.
9Sidney Weintraub, “U.S.-Latin Economic Relations.” Journal o f Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 61.
l0Lia Vails Pereira, 'Toward the Common Market o f the South: Mercosur's
Origins, Evolution and Challenges,” in Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets,
ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999), 9.
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already deeply integrated to its two large neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, and therefore
led them to join Mercosur as well.
One reason Brazil aggressively pursued Mercosur was to blunt growing American
influence and create a more prominent regional position for itself. In the 1990s, "Brazil
struck out on its own and reasserted that it was primus inter pares in South America.”11
Slowly, but surely. Brazil began to seek its aspiration of South American leadership by a
policy of annulling U.S. influence where it could, and cooperating when it must.
Mercosur gave Brazil a means to counter U.S.-led regional integration and offered an
alternative to other Latin American countries disenfranchised with U.S. hegemony.
Brazil began to actively seek economic diversification away from the U.S.
hegemony as early as the 1980s. Roett points out that Japanese commercial banks
provided substantial lending prior to the 1982 debt crisis.”1- Many Brazilian leaders did
not consider investments by the U.S. beneficial. For example, one observer noted that
when Brazilians spoke derisively of multi-national corporations (MNC). they were
speaking specifically about American MNCs.1’ Japanese diplomats and commercial
interests made a concerted effort to court Brazil. Their strategy was to utilize Brazil as a
source of raw materials, a specialization that was viewed as complimentary to Japan's
expertise in manufacturing. To this end. Japan supported projects in Brazil, such as the

"Riordan Roett. "U.S. Policy Toward Mercosur: From Miami to Santiago,” in
Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers
Inc., 1999), 114.
l2Roirdan Roett. "Brazil and Japan: Potential Versus Reality.” in Japan and Latin
America in the New Global Order, eds. Susan Kaufman Purcell and Robert M.
Immerman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 101.
l3Hollerman, 73.
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Carajas dam project and research into growing crops in the dry gerrado in the Northeast
of Brazil, that would in turn reap dividends by supplying Japan with natural resources.14
However, the nature of their complementary relationship had its limits. Brazil
wanted the benefits of Japanese technology so it could begin to produce value-added
manufactured goods and jump-start the creation of a technology sector. The fact that
Japan was not interested in technology transfer to Brazil diminished Brazilian interest in
pursuing the Japanese alternative to U.S. hegemony. One Brazilian official noted in
regard to the Brazilian-Japanese relationship, the employment effects of selling natural
resources was very small and the technology transfer expected by Brazil was not
materializing.1' In essence, it seemed Japan was turning Brazil into a client state that
would limit Brazil’s ability to transform its economy from supplying raw materials to
developed states to producing assembled goods. Because Brazilians looked to Japan to
escape a similar relationship with the U.S., Brazilian leaders diagnosed the pursuit of
Japan as an alternative to U.S. hegemony as an unfruitful policy initiative.
During the late 1990s Argentina and Brazil actively pursued a trade agreement
with the EU in another attempt to diversify Mercosur trading partners away from U.S.

I4Ibid.. pp. 20-21. Hollerman points out that Japan’s investments are aimed at
reducing its dependence on the U.S., and thus undermining the products where the U.S.
has a comparative advantage with Japan: “By its assistance in the construction of
infrastructure and heavy and chemical industries in Brazil. Japan is strengthening Brazil’s
competitive power in the low-and middle-technology industries that will seek markets in
the U.S. and in third areas where the U.S. is fighting to maintain its market share. The
Brazilian case is thus a model of Japanese strategy in challenging the U.S. through the
aspirations o f others”, 17.
l5The official gave the example of Japanese efforts to develop the gerrado. He
stated that whatever results Japan obtained were not being given to Brazil, only used by
Japanese industries to export to Africa. Hollerman, 77-78.
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influence.16 The goals of the EU were similar to those of Mercosur. The EU was alarmed
as Mexican trade was diverted to the U.S. with the advent of NAFTA, increasing from
60.4 of Mexico's percent of total trade in 1987 to 80.4 by 1994. The EU realized that if
the U.S. successfully completed a comprehensive trade agreement with Latin America it
could reduce European competitiveness in Latin American and U.S. markets.
Confirming their suspicions, during the same time period Mexico's trade with the EU
decreased from 18.2 to .4 percent of its total trade.1* The EU was seeking export markets
to strengthen its global position and was concerned about the enactment of a hemispheric
free-trade agreement, and thought the FTAA proposal could result in trade diversion,
threatening its economic growth.18
The chances of Brazilian success in reducing the U.S. profile in South America
were dependent on U.S. actions during the Bush Administration. The Clinton
Administration hoped to negotiate the expansion of NAFTA but was unable to do so
because of the loss of fast-track authority. The resulting lack of regional leadership left a

l6Presidents Fernando de la Rua of Argentina and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of
Brazil urged a formal European Union-Mercosur pact before the year 2005, an agreement
which would seek to augment commercial ties between the EU and Southern Cone
countries. “EU-Mercosur Trade Critical.” Buenos Aires Herald. 28 October 2000.
1 James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, 691-693.
I8Grabendorf notes that: “The EU. like Mercosur, has independently complained
at various times about the unilateral position of the U.S. and its capacity to gain the upper
hand in many international negotiations. See Wolf Grabendorf, “Mercosur and the
European Union: From Cooperation to Alliance,” in Mercosur: Regional Integration.
World Markets, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 108.
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power vacuum that Itamarati, the Brazilian foreign ministry, was eager to fill.w Despite
Brazil's efforts, its exports trade with Japan, the EU and the US had not significantly
been altered. Total exports, which is frequently used internally as Brazil's most
important indicator of economic success, increased by only .6 % from 1980 to 1994 to
Japan, .1% with the EU and 1.6 to the U.S (see Table 16). With the fall of the Japanese
economy, which the Euro currency, Brazil's trade diversion strategy had little success.
Brazilian ambitions took another blow when its primary Mercosur partner, Argentina,
endured an economic collapse in 2001 and is now headed into its tenth year of economic
stagnation.^ Despite regional attempts to circumvent U.S. hegemony, these efforts
enjoyed little success.
The position of Argentina on the FTAA was less clearly defined than the
Brazilian position. Although Argentina was a core state of Mercosur, it also expressed a
desire to join NAFTA, or the FTAA as a NAFTA follow-on. When Chile began to lobby
for NAFTA membership early in the Clinton Administration: the Argentine government
expressed a similar interest.:i Argentina's dual policy, being both pro-Mercosur and

I9Roett described Brazilian negotiating tactics during the FTAA conference of
1994 as designed to weaken the U.S. position and solidify Brazil's bid to be the regional
leader. See Roett, "U.S. Policy Towauxls Mercosur." 112-115.
20Japan's economic woes are succinctly described by, Stephanie Strom.
"Deflation Shackles Japan, Blocking Hope of Recovery,” New York Times, 12 March
2001, 3.
2lClaudia Dianni,, "Brazilian Officials Assess Argentina’s Support for Chile-US
Talks,” (text). Sao Paulo, O Estado de Sao Paulo (Internet Version-WWW) in
Portuguese (6 December 2000). FBIS Daily Report-Americasy 8 December 2000 (PrEx
7.10: FBIS-LAT-2000-1206). Available from World News Connection, February 19.
2001 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

204
NAFTA, concerned Brasilia, since their policy counted on Mercosur to give them
bargaining power vis-a-vis the U.S., EU and Asia.

Table 16. Brazilian Trade Trends (Exports as Percentage of Total World Trade)
1980

1985

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Japan
6.4

8.1

6.2

6.0

6.7

4.8

5.5
4.3

6.0

5.8

5.6

5.9

5.7

Exports

27.2

26.9

31.5

25.9

27.3

15.4

14.6

21.3

31.2
22.6

31.9

Imports
United States

22.7

24.9

Exports

17.4

27.1

24.6

20.2

19.1

20.7

19.0

Imports

18.6

19.7

19.8

23.3

24.5

23.6

24.3

Exports

6.1

Imports
European Union

n i

Source: Brazil was chosen as the representative for Mercosur trade as a whole since the
Brazilian economy dominates the organization and because the so the statistics can be
directly attributed to Brazil. Statistics taken from, James W. Wilkie. Eduardo Aleman
and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. 692.

Venezuela had emerged as an important economic power in Latin America due to
its large oil reserves. Under President Hugo Chavez. Venezuela generally supported a
united Latin American front to counter U.S. hegemony. Chavez had denounced current
multi-lateral security approaches to hemispheric relations as antiquated, claiming they
supported the unilateral approach of the U.S. Chavez had circulated a document to other
Latin American states suggesting that they should cooperate on creating a new security
agenda. The strongly worded document stated, "The United States* predominant military
power has been clear since [the Monroe Doctrine], through the use of an imperialist
foreign policy of territorial expansion, military conquest, and construction o f an
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American community based on its own [U.S.] concept.”- Chavez’s vociferous
opposition to the U.S. was noted by his conduct during the aftermath of a large mudslide
killing thousands of Venezuelans. Regardless of Venezuela’s need of disaster relief
assistance, he refused U.S. humanitarian aid that was already en-route. This action was
to demonstrate that any dependency on the U.S. would not be tolerated. Chavez opposed
the FTAA. since he had a well-documented resistance to U.S. leadership on most issues.

REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE DRUG TRADE
The current U.S. multi-billion dollar anti-narcotics policy began to take shape
when President Nixon first declared drugs a national threat at the end of the I960s.r'
President Reagan re-emphasized the effort when he issued the National Security Decision
Directive 221 in 1986 that declared drug trafficking a national threat. Aware of regional
sensitivities, three criteria were established that would allow U.S. military participation in
Latin American exigencies; host governments had to invite U.S. forces, the Department
of State or Drug Enforcement Agency had to coordinate U.S. efforts, and U.S. Forces
were only permitted to fill a logistics role.1-1 Under President Bush the war on drugs
began to take shape when the Department of Defense was given the task of detecting

~ Venezuela Suggests New Hemispheric Defense System.” (text). Caracas, El
National (Internet Version-WWW) in Spanish (11 November 2000). Translated by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 17 November
2000 (FBIS-LAT-2000-1 111). Available from World News Connection. February 19.
2001 .
"^Eva Bertram. Morris Blachman. Kenneth Sharpe and Peter Andreas, Drug War
Politics: The Price o f Denial (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 105.
_4Bruce M. Bagley, Myths o f Militarization (Corale Gables: University of Miami
North-South Center Press, 1991), 5.
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illegal narcotics entering the U.S., and integrate command and control of the services for
interdiction efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy was created under the
executive branch in 1989 with the mission: “...to establish policies, priorities, and
objectives for the Nation’s drug control program, the goals of which are to reduce illicit
drug use, manufacturing, and trafficking; drug-related crime and violence; and drugrelated health consequences.”' The U.S. regional military command. Southern
Command, inherited the bulk of the counter-drug mission performed by the military by
virtue of its geographic area of responsibility that included Central and South America, as
well as the Caribbean.
The drug certification process of the U.S. was central to its efforts to combat the
drug trade, and garnered a hostile reaction from Latin American states. The U.S. used
foreign aid to support Latin American efforts in various forms including; military,
economic, and law enforcement assistance. In order to continue to receive aid a regional
state had to pass through the annual drug certification process of the U.S. Latin
American states were forced to endure a unilateral U.S. process that required
recertification by a Senate majority vote on an annual basis. If the state failed to meet
U.S. criteria, then if was exempt from particular forms of U.S. aid. The certification
process was universally disliked in Latin America as it embodied unilateral measures the
U.S. imposed on other states, and was therefore viewed as infringing on Latin American
sovereignty.

^Office of National Drug Control Policy, Available at http//:www.white
housedrug policy.gov, August 11, 2001.
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There have been efforts to bridge the gap between U.S. policy and Latin
American objections to drug certification. President Vincente Fox of Mexico proposed a
plan that replaces the drug certification policy with greater bilateral cooperation with
regular contact between representatives of regional governments.26 Fox’s conciliatory
attitude seems to be unique. Other Latin American states believe the U.S. policy to be
hypocritical, frequently citing the fact that the U.S. is the largest consumer of narcotics in
the region. The same argument led former Mexican President Zedillo to announce that
the U.S. should have to undergo its own drug certification.2' Venezuela has also
vociferously denounced U.S. drug certification as a breach of its national sovereignty.2*
In 1997 the OAS General Assembly approved a resolution that was cosponsored
by fifteen members directed against the U.S. policy of drug certification.2'’ In response
the drug certification policy of the U.S.. the OAS introduced its own multilateral
certification process in 1998. The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism is embraced by
regional states and is being closely examined as an alternative by U.S. legislators. In an
effort to ameliorate tensions over the issue there were efforts to introduce legislation to

26James F. Smith, “Fox Hails Gains in Talks With Bush." New York Times.
February 12. 2001.
2/Bill Spencer. “Drug Certification,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 3. No. 24 (September
1998).
2S“VenezueIan Foreign Minister Rejects US Drug Certification Process." (text).
Madrid EFE in Spanish (2 March 2001). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 5 March 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBISLAT-2001-0302). Available from World News Connection. March 5, 2002.
29“OAS Details Resolution Against US Certification." (text). Paris, AFP in
Spanish (3 June 1997). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FB/S
Daily Report-Americas, 3 June 1997 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-97-154). Available from
World News Connection, March 5,2002.
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the U.S. Senate that would suspend the U.S. certification process for a number of years,
allowing time to review altemadves based on a multilateral process.30
Latin American leaders are also concerned about the implementation of Plan
Colombia, a billion dollar aid package given to Colombia to help in the control of illegal
narcotic trafficking. States that border Colombia are concerned about the lack of
multilateral consultation in the proposal. To control the drug trade, the Colombian
government will likely be forced to fight the guerilla insurgency that uses proceeds from
the drug trade to fund its activities. A civil war in Colombia has already raised
sovereignty issues due to forced migration from the state. Also, any U.S. involvement
raises the concern of U.S. military intervention in the border areas. Many bordering
states also believe that a dislocation of the drug industry in Colombia would force the
Colombian rebels to simply move their operations into their own territory.
Brazil has reservations about Plan Colombia directly linked to the state’s
insecurity regarding its own Northern frontier. As early as 1991 Brazil expressed
dissatisfaction with U.S. involvement in the drug war. some Brazilian government
officials believing the U.S. had the ulterior motive of wanting to occupy the Amazon to
protect it from environmental degradation or for its natural resources.31 The
implementation of Plan Colombia rekindled Brazilian concerns that its authority over
sovereign territory will come into question. To this point a political leader from the

30Tom Carter, “OAS Pushes Own Drugwar Approach,” Washington Times, 26
January 2001, 22.
jl Norton Godov, “Government Apprehensive Over U.S. Drug Role,” (text). Sao
Paulo Folha de Sao Paulo (20 May 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Latin America, 24 May 1991 (PrEx 7.10 FBISLAT-91-244; 34).
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Amazon region stated, “the real plan is to occupy the whole Amazon region, and not just
the Colombian area.”52 The specter of U.S. troops near the Brazilian border has
contributed to rising apprehensions over the possibility of U.S. military intervention. In
response Brazilian leaders created emergency plans to defend the area, one called the
Calha Norte and other known as the Amazon Region Protection System.5' Luis Inacio de
Silva, an influential labor leader in Brazil since the 1980s, and strong presidential
candidate, has announced his opposition to Plan Colombia. If he were elected President,
it is likely Brazil would stand firmly against U.S. military aid to Colombia.0
The controversy surrounding the System for Vigilance over the Amazon
(SIVAM) project provides an example of Brazilian suspicions of U.S. intentions in
Brazil’s northern frontier. The SIVAM system is intended as a surveillance system for
use in curbing the trafficking of illegal narcotics and can also be used to monitor
environmental degradation in the Amazon region.55 Many Brazilians, and in particular
the military, felt that the system could be used to threaten Brazil's sovereignty because a
U.S. company was awarded as the primary contractor to construct SIVAM. Although the
controversy continued for some time because of charges of bid-rigging and other

32Antonia Marcia Vale and Giselle Saporito, “Plan Colombia Rekindles Concerns
Over Amazon Sovereignty.” (text). Rio de Janeiro, Jom al do Brasil (Internet VersionWWW) in Portuguese (26 September 2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 9 September 2000, (PrEx 7.10: FBISLAT-2000-0926). Available from World News Connection. February 19, 2001.
33Ibid.
34Kenneth Maxwell, “A America Latina Joga A Toalha,” Folka de Sao Paulo
(April 7, 2002), 7.
35James Mintz, “Raytheon’s Amazon Deal Hits Snag,” International Herald
(November 27, 1995).
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corruption, the U.S. contractor was eventually awarded the contract and the controversy
has subsided.
Due to the threat of Plan Colombia to Brazilian sovereignty. Brazilian leaders
committed resources to autonomously defend its 1,650-kilometer long Amazon border in
order to fight the narco-trafficking.36 General Alberto Cardoso, chief of the Institutional
Security Cabinet, stated: “The Brazilian territory cannot be used as a base for standard
US military actions, nor as a sanctuary for guerrilla elements to flee to, nor a shelter for
drug traffickers and their laboratories.” There were rumors that Brazil was allowing the
U.S. to construct military bases in the Amazon to fight drug trafficking, Cardoso denied
that the Brazilian Government is going to authorize any U.S. use of its territory'.” Brazil
prefers a multilateral approach to the drug problem in order to minimize the impact of
U.S. hegemony.18 One example of Brasilia's preferred multilateral approach is the South

j6Defense Minister Geraldo Quintao stated that by the end of the year around
1.150 soldiers will form advanced platoons on the border with other countries. Marco
Antonio Martins. “The entire Brazilian border is to be occupied by the Army,” (text). Rio
de Janeiro Jomal do Brasil (Internet Version-WWW“) in Portuguese (7 March 2001).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 8
March 2001 (PrEx. 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001 -0307). Available from World News
Connection. February 16, 2002.
37Sonia Cameiro, “Brazil: Federal Police To Patrol Colombian Border,” (text).
Rio de Janeiro Jom al do Brasil in Portuguese. (31 August 2000). Translated by the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 01 September
2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2000-0831). Available from World News Connection,
February 16,2002.
38“South American Summit Creates Group To Fight Money Laundering,” (text).
Rio de Janeiro. Jom al do Brasil (Internet Version WWW) in Portuguese (5 September
2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily ReportAmericas, 6 September, 2000 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2000-0905). Available from World
News Connection. February 19,2001.
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American Financial Action Group that will coordinate anti-money laundering laws of
participating states to affect the profit of narco-traffickers.
Brazilian policies reflect a need to control U.S. hegemony, but do not promote a
specific proposal to deal with the Colombian crisis. Brazil’s reticence to address the
issue prompted historian Kenneth Maxwell to comment, “Brazil is the main ostrich,
which paradoxically searches for a leadership role in South America, but keeps its
distance from the most dangerous conflagration, and the most potentially divisive
conflict: Colombia.”” However, the unwillingness of Brazil to deal with the drug trade
on its northern frontier is partly due to its reluctance to regularly patrol this area.
Because it is a large territory covered by dense jungle the undersized Brazilian Army
would be pressed to maintain a regular presence.
The U.S. has met with objections from other regional states in its efforts to
combat the illegal narcotics trade, based on familiar concerns of U.S dominance. The
U.S. had agreed to withdraw its military in Panama by the year 2000. The U.S. prepared
to leave the Panama Canal to Panamanian authorities, as directed by the Torrijos-Carter
Treaties signed in 1977. Even as the U.S. prepared to withdraw its military forces from
Panama, the Panamanian Government tried to negotiate to allow U.S. forces to stav. The
w

•

talks were controversial among Panamanians, ending when President Mireva Moscoso
said that “never again would there be a US military presence in her c o u n t r y A n y

'^Maxwell. 9.
40Jorge Medina Vieras, “Moscoso Opposes Renewed US Presence,” (text).
Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish (24 January 2000). Translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 27 January 2000, (PrEx
7.10 FBIS-LAT-2000-0126). Available from World News Connection, July 8, 2001.
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continuation of a U.S. military presence was understood by the U.S. as a deal among
equals, whereas Panamanians only viewed a continued U.S. presence as denigrating the
ability of Panama to safeguard the canal and effectively fight drug trafficking. Prior to
Moscoso, President Ernesto Perez tried to broker an agreement that would place an
international center to fight drug trafficking and money laundering in the former U.S.
installations. The center was to be a joint Latin American effort called the Multilateral
Coordination Center to Fight Drug Trafficking. It was considered during the proceedings
of the OAS in 1996, but withdrawn due to domestic opposition in Panama.41
Other proposed and active U.S. bases are generating similar nationalist opposition
in Ecuador and Peru. A U.S. base was established in the Iquitos area of Peru, near the
border with Ecuador. Its purpose is to provide support to the Peruvian National Counter
narcotics Directorate that works to eradicate coca crops and to combat drug trafficking
activities. The residents are strongly opposed to the presence of U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agents and military personnel who will settle at that location.42 They have threatened
violent action against them. In Ecuador, a similar dynamics seem to be at work. A U.S.
base was established in Manta to monitor the flows of heroin and cocaine from the
Putumayo and Caqueta provinces of Colombia through the basing of advanced air-

4‘“President Repeats Offer To Set Up Antidrug Center," (text). Paris. AFP in
Spanish (2 July 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS
Daily Report-Americas. 5 July 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-96-129). Available from
World News Connection. July 8. 2001.
42 "Loreto Patriotic Front Gives Ultimatum to DEA. Southcom Members if Base
Built in Peru." (text). Mexico City, NOTIMEX in Spanish (01 March 2001). Translated
by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 2 March
2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001-0301). Available from World News Connection. July
8, 2001.
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warning aircraft and their tankers. Although the U.S. presence is supported by a large
part of the populace, strong doubts remain among congressmen who state that Ecuador
has “sold-out” and is becoming the “new Panama” of Latin America/3 Antagonists of the
American presence disliked the expansion of U.S. influence in Ecuador noting that the
state has already adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN REGIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS
Latin American nationalism has had a propensity to be strongly associated with
anti-U.S. sentiment since the end of World War II. Many Latin American observers
believed Latin American resistance to U.S. hegemony would be reduced with the end of
the Cold War. Certainly tensions have been reduced, but opposition to U.S. hegemony
has not completely dissipated. Certain U.S. actions during the 1990s soothed regional
concerns, such as the end of U.S. control of the Panama Canal, and the role of the U.S.
military in the Peru-Ecuador border conflict. Despite the assurance provided by these
examples, regional states still exhibited mistrust represented by the 1994 Haitian security
crisis, and continued support for the Cuban government.
Two incidents during the 1990s engendered security cooperation between Latin
American states and the U.S. by reducing traditional antagonisms concerning state
sovereignty. The first was the way in which the Peru-Ecuador conflict was resolved, and
the second dealt with the U.S. peacefully relinquishing control of the Panama Canal. The
U.S. did not take a unilateral approach when it intervened in the two hundred-year-old

43Anthony Faiola , “U.S. Base In Ecuador Stirs Debate,” Washington Post, 25
January, 2001, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214

border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Fifty years ago the dispute had been solved
through the vehicle of the Rio Protocol, the agreement including Argentina. Brazil. Chile,
and the U.S. as guarantors. Although the accord settled contentions on the large majority
of the border between Peru and Ecuador, the Condor Mountain and Cenepa River areas
had not been properly mapped before the treaty and therefore remained under dispute."
In 1995 Peru and Ecuador clashed over their interpretations of which state controlled the
Condor and Cenepa areas. The two sides endured hundreds and possibly thousands of
casualties.45
Ecuador approved the plan to let the guarantors of the Rio protocol mediate the
conflict. The complicity of Ecuadoran Government was likely due to the cost of war.
The border war incurred an estimated $7-510 million a day. with one report calculating
the total cost of the conflict at $250 million.4* Not only was the war blamed for a
decrease in foreign investment, but also an increase in inflation that had the combined

b e n ja m in Ortiz Brennan. “Strategic Importance of Condor Range Viewed,”
(text). Quito HOY in Spanish (19 November 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 16 January 1995. (PrEx 7.10: FBISLAT-95-025). Available from the World News Connection. March 5, 2002.
45CasuaIty estimates vary, see James Brooke, “Peru and Ecuador Halt Fighting
Along Border, Claiming Victory,” New York Times, 15 February 1995; and David Mares.
“Deterrence Bargaining in Ecuador and Peru's Enduring Rivalry: Designing Strategies
Around Military Weakness,” Security Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996-97): 91-123.
^ “Newspaper Reports $10 Million Spent Daily on Conflict,” (text). Quito, Voz
de los Andes in Spanish (7 February, 1995). Translated by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 7 February 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBISLAT-95-026). Available from World News Connection; January 23, 2002.
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effect of increasing Ecuador’s fiscal deficit.47 Whatever the reason, the U.S. seemed
prepared to act as an equal partner in unison with the Rio Treaty’s other guarantor states.
Both Ecuador and Peru agreed to seek a resolution through the Rio Protocol. The
resulting document signed by antagonists and guarantors was agreed upon in Brasilia in
February of 1995. Subsequent procedural meetings took place in Argentina and Chile.4*
The peaceful transition of the Panama Canal also helped ease Latin American
concerns about U.S. dominance. Panama had long been derisively considered the fiftyfirst state of the U.S. throughout the region. Therefore, many Latin American observers
interpreted the transition of the Panama Canal to Latin American control as the
conclusion of U.S. occupation. However, because the U.S. president did not attend the
transition ceremony, the U.S. failed to capitalize on the event. President Clinton,
concerned that the ceremony might project U.S. weakness as opposed to its willingness to
compromise, declined to participate in changeover ceremonies. Panamanian Foreign
Minister Jose Miguel Aleman stated that the absence of President Clinton and the U.S.
Secretary of State was indicative of the ’’lack of diplomatic courtesy” by the U.S.41'
Aleman bitterly pointed out that: “the Latin American countries and Panama are

47“Central Bank Chief Warns of Economic Fallout” (text). Paris AFP in Spanish
(27 February 1995). FBIS Daily Report-Americas. 18 November 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBISLAT-95-039). Available from World News Connection, January 23,2002.
■^David Scott Palmer, “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities.
Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping,” Journal o f Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 126-127.
49“Govemment Voices ‘Disappointment’ Over Clinton Absence,” (text). Mexico
City, NOTIMEX in Spanish (13 December 1999). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 14 December 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBISLAT-99-1213. Available from World News Connection, February 7, 2002.
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disappointed by the fact that the people heading the current U.S. administration are going
to miss a celebration where they might have shined.”50 Latin American leaders might
have viewed U.S. participation in the ceremony as a demonstration of U.S. resolve to
amicably negotiate settlements with less powerful Latin American states. Instead, the
U.S. was perceived as begrudgingly accepting its eviction from Panama. If the power
disparity were less between the U.S. and Latin American states the U.S. might have been
more responsive to the degree of importance that many Latin American states placed on
the occasion.
Latin American leaders demonstrated their continued mistrust of the U.S. by
hesitating to approve any intervention during the Haiti crisis in 1994. Many regional
states declined to support the humanitarian mission despite the obvious human suffering
and absence of legitimate state authority. The U.S. first opted to consult with the OAS.
which refused to support the U.S. led initiative. The U.S. then sought approval by the
UN, where the strength of Latin American opposition was overcome by support for the
U.S. position. The sequence of events underlies how the U.S. asymmetric power so
troubles the rest of the OAS membership that they refused to come to the aid of a
regional state in acute humanitarian need.
The question must be raised, if not Haiti during the 1994 crisis, then when will the
OAS approve an intervention and under what circumstances? Maingot points out that
although Latin American states pledged to support and defend democracy in the region
by signing the Santiago Declaration, they still valued state sovereignty above this

^ id .
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commitment.51 The explanation for this duality is that Latin American states are more
concerned about U.S. dominance than they are about supporting democratic norms.
Whether the U.S. offers a direct threat or not. Latin American distrusts the overwhelming
nature of U.S. power that has the potential to ruin their economy or destabilize their
government at the change of a single policy.
As discussed in earlier chapters the issue of Cuban sovereignty has undermined
Latin America and U.S. relation during most of the Cold War. One might expect these
differences to fade with the end of the Cold War, the theory being that the Soviet Union
used Cuba as one of many issues to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Latin America.
This has not been the case. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. are still a point of contention,
although states demonstrated a tendency to look beyond their differences with the U.S. on
the topic of Cuban sovereignty during the 1990s. Key regional states still defend the
government of Cuba since they believe if the U.S. intervenes in the affairs of any regional
state, such a precedent may allow the U.S. to do the same in any state in the region.
Most regional states support the idea of democratic change in Cuba, but also
admire Cuba for circumventing U.S. dominance. For this reason most Latin American
states disagree with Washington’s economic embargo and political stand against Cuba.
Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Jorge Castaneda, stated that the Fox
Administration would try to improve its financial, cultural exchange and trade ties with
Cuba and he added that U.S. policies were impediments to Cuban reform.52 President Fox

5lMaingot. 190-191.
52Ben Barber, “Mexico says it will try to improve ties to Cuba.” The Washington
Times, 18 February 2001,6.
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stated, “We do not agree with the blockade; we believe that Cuba’s solution must make it
move toward a market-oriented economy and democracy. It is a position different from
that of Washington.”51
Similarly, Brazilian leaders announced their support of Cuban sovereignty, and
therefore disagree with U.S. policy.51 However, a willingness to push the issue of
democratic change in Cuba denotes a degree of movement towards the U.S. position.
President Cardoso broke with Brazil's traditional neutrality on the Cuban government
when he announced his support for human rights and the establishment of democracy.
%

Cardoso's proclamation angered the Castro government and in retaliation Fidel Castro
shunned the visit of Brazil's foreign minister in 1998. excusing himself because of
illness. An observer in the foreign ministry carefully noted that despite Cardoso's
comments, the President was in no way suggesting he approved of the violation of
Cuba's sovereignty: “The president’s speech was not against the principle of not
interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. President Cardoso did not demand
that Castro call elections now. he only recalled Brazil’s commitment to a democratic
Cuba.”55

Bush Exchange Opinions on Cuban Issues,” (text). Mexico City
NOTIMEX in Spanish (16 February 2001). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information
ServiceSB IS Daily Report-Americas, 17 February 2001 (PrEx: 7.10: FBIS-LAT-20010217). Available from World News Connection, January 23, 2002.
5j **Fo x .

54Freita.
55Monica Yanakiew, “Brazil: Castro Ignores Brazilian Foreign Minister's Trip to
Cuba.” (text). Sao Paulo, Agenda Estado in Portuguese (30 May 1998). Translated by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas. I June 1998
(FBIS-LAT-98-152). Available from World News Connection. January 23,2002.
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However. Brazil and Cuba improved relations both economically and politically
during President Cardoso's tenure. The state-owned Brazilian oil-company, Petrobras, is
working with Cuba to begin drilling for oil off the Cuban coast, and Brazil is working
with Cuba to overhaul its antiquated sugar harvesting techniques. The willingness of
Brasilia to push democracy in Cuba is still limited, as Cardoso made a point to endorse
the end of U.S. sanctions against Cuba during a visit to Havana.
Argentina and Venezuela stand at opposite ends of the Cuban issue.
In 1997 President Menem regularly told domestic and international audiences he opposed
the Cuban government. Menem backed his position, framing an important question
concerning what he perceived as a double standard applied to regional efforts to
democratize:
“Cuba is a dictatorship where for the past 36 years human rights have not been
respected, there is political persecution, and prisons are full.... If we have been
so tough on Stroesner or Pinochet, who at least left their respective countries in
working condition, whv should we behave anv differentlv toward Fidel? Or are
there different standards for democracy? 56
*

The speech was indicative of improving relations between Washington and Argentina.
Although not all Latin American leaders fully agreed with the statement, the fact that a
leader of a major Latin American state said this in a public forum demonstrates that some
of the difficulties caused by U.S. hegemony in the previous forty years may have been
receding.

56IsabeI San Sebastian, “Menem Views Relations With Spain,” (text). Madrid,
ABC Language in Spanish (4 May 1997). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 4 May 1997 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT97-087). Available from World News Connection, February 19, 2001.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

220
President Hugo Chavez had a different approach to relations with Cuba. Chavez
strongly supports Cuba and condemned the U.S. economic embargo against it. Chavez
promised to provide Castro with half of Cuba’s petroleum needs, and in return Cuba
agreed to send doctors, trainers and industrial engineers to Venezuela. Chavez claimed
these actions were part of a broader policy to truncate U.S hegemonic aspirations.5'

CONCLUSION
The GNP totals demonstrate that extreme power asymmetry remained intact
during the 1990s, except for defense spending indicators that reflected a reduction in U.S.
spending during the Bush and Clinton Administrations. The end o f the Cold War
introduced a period of reduced U.S. spending, and conversely, an era of economic
success in Latin America leading to an increase in defense spending. Although enough
consistent data was presented to note these trends, total U.S. spending was still
significantly higher. It initially seemed that extreme power asymmetry remained
entrenched, but the slight deviation in military spending may have had a positive impact
in regional relations by lessening the extreme dominance of the U.S. This chapter
reviewed key security issues confronting the region in the post Cold-War order and
concluded that regional security relations were improved when compared to the prior
twenty years. It also concluded that the level of improvement could not be directly
correlated with the small decrease in extreme power asymmetry levels, so other
explanations for the improvement in security cooperation must be highlighted.

^Scott Wilson , “Chavez, Castro Sign Oil A ccord,” Washington Post, 31 October
31 2000, A-16.
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Table 17 summarizes four Latin American states general attitudes towards issues
pertinent to U.S. Latin American relations during the 1990s. Argentina's viewpoints
were most similar to those of the U.S. than other Latin American states, a trend that was
introduced with the end o f dictatorship in 1983, but gathered momentum during the
1990s. Whereas Brazil may worry about U.S. domination. Argentina seemed to use its
pro-U.S. policy as a fulcrum against Brazilian dominance. Argentina was supportive of
the U.S. Gulf War and actually sent military forces to aid the coalition effort. This action
brought a notably negative reaction from Brasilia. Brazilian leaders perceived

Table 17. Regional Issues Demonstrating Security Cooperation. 1990-2001
FTAA/NAFTA

U.S. Drug
Certification

Plan Colombia

U.S. Policy
Towards Cuba

Argentina

Positive

Unknown

Positive

Positive

Brazil

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Mexico

Positive

Negative

Neutral

Negative

Venezuela

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Argentina was currying favor with the U.S. at the expense of Brazilian-U.S. relations.
President Fernando de la Rua announced his support for Plan Colombia and both de la
Rua. and his predecessor Menem, made their dislike for Castro publicly known.
Argentina supported the OAS sponsored multilateral drug effort and did not approve the
highly unpopular U.S. drug certification policy. Argentina supports the expansion of
NAFTA, or the creation of the FTAA. Buenos Aires is not as concerned as Brasilia that
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it could become a U.S. dominated institution. Argentine leadership supported both
Mercosur and U.S. efforts to solicit support for the FTAA.
Brazilian leaders stated that they supported the FTAA. but they preferred an
agreement negotiated on their terms. Judging by recent policies it seems that Brazil seeks
to solidify itself as the regional leader through Mercosur, and diversify its domestic trade
and investment away from U.S. dominance, towards the EU and Asia. Brazilian leaders
believe these efforts will increase its bargaining position against the U.S.. and allow it to
enter an FTAA on more favorable terms.58
If Brazil's trade policies were the only signs of disagreement with the U.S. then
securing Brazilian cooperation on security issues would not be problematic. However.
Brazilian leaders voiced some disagreement over U.S. policy towards Cuba and stronger
disagreement with Plan Colombia, both touchstone issues showing a general inclination
against U.S. hegem ony.A lthough Brazil's stand on both issues was not nearly as clear
as Chavez's. Brazilian leaders expressed concern that Plan Colombia could lead to a
long-term U.S. military presence in the Amazon, and therefore they do not want to
support the U.S. interference with Cuban sovereignty, although it is not supportive of
Cuba's government.

58For more on this view. See Susan Kaufman Purcell, "The New U.S.-Brazil
Relationship,” in Brazil Under Cardoso, eds. Susan Kaufman Purcell and Riorden Roett
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 92-101.
59Castro asked Cardoso to become his advocate to the U.S. showing a certain
level of amity. See, Renata Giraldi and Sonia Cameiro, ““Fidel Castro Wants Cardoso to
Mediate End of US Embargo,” (text). Rio de Janeiro, Jom al do Brasil (Internet VersionWWW) in Portuguese (02 November 2000). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas, 17 November, 2000 (PrEx 7.10:
FBIS-LAT-2000-1102). Available from World News Connection, January 23.2002.
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Mexico and the U.S. continued to become closer on economic, political and social
issues, but more friendly relations did not inhibit Mexican leaders from adopting
positions opposite of Washington on some other areas. Recently, the Fox Administration
made it clear Mexico will remain friendly with Cuba. Mexico has chosen the role of
intermediary between Latin America and the U.S.. denouncing the unilateral drug
certification policy of the U.S. but constructively countering with the negotiation of a
bilateral accord.60 In its new role Mexico has warned Washington about how states
bordering Colombia are concerned about the secondary effects of Plan Colombia.61
Instead of maintaining the role of interpreter of U.S. actions to Latin America, it has
become the interpreter of Latin America to the U.S. There are promising signs that the
Bush and Fox Administrations are forging ahead on key issues that they were formerly
unable to compromise on. The interdependence reinforced by NAFTA infused a new
sense of urgency to Mexican-U.S. relations.
Venezuela was opposed to the U.S. in all key regional issues during the 1990s.
Venezuela had stated their opposition to a regional trade agreement with the U.S.
Venezuela, like most of the region, severely criticized the U.S. policy of unilateral drug
certification. Despite FARC incursions on the Venezuelan border and the influx of
Colombian migrants, Venezuelan leaders believe that the Colombian conflict is an

60F o x stated that Mexico would make compromises such as agreeing to
extradition in drug-related crimes. "Mexico, US Prepare Bilateral Fight Against Drugs,”
(text). Mexico City. Reforma.com WWW-Text in Spanish (18 February 2001).
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Americas.
20 February 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001-0219). Available from World News
Connection, February 19, 2001.

61Jane Perlez, "Mexico Warns Of Colombia Drug War Spillover,” New York
Times, 31 January 2001, 7.
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internal matter and does not support Plan Colombia. Since the election of Chavez.
Venezuela is Cuba's strongest proponent, offering Cuba petroleum on favorable terms
and frequently voicing support of the Cuban government.
The broader trends show that anti-American rhetoric has been substantially
moderated during the 1990s in Latin America. This trend is in part reflected by the
regional posture of Latin American leaders toward Cuba that has migrated from strong
anti-U.S. opinion to one of general disinterest. Since the spread of democracy and the
reduction of U.S. interventionist activity, democratic and pro-market administrations in
Latin America find it difficult to support the Cuban form of government. Mexico is the
most vivid example of the Latin American move away from Cuba. In the past. Mexico
was Cuba's most ardent supporter: but the Fox Administration has distanced itself from
that role."'
Latin American states no longer consider democracy and human rights as first
world issues being imposed on them, and the region has shunned *the third wav'-type
economic policies aimed at curbing U.S. hegemony. The regional discourse is no longer
focused on the dogmatic debates of the fiee-market versus import-substitution
government-led development, but only how far the free-market model is applied to
developing economies. U.S. leadership in the creation of the FTAA is widely accepted,
although the timetable for its implementation is still being debated between Brazil and
the U.S.
During the 1990s. U.S. military power declined by comparison to Latin American

6“Venezuela during the presidency o f Hugo Chavez is the lone exception to this
trend.
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states. The reduction in the overwhelming nature of U.S. hegemony had a positive
impact in regional security relations, although differences still remain between the region
and the U.S. One mitigating factor in U.S. hegemony seems to be the creation and
continued maintenance o f the NAFTA accord. Its general effect is to circumvent the
hegemonic relationship and place U.S .-Mexican relations on a different level than U.S.
relations with the rest of the region. Recent U.S .-Mexican cooperation under the Bush
and Fox Administrations is unprecedented, and seems likely to continue as both states are
forced to confront interdependence in a constructive manner.
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CHAPTER VH
FINAL ANALYSIS: COOPERATION UNDER POWER ASYMMETRY

The central purpose of this dissertation was to explore the obstacles to achieving
greater security cooperation between Latin America and the U.S. Hegemonic stability
theory was used as a tool to understand the historical interaction between regional states.
The use of hegemonic stability theory necessitated analysis at the structural level,
avoiding the more common state-level approaches normally applied to Latin AmericanU.S. relations. Hegemonic stability aptly described the relative peace between regional
states, but did not account for the undercurrent of non-cooperation exemplified by
varying degrees of Latin American distrust of U.S. hegemony. This weakness in
hegemonic stability theory prompted the question: Could varying levels of power
asymmetry in the hegemonic system explain some of the problems in security relations?
More to the point: Do higher levels of U.S. power asymmetry negatively impact U.S.Latin American security relations? The research question, how does power asymmetry
impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America?, provided a framework
to test the contention that higher levels of power asymmetry may negatively impact the
security cooperation generated by a hegemonic system.
The case study chapters demonstrate that the U.S .-Latin American security
relationship is aptly described by hegemonic stability theory. The historical analysis
suggests that the regional relationship is not a pure power relationship, nor it is likely that
Latin American states would have banded together to balance against the U.S., and form
a security-based alliance to deter U.S. unilateral actions. Instead, all functioning security
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alliances in the region include the U.S. as the senior partner. Hegemonic stability explains
why states have not formed a cohesive front against the U.S., because the hegemon
provides public goods to the weaker states in the form of stability. However, as the brief
review below will show, the strength of U.S. hegemony also created problems for
regional security cooperation.
The deleterious impact of extreme power asymmetry began to show several
decades after the U.S. Civil War. The U.S. status as the regional hegemon began to
emerge with the end of the Civil War. Latin American states were for the most part
receptive to the role of the U.S. because the U.S. showed a willingness to intervene when
Latin American states were threatened by European incursions. Regional incursions by
Spain and France during the Civil War were both turned back by the threat of U.S. force,
and a British threat against Venezuela several years later. Latin American states lauded
the exercise of U.S. power, as the U.S. seemed to become the regional broker of state
sovereignty.
However. Latin America soon grew to recognize their inability to influence U.S.
security policies, leading them to realize that the unilateral security guarantee by the U.S.
could be a double-edged sword. The Baltimore incident was a lesson to Chileans that the
U.S. was able to enforce its policies without what they deemed as proper attention to their
state sovereignty. The purpose of the first Pan-American Conference was to rectify the
tendency of the U.S. to set security policy for the hemisphere, a goal both sides of the Rio
Grande concurred with for different reasons. The U.S. wanted to reduce their regional
obligations as laid out in the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American states sought to curb U.S.
power. Although the first Pan American Conference and three follow-on events forged
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the Pan-American Union, little progress was made beyond the founding of the
organization because of lingering Latin American suspicions of U.S. dominance. As
regional historian Lloyd Meecham points out. “Yankeephobe intellectuals in Larin
America were becoming popular at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth century."1 Larin American leaders began to realize the limitations of
security arrangements under a hegemon that was comparatively too powerful. Security
agreements among disproportionate powers are difficult to maintain. What may be
cooperation can be interpreted as coercion, and the ability of the system to produce
visible public goods becomes increasingly complicated.
The Wilson Administration's interventionist policies against the Caribbean,
Central America and Mexico were negatively viewed in much of Latin America, and as a
result, hemispheric security relations languished. Wilson had a policy that justified
intervention against all non-democratic governments, a prescription viewed as moralistic
by the U.S.. but imperialistic by Latin Americans. With Argentina and Mexico at the
forefront of anti-U.S. sentiment, many Latin American leaders equated security
cooperation under Pan-Americanism as approval of U.S. expansionism. Latin American
states began to commit to a strategy to displace U.S. regional influence by positively
affecting trade flows with Europe, and thus reducing the hegemonic influence of the U.S.
Many Latin American leaders throughout the Cold War mimicked this strategy.
Interventionist U.S. policy subsided with the onset of the Great Depression.
Because the U.S. had neither the will nor the capacity to intervene, it seemed logical that
President Roosevelt's ‘Good-Neighbor Policy' was a natural outcome. Whether the

lMecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 34.
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origins of the policy were altruistic, or executed in self-interest, it resuscitated Latin
American-U.S. friendship. Improving relations cleared the way for security cooperation
in the form of an anti-intervention treaty signed at the seventh hemispheric summit in
1933. The depression reduced power asymmetry in the system, with the ultimate impact
of increasing trust among the U.S. and Latin American states. The positive atmosphere
fostered by a reduction of power asymmetry to more acceptable levels by weaker states in
the system greatly benefited U.S. efforts to successfully lobby regional states to support
the Allied cause during World War II.
After World War II the military and economic power of the U.S. reached an apex
unparalleled in world history. Post-World War II security cooperation began on a
positive note with the creation of institutions that had remained elusive under the prior
fifty years of Pan American meetings. The creation of these institutions belied the
strength of the post World War II hegemonic system. Several important treaties were
signed, including; the IADB in 1942. the Rio Treaty in 1947, and the OAS Charter and
Pact of Bogota in 1948. The Rio Treaty, in particular symbolized the growth of trust in
the hemisphere compared to regional relations twenty years earlier. It focused on
codifying security cooperation among regional states, a goal that the Pan American
Union could never achieve. During this period and into the early 1950s, Latin American
states regularly supported U.S. proposed security measures in the UN and OAS.
With the growth of U.S. power relative to other regional states, security
cooperation steadily deteriorated. The U.S. directed a series of overt and covert
operations aimed at overthrowing Latin American regimes in Cuba and Guatemala,
culminating in the widely condemned intervention of the Dominican Republic in 1965.
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The U.S. miscalculated the degree of Ladn American support in the Cuban-U.S. dispute.
Latin American states began to identify with Cuba, although most regional states did not
approve of Cuba's form of government. This duality can be explained by the ability of
Cuba to attain independence from U.S. influence. Cuba became a symbolic focal point
for U.S .-Latin American security relations. The more Latin American states thought the
U.S. was imposing its will, the stronger they seemed to support Cuban efforts to
circumvent U.S. hegemony. At an OAS meeting in the early 1960s, the U.S. was unable
to gamer support for its measure that condemned Cuban human rights abuses. Instead,
the U.S. settled for a measure vaguely aimed at Cuba denouncing communist principles.
Latin American leaders were becoming increasingly frustrated with the public
goods the U.S. provided to hemispheric states. Latin American states expected a great
deal of economic support from the U.S. in the post World War II era. They were
expecting something akin to the Marshall Plan rewarding regional states for their support
of the Allied cause during the war. They were disappointed by the lack of corporate
investment and monetary infusion, noticing the U.S. did far more to help its former
enemies. Japan and Germany, than hemispheric allies. As U.S. power grew Latin
American states expected to accrue some benefit. The U.S. raised regional expectations
when the Kennedy Administration initiated the Alliance for Progress, but the program did
not meet the level of economic support that Latin American states thought was necessary
to alleviate regional poverty.
A division over the kind of public goods offered by the U.S. began to become
pronounced during the 1960s. Both sides thought that the U.S. should provide stability,
but how that stability would be achieved was the central question. Latin American states
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thought the public goods required to achieve stability should be in the form of economic
and social support to relieve their intractable problems with poverty and education. The
U.S. thought it provided stability in terms of protection from Soviet intervention.
Regional arrangements began to emerge that excluded the U.S.. such as the Andean
Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and the Latin American
Economic System, as the U.S. was increasingly perceived as the security threat rather
than a security partner. The public goods equation was influenced by the more visible
role the U.S. played in regional security as power asymmetry remained a key feature of
the post World War II era. As the U.S. became more visible in the region because of its
strong hegemonic position, expectations on what the U.S. should, and should not. provide
increased.
Although the regional dominance of the U.S. did not subside during the 1970s. the
oil crisis, combined with Latin American economic growth early in the decade, gave the
short-term impression U.S. power was declining. Due to the defeat and social unrest
attributed to the Vietnam War. the U.S. public was inclined towards the support of an
isolationist foreign policy. Double-digit inflation and high unemployment rates brought
on by an oil crisis added to national pessimism and forced the Carter Administration to
become less interventionist in Latin America. The Carter Administration viewed U.S.
economic problems as the signs of a permanent decrease in U.S. power and believed the
U.S. must learn to act multilaterally to exist in such an environment.
In the same time frame Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico began the decade with
growing economies, bolstered by strong export earnings and domestic consumption.
However, hyperinflation from over-borrowing, and the impact of the global economic
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crisis, sent Latin American states into debt. These states began the decade with the
perception they were gaining vis-a-vis Washington, supported by statistics showing their
imports and export dependence on the U.S. to be shrinking, only to be frustrated by a
dramatic downturn leaving the national outlook cynical and embittered. Just as the U.S.
self-perception of declining fortunes made it more compliant on security issues towards
Latin America. Latin American self-perceptions of success, dashed by crushing
hyperinflation, made it less amenable to U.S. overtures. Despite the Carter
Administration's attempts to improve relations by trying to negotiate with Nicaraguan
revolutionaries, to increase contacts with Cuba, and to negotiate the end of the U.S.
occupation of the Panama Canal, inter-American security cooperation was barely
functioning.
Perhaps if Latin American economies had not experienced severe downturns that
crushed growing Latin American confidence. Carter's attempts to use multilateral forums
rather than unilateral action might have been viewed as constructive engagement by
regional states. However, the economic turmoil of the 1970s forced Latin American
states to look inward, too absorbed by domestic concerns to notice overtures from the
U.S. Washington's motivations stemmed from its own self-perception of declining
international status. Eras of economic or security crises seemed to have a different
impact on hegemonic powers and weaker states: whereas crises seemed to force Latin
American states to look inward, they made the U.S. search outward for regional allies to
shore up an eroding hegemonic position. The radicalizadon of Latin American policies
towards the U.S. was highlighted by the proliferation o f dependency theory that cast U.S.
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hegemony in a negative tight and regional flirtation with the Soviet Union as a means to
balance against the U.S.
During the 1980s the inability of Latin American states to balance U.S. military or
economic power led to greater insecurities. Whereas South American states usually
considered themselves ethnically and geographically separate from the Caribbean and
Central America, they now took stronger interests when the U.S intervened in any part of
Latin America. Despite the hemispheric growth of democracy, regional states
demonstrated outward sympathy to non-democratic regimes in Argentina, Cuba,
Grenada. Nicaragua, and Panama. Latin American states viewed U.S. interventions
against any regional state as a potential threat against themselves, and the U.S.
democratic justification as a cynical pretext.
Argentina and Brazil both embarked on aggressive campaigns to build indigenous
arms-manufacturing industries, aimed in part at their interstate rivalry, but also to gain
autonomy from the U.S. dominance. These expensive efforts continued despite economic
hardships, underlying the degree of concern these states viewed on U.S. dominance.
Complaints from the U.S. concentrated on Argentine and Brazilian attempts to sell
ballistic missile technology to Middle Eastern countries, and was vehemently rebuffed as
yet another attempt by the U.S. to interfere with state autonomy.
The 1990s marked an important event: the end of the Cold War, the decrease of
the perceived threat by the U.S., and its subsequent reduction in defense expenditure.
Since the defense expenditure of the U.S. dropped, so did the level of power asymmetry
in the region, and security cooperation increased. The decade after the Cold W ar resulted
in many regional states conforming to the hegemon by moving towards liberal economic
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and democratic reforms. Government representatives in Buenos Aires and Mexico City
tended to side more frequently with the U.S. on regional security issues. Economic
integration attributable to NAFTA generated good will between the Mexico and the U.S.
Issues such as cooperation against the illegal narcotics trade, illegal migration, and
commercial trade, were being positively addressed between national officials. The U.S.
and Argentina vastly improved relations, although Argentina's ongoing economic crisis
has placed a question mark on this trend continuing. The U.S. and Brazil still maintain
differences over the drug war but reached a compromise in the OAS on cooperation in
this arena, and recently the U.S. has pledged to fund a Brazilian sponsored plan to curb
drug use in the region. Because of Chavez's strong stands against several U.S. regional
policies, and Washington's unwillingness to engage Chavez. Venezuela and the U.S.
have not maintained productive relations.
This research shows that the lack of security cooperation between Latin America
and the U.S. described in the case study chapters reviewed above can be attributed to
extreme power asymmetry. Power asymmetry explains why security cooperation was
more difficult during certain periods, such as the early 1900s, and from roughly 1965 to
1994. Conversely, security cooperation increased during the post Civil War and postDepression periods, when the U.S. had not yet obtained regional dominance (Civil War),
and when the U.S. significantly reduced its regional presence (Depression). During
periods of reduced U.S. power asymmetry the U.S. intervened in regional states to a
lesser degree, and was more inclined to pursue multilateral as opposed to unilateral
policies.
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During times of extreme hegemony the U.S underutilized regional institutions
since it was tempted by its capability to unilaterally enforce its policies. For this reason
the OAS was disregarded as a vital instrument of regional security during most of Cold
War. The IADB, Rio Treaty, and OAS are the focus of regional multinational security
efforts. All were created before extreme power asymmetry negatively impacted the
hegemonic system.
Distrust related to extreme power asymmetry also explains the Latin American
tendency to search for alternatives to the U.S. during the I960-1980s period. During
times of extreme power asymmetry Latin American states tended to look to Europe.
Japan and the Soviet Union as a means to circumvent what they perceived as dominance.
The EU, Japan, and the Soviet Union all took their turns in courting individual Latin
American states from the 1960s to the 1980s. Many Latin American states turned to
regional alternatives also. Organizations such as the Andean Group and Mercosur were
in part created to reduce Latin American dependency on the U.S. Despite the negative
impact of power asymmetry, the research also shows that the majority of states
acknowledged the benefits of the hegemonic system at any given time. Because Latin
American states were not determined enough to undermine U.S. hegemony through
balancing against it. some level of advantage must have been perceived.
In the 1990s the Latin American preoccupation with sovereignty cooled although
power asymmetry remained relatively unchanged. Latin American defense of Cuba has
subsided except for the unique case of the Chavez regime in Venezuela. Regional
sensitivities still exist over the conduct of the drug war but the U.S. has established bases
in Ecuador and Curasao, and received cooperation from Peru. Bolivia and Colombia.
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The Brazilian approach had been to ignore the problem and oppose U.S. initiatives, but
even Brazilian sensitivity over the Amazon region in the North is giving way to
cooperation sponsored in the OAS and forced to some degree by the heightened conflict
in Colombia.
The increasing trust between the U.S. and Latin America during the 1990s is more
difficult to explain since U.S. economic power grew substantially during the period.
Several potential explanations exist for recent improvement in security relations. One is
that despite continued power asymmetry, growing globalization has forced the U.S. to
acknowledge Latin American interests. Competition from the EU encouraged the U.S. to
implement NAFTA. Because U.S. interests are more tightly aligned with Mexican
interests through NAFTA, the U.S. is consistently aware of Mexican domestic problems,
and maintains an open dialog with the Mexican government to maintain bilateral
stability. The growing U.S. energy dependency also makes regional stability more
important than in the past. The petroleum production of Mexico and Venezuela has
grown in importance, particularly due to the growing instabilities in the Persian Gulf
region. Finally, the growing strength of the EU as a competitor to U.S. global leadership
encourages the U.S. to increase its multilateral ties to Latin America and push for an
FTAA.
Locating the precise moments when extreme power asymmetry impacted security
cooperation is difficult because of the complex relationship between power asymmetry
and security cooperation as well as a lag-time between power changes and system
reaction. In this case study chapter 3 contains two examples of hegemony under
acceptable power asymmetry: after the U.S. Civil War until the end of the century and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

237
from the beginning of the depression until the end of World War II. Chapter 3 also has
one example of extreme power asymmetry, from the turn of the century until the
depression. Even with these obvious cases exact dates are difficult to identify because of
a lag-time between eras. For example, the true security benefits of beneficial levels of
power asymmetry produced after the depression did not appear until the early 1940s.
although the actions to create that cooperative behavior occurred fifteen to twenty years
earlier. Also, there was a notable change in Latin American opinion towards the U.S.
near the end of the nineteenth century, however the true lack of security cooperation was
demonstrated by the lack of security cooperation produced by the Pan American Union
and Latin American sensitivity towards U.S. interventionism during that era.
The connection between hegemony and security cooperation is complex, making
the task of isolating specific moments when extreme power asymmetry negatively
affected security relations difficult to identify in case study chapters 4 through 7. There
are points when extreme power asymmetry seems to be clearly defined. After World
War II Latin American states approved of U.S. interventions until 1965. when there was a
backlash against the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic. During this period the
negative impact of power asymmetry seemed to reach its height during the 1970s. In the
late 1970s U.S. power and unilateral policies declined: a similar pattern to U.S. policy
change due to the depression during the 1930s. However, strong Latin American distrust
remained, and generally rebuffed U.S. attempts to peacefully mediate the Nicaraguan
conflict.
Through the collection of empirical evidence the study identified several stress
points in regional security relations that were used to identify when weaker states became
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uncomfortable with power asymmetry. These stress points included an increase of Latin
American sensitivity towards sovereignty issues, an increase in Latin American efforts to
find alternatives to U.S. dependency, and an increase in U.S. unilateral action. When
U.S. power rose to unacceptable levels there was a notable increase in Latin American
sensitivity to any sovereignty issue. Latin American states were extraordinarily defensive
of U.S. policies against Cuba, not so much because they supported Cuban policies, but
because they sensed if they were complacent on the issue it was tantamount to approving
similar U.S. policies against other states in the region. As U.S. power rose to
unacceptable levels Latin American leaders began to increase their efforts to ameliorate
their security dependencies on the U.S. through internal or external economic and
security arrangements. Power asymmetry also resulted in an increase in U.S. unilateral
behavior. When U.S. power grew the temptation to act in its own interests without
regional consultation would grow. When power asymmetry was extreme Latin American
leaders demonstrated their mistrust of U.S. leadership by disapproving of any U.S.
intervention for humanitarian reasons or security concerns. Latin American opposition
increased the likelihood of U.S. unilateral action that resulted in the erosion of
multilateral institutions.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARSHIP
This study opens debate into a dimension of hegemonic stability theory not yet
explored and to this moment assumed. It suggests that hegemony can no longer be
thought of in one dimension: the level of power asymmetry in a given system must be
taken into consideration. The consequence of power asymmetry is to work against the
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stability created by the presence of the hegemonic system by creating mistrust among the
weaker states in the system against the hegemon. As the power of the hegemon grows, it
tends to rely increasingly on material incentives to spread its power since it is already
generating a surplus of this commodity. There were two important time periods in which
extreme power asymmetry happened. The first occurred during the last years of the
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, the second proceeding
World War II. After the increase in U.S. military and economic power, relative to Latin
America, interventions increased as well, one expression of the U.S.'s use of material
incentives. The question of the legitimacy of interventions is not the primary issue, but
the fact that they resulted in Latin American sensitivity to any expression of U.S. power
helped create distrust among regional states directed against the U.S. This distrust eroded
the positive impact of hegemony. This occurred by weakening the role of the hegemon in
supporting regional institutions, security or economic initiatives. Opposition to the U.S.
was symbolized by initial support for the Cuban revolution, sustained over the years
despite the spread of democratic norms that Cuban leadership had rejected. Further.
Latin American distrust led to the active search for an alternative to the hegemon, as
Latin American states turned toward Europe. Japan, and finally regional agreements
excluding the U.S.
The opposite is also verified by the study. When extreme power asymmetry is
alleviated, relations between the hegemon and weaker states generally improved. This
occurred because the exercise of material incentives of the hegemon was curtailed,
eventually reducing the level of distrust between the U.S. and Latin American states over
the course o f several years. After years of active intervention, the Depression led to
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Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The U.S. lacked the resources and therefore the will
to intervene in Central America and the Caribbean as it had during the previous twenty
years. As noted in chapter three, the Good Neighbor Policy was hailed in Latin America,
improving regional relations and setting the stage for a high level of cooperation during
World War II. The power of the U.S. was curtailed once again during the 1970s due to
economic crises, over-extension in Vietnam, and other domestic concerns. Regional
relations and security cooperation significantly dipped during this era, even as President
Jimmy Carter actively worked to improve ties by curbing arms exports, support
democracy, and reawaken a multilateral forum to solve regional security issues. This
result can be explained by decreasing Latin American power during the 1970s. occurring
in tandem with the decline of the U.S.
This study demonstrates that when hegemonic stability theory is applied,
hegemonic power should not be considered static. The power level of the hegemon is
likely to fluctuate over time, and this fluctuation affects the system. When a hegemon
accrues excessive power relative to the weaker states in the system, dynamics occur that
impede security cooperation despite the presence of public goods. The primary good of
the hegemonic system, in that it promotes stability and fosters the best possible
environment for the expansion of wealth that benefits all states in the system, can be
eroded by extreme power asymmetry.
This study also provides a systemic base from which to examine U.S.-Latin
American security relations, a perspective largely neglected in the literature dealing with
hemispheric relations. Literature concerning regional relations typically focuses on
state-level analysis, such as the enabling of democratic institutions or the spread of free-
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market principles to enable domestic growth. Another popular approach is to compare
the cultural differences of each side to determine which one requires renovation to
improve regional relations. The systemic view tells us that the spread of political,
economic and cultural structures is a result of the diffusion of the norms of the hegemon
through a socialization process, or as Ikenberry and Kupchan label it. alteration of
substantive beliefs. Since they are a result of the system, it may be more helpful to focus
on these phenomena from the structural view as opposed to state or unit levels.
Although this study utilizes the systemic level and maintains that such an analysis
has the potential to explain the majority of state behavior, it also recognizes that other
theories at the state level are useful in identifying contributing causal variables. The
systemic level is appropriate for examining international relations dynamics over large
periods of time, however state-level theories allow a researcher to examine particular
events in more depth than systems-Ievel analysis allows.
Individual studies of Latin American or U.S. culture may shed light on problems
in the inter-American dialog. Prominent works regarding state-level theory were
reviewed in Chapter 2. Huntington explains how the prominence of U.S. culture in Latin
America can create domestic resentment in Latin American states, and therefore harm
regional relations. Schoultz focuses on the superiority that U.S. citizens feel towards
Latin Americans, and how that attitude negatively impacts U.S. foreign policy. Wiarda
and Fukuyama focus on different views of Latin American and U.S. social structure to
explain the relative success of the U.S. compared to the challenges faced by most Latin
American states. Wiarda argues that U.S. policy makers should consider these
differences.
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Other state-level factors such as changes in domestic political and economic
institutions are frequently used to explain the improvement or decline in domestic
circumstances. Dominguez focuses on the regional transformation towards republican
democracy as a foundation for improving relations. Other authors focus on the efforts of
Latin American states changes their economic structure as a means to promote greater
stability and improve regional relations.
These state-level theories are capable of describing certain aspects of U.S .-Latin
American relations in depth, but do not provide an analysis broad enough to explain the
reoccurring patterns in U.S .-Latin American relations across time. The power asymmetry
argument explains why security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America has
occurred despite cultural differences, changes in types of government and economic
structure.
Detailed case studies of the time periods involving the sudden growth of U.S.
power, and sudden reduction would be helpful in determining how the hegemonic system
conformed to those circumstances. By studying these periods in isolation details may
emerge to further explain why security cooperation decreases and ways to ameliorate this
phenomena.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The U.S. must work to reduce the negative impact of power asymmetry, which
may improve the perception of Latin American leaders towards the U.S. One method to
accomplish this is by working harder to support a multilateral forum for Latin American
states to provide input into regional issues. Unilateral U.S. action must be avoided as
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much as possible, although leadership stipulates it must occur on occasions. Institutions
exist to enable U.S. consultation; these multilateral organizations should be given greater
importance in Washington's overall foreign policy. The pattern of reoccurring power
asymmetry among regional states is not likely to dissipate in the foreseeable future. The
U.S. can increase regional security cooperation and facilitate its ability to lead on key
security issues by at a minimum consulting with Latin American states, and when
possible including Latin American states in the solution as in the case of the PeruEcuador border conflict.
In order to reduce the negative impact of hegemonic leadership the U.S. must also
show tolerance for the Latin American states that disagree with Washington's policies.
The U.S. maintained a more moderate response to Venezuela and Cuba during the last ten
years. Despite the efforts of the U.S.. deep Latin American suspicions remain. For
example, although there is little evidence to charges against the U.S. that it planned to
overthrow Chavez with domestic opposition in 2002. many policy makers in Latin
America believe this has been the case. The U.S. will always find its credibility in
sovereignty issues to be very low. mostly due to power asymmetry. However, the U.S.
must demonstrate a willingness to engage its critics rather than give the appearance of
condescension, as it has done in some past cases.
If Latin American states truly want to influence the kind of public goods the U.S.
is willing to offer, it must seek to engage the U.S. in a NAFTA type arrangement. The
prognosis of the region-wide implementation of an FTAA is not promising. Argentina
was in line to negotiate its entry into a trade agreement with the U.S. behind Chile,
however Argentina became mired in financial crises during the last part of 2001 that
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endangered the Mercosur agreement, and will likely curtail its partnership in any other
similar agreement. The economic crisis of Argentina may affect the Brazilian position on
the FTAA. encouraging Brazil to push for a region-wide integration plan during the next
five to ten years. If the U.S. were to support a free-trade agenda, it is conceivable that
this action might create enough momentum to bring a recovered Argentina, and even
Brazil into an arrangement, with the rest of Latin America following suit. The continued
growth of the Mexican economy also will act as encouragement to other Latin American
states.
Cooperation seemed to marginally improve during the 1990s, but power
asymmetry may increase in light of the growing U.S. defense expenditures. The power
asymmetry argument dictates that a new undercurrent of distrust is likely to challenge
whatever progress has been made during the 1990s. This means it is likely another era of
strong hegemony may create security cooperation problems between the U.S. and Latin
America. The Colombian issue is one potential issue that will test regional relations.
Latin American hostility to extreme U.S. hegemony will continue to express itself around
sovereignty issues and lead to periodic quests to find alternatives to U.S. power in the
region. The best method for Latin American states to ameliorate the impact of extreme
power asymmetry is to successfully bind the U.S. to an FTAA scheme that creates a
mechanism that increases the likelihood the U.S. will pay attention to their agenda.
There are two positive indicators that show security cooperation, and therefore
regional stability, improved over periods when power asymmetry was more extreme.
First, U.S. leadership seems increasingly dedicated to engaging Latin American states on
a regular basis. This is motivated primarily by trade concerns, but also because there is
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an increasing recognition that unilateral policies tend to be counterproductive in the long
term. Second, the U.S. as the hegemon has been successful at socializing the system
since its norms are now widely accepted in Latin America. Democracy and free market
economies proliferated and continue to endure in Latin America as in no other time in
history. With democratic reforms and liberalization creating some degree of stability in
most Latin American states, the political discourse has moderated. The combination of
growing interdependence, and wide acceptance of common political and economic values
may be enough to block the negative impact of extreme power asymmetry.
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